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Roy Kristiansen
Member
Username: whh
Post Number: 32
Registered: 2-2004
| | Posted on Friday, November 12, 2004 - 10:54 pm: | 
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This is a question, not a challenge. :-)
Why do we take it that the Olympic's 37-second response time had anything to do with the Titanic in its unique predicament?
Fleet said both in America and in London that he noticed the Titanic had turned two points to port while he was *still on the phone* to the bridge. That conversation, even when one reads it aloud slowly, takes less than 10 seconds, suggesting the possibility that the wheel had been turned maybe 40-45 seconds *prior* to Fleet's taking notice.
I don't think Fleet was aware of any turning tests done with the Olympic when he testified in the US.
Would a *partial* turn of the wheel (i.e., not full over) have had any effect on the ship's visible response time? That is, would it have begun its turn quicker? It's been a long time since I've hung around ships.
Seems to me that, if we're going to apply the results of the Olympic's test, we would need to start counting the 37 seconds just *after* Moody replied "Thank you" to Fleet. And if those results conflict with what all the guys down below remembered (which they seem to), then perhaps something is wrong with our basic presumptions somewhere?...
Guys, I'd appreciate your input.
Roy |
Michael H. Standart
Moderator
Username: mstandart
Post Number: 10545
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Saturday, November 13, 2004 - 3:38 am: |
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My own input would be that if we're going to use the 37 second figure, it would behoove us to make sure that the underlying assumptions behind them are valid and this may well not be the case.
>>Would a *partial* turn of the wheel (i.e., not full over) have had any effect on the ship's visible response time? That is, would it have begun its turn quicker?<<
No quicker then if the rudder had been put hard over in my opinion. Less rudder angle equals a longer turn rate, not a shorter one.
Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
Equal Opportunity Curmudgeon
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Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 381
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Saturday, November 13, 2004 - 4:07 pm: |
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A few points of clarification here.
1. I believe Fleet said she started to turn before he got off the phone. The famous two points is amount turned at the time she struck the ice, not the time he got off the phone.
2. 37 seconds is time from receiving hard astarboard order for the ship to turn 2 points. When that order was given, assuming it was that, and the completion of the phone call from the cross nest are two different things. The order may well have ocurred prior to the lookout report, thus explaining why the ship appeared to have started to turn. In other words, Murdoch saw the berg about the same time as the lookouts and took action before the phone call completed. There is evidence that there was a small delay in answering the phone on the part of 6/O Moody who would be responsible for seeing the helm order carried out first.
3. The ship was also ordered to go to hard aport. Exactly when this order ocurred is an open question. Did it happen before she struck the ice or a few seconds afterward? Testimonies are not too reliable with regard to exact timing, or for that matter, the actual sequence of events themselves. The implications of this is tremendous in figuring out what exactly did happen.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Malcolm Wardlaw
Member
Username: malcolm
Post Number: 24
Registered: 6-2004
| | Posted on Friday, May 20, 2005 - 2:01 pm: |
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In Leslie Reade's book, he interviewed Fred Fleet. Fleet told him that he saw the iceberg but did not understand what it was, so took no action until it became clearer. Reade got the impression that Fleet had never grasped the significance of what he was saying. It may be that Fleet watched the iceberg for as long as a minute (Reade could not get a definite elapse of time from Fleet, but it definitely seemed that Fleet was talking about many seconds, not moments), probably anguishing over whether to sound the bell or not.
This does not seem to have been widely commented on. I can't give you a reference from the book, it was a library copy I was reading, but the interview was in a later chapter, covering the later lives of those concerned. Fleet's later life was sad; he eventually committed suicide.
One other point; the description of a two-point turn was surely just an estimate, it might have been three points, or one point. Reading the trial record, you get the impression that Hitchens made a casual estimate, but then felt obliged to appear more sure of himself when he was pressured by the counsel.
Besides, there seems to be quite strong arguments that the ship was not actually turning hard to port as she struck - her stern did not hit the iceberg/pack ice. Would it not have taken some seconds for such a large ship to steady up after a hard turn, before hitting? |
Michael H. Standart
Moderator
Username: mstandart
Post Number: 12018
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Friday, May 20, 2005 - 5:26 pm: |
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>>This does not seem to have been widely commented on...<<
I'm not sure why it would raise a lot of eyebrows. If Mr. Reade had in fact carried out this interview, it would have been several decades after the actual event so it's reliability would be a bit suspect.
>>Fleet told him that he saw the iceberg but did not understand what it was, so took no action until it became clearer.<<
If that's in fact true, then that doesn't reflect at that well on Fleet. It's not the lookouts job to understand what's in front of him. It's his job to report what's in front of him. They can at least evade now and ask questions later that way.
>>One other point; the description of a two-point turn was surely just an estimate, it might have been three points, or one point.<<
Probably, but it did come directly from the man who was at the helm at the time and who would of nesseccity had his eyes on the compass. It also seems fairly well corroberated. Whether or not any of these people were actually truthful about what they said is a whole 'nother smoke. For my own money, I think they were honest about what they saw and testified to even if not always verifiably accurate.
>>Would it not have taken some seconds for such a large ship to steady up after a hard turn, before hitting?<<
Yes it would. You're starting to see some of the light here, Grasshopper. The thing here is that among other factors, the ship's own inertia and mass are working against her, so it takes a few seconds for the rudder to actually become effective. Since it's a given that the stern recieved no damage, it's my beleif that they ported the helm just befor going onto the ice. I may be wrong on this, but if any of our more seasoned Big Ship drivers has some insights to offer on that, I'm open to being educated.
Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
Equal Opportunity Curmudgeon
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Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 540
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Friday, May 20, 2005 - 5:33 pm: |
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Fleet to Reade:
quote:I saw this black thing looming up; I didn’t know what it was. I asked Lee if he knew what it was. He couldn’t say. I thought I better ring the bell. I rang it three times.
How much time was spent before he rang the bell is speculative. He also said in the inquiries that he said to Lee "there is ice ahead" before ringing the bell. This makes sense since he reported "iceberg right ahead" to Moody on the phone. It obviously came close enough for him to finally realize what he was looking at. How long did that take? Your guess is as good as mine, but I'm assuming it was a matter of a few seconds, certainly not minutes.
The more interesting question is when did Murdoch first see the berg?
You are correct Malcolm in that the 2 points was not a precise value. Fleet said it was about 1 to 2 points. Hichens said about 2 points and he would have been looking at the steering compass during the collision. Anything in that range is probably close enough.
As far as turning characteristics, it all depends on when a shift in helm is ordered and the response of the rudder. Not to get into all the details here, my own analysis shows that a full rudder shift from 40° left to 40° right would take about 15 seconds, and that the ship would continue in its initial turn to port for about 20 seconds after the start of the helm shift before starting to swing the other way. It is the shift in rudder that would stop the hard turn to port. (see Fig. 16 in: http://web.nps.navy.mil/~me/tsse/TS4001/support/1-11-1.pdf)
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Roy Kristiansen
Member
Username: whh
Post Number: 242
Registered: 2-2004
| | Posted on Friday, May 20, 2005 - 9:29 pm: |
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Hi, Sam!
>>Your guess is as good as mine, but I'm assuming it was a matter of a few seconds, certainly not minutes.
What happens when you figure Olliver and Scarrott into the mix? Between the two of them, they point to a time gap of between 5 to 8 minutes between Fleet's bell and his phone call to Moody. They were in completely different parts of the ship, yet they received the same impression. Most people have tended to write their testimony off (individually) as having been "mistaken." But what if they weren't? Personally, I don't have a great deal of confidence in the testimony of *anyone* connected with the Titanic's bridge. We've been trying to make the traditional story "work" for 93 years now, and no matter how we slice it, or rationalize it, it refuses to work.
Roy |
Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 542
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Saturday, May 21, 2005 - 12:45 am: |
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It would be a very big mistake to write off the testimonies of those two witnesses. In fact Olliver's in particular I believe is key to understanding the actual timing of events. When the 3 bells were struck by Fleet, Olliver was on the standard compass platform finishing trimming the lamps. When he heard the 3 bells he looked up and not seeing anything, went forward onto the bridge. He arrived on the bridge just as the ship struck the ice. Allowing for walking the 230 feet and some reaction time, we are getting to about 50 seconds between the two events.
Scarrott said he was on the forecastle head when 3 bells were struck. He said he rushed down to tell his mate at the bottom of ladder that something must be going on when the ship struck. He then rushed up with everyone else and actually got to see the ship's stern slewing off the iceberg on their starboard quarter, which proves that the ship was under port helm at by that point in time. The confusion regarding Scarrott has to do with what time the three bells were struck. Scarrott maintained all along that he did not take much notice of the time, and was guessing that the bells came about 11:30. When pressed about the time between the 3 bells and the collision he said: "As I did not take much notice of the three strikes on the gong, I could hardly recollect the time; but I should think it was - well, we will say about five or eight minutes; it seemed to me about that time." Now to put this in proper perspective. At 11:30 7 bells were struck as was normal to do. And we know from an abundance of witnesses that the ship impacted with the ice at 11:40. To me what he remembered was the ship striking about 5 to 8 minutes after hearing bells rung. But which bells? Most likely this was the 7 bells that were struck at 11:30, not the 3 bells from the crow's nest that came within a minute of the collision. It is very easy to get confused when you aren't paying too much attention to matters such as time. It certainly doesn't take 5 to 8 minutes to rush down from the forecastle deck to E deck where his mate would have been. And 5 to 8 minutes is about 2 to 3 miles of steaming at 22.5 knots. A 70 foot berg 2 to 3 miles away would be about 1/4 to 1/3 of a degree in size, less than the diameter of a full moon, and with only the black sea as a background, no stars behind it. On a clear moonless night, the best you could hope for is seeing that kind of object within about 1/2 mile or less, a distance that Reginald Lee estimated for first sighting. (See also Leo Shubow, "Iceberg Dead Ahead!" Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1959.)
The real question is when did Murdoch order a hard-astarboard and when did he order hard-aport as witnessed by Olliver after coming onto the bridge? Fleet said he was on the phone for about a 1/2 minute (for a conversation of about 10 seconds). Hichens said it was about a 1/2 minute between 3 bells and Murdoch's hard-astarboard order. The numbers here do fit. What doesn't fit is the ship striking the berg at about the same time that Murdoch gives a hard-astarboard order. What doesn't fit is Boxhall hearing 3 bells while coming out of the officer's quarters and the ship striking the berg when he gets halfway to the bridge.
Cheers.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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David G. Brown
Member
Username: brown
Post Number: 1583
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Saturday, May 21, 2005 - 4:46 am: |
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Warning to traditionalists--this will be unpleasant.
Scarrott was specific that 5 to 8 minutes evolved between the lookouts' bell and the accident. He even mentioned that 7 bells had struck prior to the crow's nest bell.
Boxhall heard the warning bell as he came out of the officers quarters on his way to the compass platform where Olliver was already working on the lamps. Both men should have been on the platform to perform the compass check required every half hour by IMM/White Star regulations, paragraph 253.
"253. Steering and Compasses.-- He (the officer of the watch) must pay particular attention to the steering and the course the ship makes. He must steady the ship on her course by standard compass every half-hour, and must compare the compasses every Watch, the comparisons to be entered in Compass Comparison Book for reference. He will also ascertain the deviation as often as possible."
Under paragraph 253, a junior officer had to walk about 230 feet aft of the bridge and climb the standard compass platform every half hour, day or night, fair weather or foul. That's 8 trips per watch, or 48 trips a day. On Titanic, the only communications between the compass platform and the bridge was a one-way bell pull similar to the ones used for summoning stewards. The bell rang inside the wheelhouse.
Scarrott's 5 to 8 minutes between warning bell and impact is easily accounted for by Boxhall's 50 second walk/climb to the platform, the delay waiting for Olliver to complete working on the lamps, and a couple of minutes for the actual compass evolution, and then the 50 second walk back to the bridge.
Hichens was very specific in talking only about what took place before impact. His testimony stops there in terms of information. But, he was specific enough about the two point turn. This suggests that the ship steadied up on a new heading after being hard a-starboard.
And, the physics behind rudder-steered vessels confirm that Titanic must have been steadied up prior to impact. Had it been in a hard left (starboard helm in 1912) turn, the accident would have been quite different. The bow forward of hold #3 would likely have escaped damage while the berg would have bumped and scraped along the starboard side all the way aft.
Which means that while Hichens told the absolute truth about a "hard a-starboard" helm command, he did not tell all of the truth. He left out two critical words spoken by Murdoch. Those words were "two points." The command must have been, "Hard a-starboard two points" for the accident to have happened as it did. In a simple hard-over turn, the QM has no need to watch the compass as it spins. Hichens would have stood holding the wheel against the stop and waiting for a second order to center the helm. But, with a "two point" turn, Hichens would have been studying the compass and turning the wheel to "meet" the swing of the ship. He would have known...as he did...the amount of turn made by the ship.
Fleet and Lee both said the ship headed straight at the fatal berg, which was dark. This confirms a steady course. Why did they discuss what they were seeing? And, why was it necessary to use the telephone to make their second report?
The answer is that Titanic successfully avoided the berg for which the lookouts rang their warning bell. This berg was 2 to 3 miles distant when they made their report, so must have been a "bright" or "white" berg. Two to 3 miles was the distance the other mariners who testified at the BOT hearings thought a berg should be spotted.
The fatal berg was dark. Fleet and Lee had to discuss what they were seeing because the ship turned right toward it. They had no bell code for, "berg to port coming ahead." So, the phone became necessary.
Murdoch delayed making the turn to avoid the first "white" berg simply because Boxhall and Moody were performing the routine compass check. The turn to avoid the first berg was made at more-or-less the last moment, but the ship was then pointed at a second, dark and fatal berg.
The problem that allowed the accident was something known as "loss of situational awareness." It is now recognized as the single greatest human factor in transportation accidents. Of course, it was unrecognized in 1912. Titanic's bridge design prevented the necessary flow of information and communications required for effective bridge team management. This is a key part of my current article in Professional Mariner.
Two bergs? Damned right. It is a physical impossibility to make the accident work with a single berg in the manner the distorted traditional story recorded events. The way ships steer won't allow it. It is necessary to find an answer that accounts for the head-on approach, the "hard a-starboard" helm command, and the physical location of damage on the hull of the ship. The only set of circumstances which allows every witness to tell the truth...and the damage to be where the damage was...is a two-berg scenario.
Now, why was one berg white and the other dark? And, why were they in such close proximity? The answer is simple. They were once parts of the same larger piece of ice. The fatal berg had "calved" a short while before the accident and now presented its former underbelly to Titanic. The formerly submerged ice was still darker than the weathered ice of the upright first berg. The calving put the fatal piece only a couple hundred yards from the larger white piece.
Boxhall did hear bells, three times in fact, when he came back to the bridge. Murdoch operated the engine telegraph. He pulled it back for one ring, pushed it forward for a second ring, then pulled it back to Astern Full for the third ring.
Please note that the above two-berg theory is based on making everyone's testimony true. The old single berg concept makes Scarrott and Olliver liars. It requires Titanic to have maneuvered more like a school bus than a ship. And, it requires an iceberg to suddenly appear out of nowhere.
I submit that my 2-berg version is admittedly just speculation. However, the one-berg version made famous all these 9 decades is quite simply preposterous. It did not happen because it could not have happened.
-- David G. Brown
PS - Lest I be accused again of "revising" history, that is not my purpose or goal. It is not "revisionist" to demand an accurate retelling of events instead of slavish adherence to physical impossibilities. |
Steve Hall
Member
Username: ss400
Post Number: 203
Registered: 1-2002
| | Posted on Saturday, May 21, 2005 - 5:57 am: |
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I have been talking about there being two bergs for the last 7 years.
It is good to see someone else talking about it.
The way the ship turned - the point where the berg was sighted etc suggested to me years ago a two berg scenario.
It was the only way the whole situation could have ended the way it did. |
Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 545
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Saturday, May 21, 2005 - 9:38 pm: |
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Dave, I am glad that you said that your version of what happened is just speculation. That it is. But a one-berg scenario is entirely possible, most likely, and is in fact very much physically possible. What is not possible is for the accident to have happened as traditionally accepted over 9 decades. That I absolutely agree with you on.
There are several points in your post that I would rather not debate publicly. But for any theory to have substance there needs to be some corroborative and supportive evidence, not just speculative.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Steve Hall
Member
Username: ss400
Post Number: 204
Registered: 1-2002
| | Posted on Sunday, May 22, 2005 - 3:44 am: |
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Samuel, you said "there are several points in your post that I would rather not debate publicly".
David has posted his speculative opinion, by taking the thread to private debate somewhat defeats the purpose of this message board.
If David is in your opinion in error for some reason on his idea, I would like to hear why.
If you gentlemen want to debate certain aspects privately that’s OK. But why post a message here saying you would “rather not debate publicly", why not post him privately in the first instance.
Samuel, I agree you need corroborative and supportive evidence. But where would you find it. David has done a pretty good job thus far. |
Michael H. Standart
Moderator
Username: mstandart
Post Number: 12026
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Sunday, May 22, 2005 - 5:58 am: |
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>>But why post a message here saying you would “rather not debate publicly", <<
In fairness, it may touch on areas of research that David and Samuel may not want...or be in a position to...make public at this time. A pity if this is the case as I'd like to hear what they both have to say as well.
Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
Equal Opportunity Curmudgeon
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Steve Hall
Member
Username: ss400
Post Number: 205
Registered: 1-2002
| | Posted on Sunday, May 22, 2005 - 6:54 am: |
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Perhaps Michael.
Now that I look back to when I was doing the conspiracy book – a chapter that had been left out of the book called ‘Fire & Ice’ devoted 25% of the chapter to the 2 iceberg theory.
Two bergs make everything work. Although I had mentioned it numerous times over the years (trying to prompt discussion), people just scoffed at the suggestion. In the end, I gave up trying to communicated the evidence to those blinkered by their own believe in the traditional version.
I would have just been interested in what they had to say because I researched the same idea 8 years ago.
So you can understand Michael - the idea of two icebergs is a 'been there done that' many years ago.
That's it for me - subject closed. |
Michael H. Standart
Moderator
Username: mstandart
Post Number: 12030
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Sunday, May 22, 2005 - 7:16 am: |
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>>So you can understand Michael - the idea of two icebergs is a 'been there done that' many years ago.<<
Maybe longer ago then that. I'll have to dig it up and reread it but I seem to recall that George Behe alluded to the possibility of three icebergs in Speed, Safety, and Sacrifice.
(George, if you're reading this, apologies offered if I didn't recall this correctly) Either way, I agree that the traditional version just doesn't work, and not just over the question of how many icebergs there were. I hope Dave and Sam can continue their discussion further right here.
Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
Equal Opportunity Curmudgeon
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Steve Hall
Member
Username: ss400
Post Number: 206
Registered: 1-2002
| | Posted on Sunday, May 22, 2005 - 8:25 am: |
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Let be a hypocrite for a minute (and post).
Indeed George did work on the multiple iceberg theory many years ago. Though David’s research is along the similar lines I took all those years ago, (2 bergs) mine differs slightly from his and George's..
Yes, the idea is not new – though it’s excellent to see him looking further into the scenario of multiple bergs. There is a lot more that could be done to see the theory develop beyond where it is today. If he takes the theory to the next level through meticulous research – I believe many will be absolutely surprised to see how the puzzle of what happened between 11.30pm & 11.45pm that night so easily fits together.
Good luck David. |
Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 547
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Sunday, May 22, 2005 - 8:09 pm: |
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Steve: My reaction was to Dave's comment:
quote:The only set of circumstances which allows every witness to tell the truth...and the damage to be where the damage was...is a two-berg scenario.
That was a very strong statement and one that I must disagree with. You do not need to have two icebergs. And yes there were things that were mentioned that could be addressed more fully, but I don't have time to get into a public debate on a point-by-point bases. I have too many things going on right now. As I said before, you need corroborative and supportive evidence for any theory put forth, and that is somewhat lacking here. At least in Behe's work he went out of his way to find supportive material that gave weight to his propositions, though much of it was based on hearsay and accounts filtered by the press. What I do agree with is that the accident could not have happen as described in the official reports.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Steve Hall
Member
Username: ss400
Post Number: 207
Registered: 1-2002
| | Posted on Monday, May 23, 2005 - 1:31 pm: |
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I understand your points Sam.
Over the years many lines of research into the Titanic have been practically exhausted, the breakup, the flooding timeline; the iceberg avoidance manoeuvre (& obviously until something new or / of significant relevance therein presents itself) will remain purely theoretical and static.
Like trolling for gold in a stream – 99.9% rubbish, 1% gold. Sometimes you have to ignore the 99.9% (using an analogy – as in other information) and retain all those 1 percents until your left with just the supportive & relevant information. It’s only when you walk into the bar with a bag of gold – will someone listen.
At the end of the day, can you prove it (2 bergs or 3) ? Or just the lone assassin.
Well in this case – perhaps.
Consider all the times they return back to the wreck – how hard would it be to take an inflated or Styrofoam iceberg replica and simulate the distances at which a dark berg (light berg or whatever coloured berg) becomes visible. You don’t need to use the prime expedition & dive platform vessel – the supply ship would suffice.
We know the speed of the Titanic (the approach speed).
We know the weather & sea conditions.
We know the turning characteristics of the ship.
We know the height of the crows nest / navigating bridge and distance from the stem.
We know the fatigue levels of the participants.
We know the lighting conditions.
We know humans don’t see any better today than they did in 1912.
When doing research you need to look at it laterally.
The world would trip over getting into the lounge room to watch a simulation like this. Are they that keen to seen another dive to the wreck ? |
Michael H. Standart
Moderator
Username: mstandart
Post Number: 12035
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Monday, May 23, 2005 - 3:20 pm: |
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>>When doing research you need to look at it laterally.<<
That's what we tried to do last year at the Maine Maritime Acadamy Symposium, only we did the experiments with the bridge simulator. While we couldn't duplicate the handling characteristics of a triple screw ship..apparantly, there aren't any in use so nobody trains for it anymore...it still gave us a broad enough snapshot of what was possible as well as what wasn't. If there was only a single berg, I'm sure the ship would have to be under port helm (Turning to starboard by 1912 conventions) to produce the sort of accident that actually happened.
Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
Equal Opportunity Curmudgeon
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Bill Wormstedt
Member
Username: wormstedt
Post Number: 1023
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Monday, May 23, 2005 - 4:19 pm: |
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Now, if we can just get the simulator to show an ICEBERG, and not a small power boat as it did!
Bill
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Roy Kristiansen
Member
Username: whh
Post Number: 247
Registered: 2-2004
| | Posted on Monday, May 23, 2005 - 10:00 pm: |
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I'm hoping to get some input on this odd little snippet from Scarrott's London testimony. Seems to me Mr. Quilliam opened a door here and - just as quickly - closed it. I haven't edited a thing.
Roy
**************
Examined by Mr. QUILLIAM.
569. I want to ask you about the two icebergs. Can you tell his Lordship how far you were able after the collision to see that iceberg distinctly - when you got into the small boat I suppose you were from time to time some distance off the iceberg?
The Commissioner: I do not know that he was, you know; for aught I know he was close upon it.
570. (Mr. Quillium.) Were you close upon it? - I did not see the iceberg after we were away in the boat, not till daylight.
571. At any time you could not see the iceberg when you were away in the boat? - Well, we really did not look for it.
572. It was only in the morning time you noticed the iceberg. With regard to rafts, did you see any of them lowered into the water? - No. |
Erik Wood
Moderator
Username: ewood
Post Number: 2647
Registered: 4-2001
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 24, 2005 - 2:49 am: |
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Just to be difficult I thought I would post something rather thought provoking. As many of you know I have some experience in maritime forensics.
Sam points out that the 1 to 2 point turn is speculative. Which of course it is. But all of Titanic history is based off this 1 (more often 2) or 2 points. Every single damage assessment ever pubicly discussed is relative to this 2 point turn. Dave Browns ideas and theories as well as mine and SNAME's and RINA's are all based on this 2 points.
In modern day accident reconstruction the base of the question being asked on this thread would be posed in this manner (it's the government version so it is multipronged):
1. Who was responsible for reporting danger to the bridge??
2. At roughly how much time did this person allow to pass before taking action??
3. How close was the object at the point action was taken??
4. What was the result??
Now to be again, difficult the first question answers all four.
It was both Murdoch and Fleet's job to keep an eye to the sea and observe and report danger and for Murdoch to take action. This task has been discussed in other threads so I won't rediscuss it here.
In 1912 these two men, performing the same task operated indepently of each other. The only surviving bridge crew memeber that night who was on the bridge when orders where issued was Hitchens who was enclosed and can not accurately describe what Murdoch was trying to do or not do. So the reality is we have no way of knowing whether Murdoch saw and observed the danger and took some action or was coming up with a plan or if he was waiting for the lookouts to do his job for him.
I would tend to think that Murdoch probably noticed it before the lookouts. In my opinion this is supported by the ships manuevers directly before and after contact, as well as the ships condition directly after the accident.
Murdoch is the only one who could have accurately discussed what he saw or didn't see, when he was made aware of it, and what his intentions where. The rest is hear say. Fleet has no idea what Murdoch did or didn't see, nor does he have any specific information on what actions he took.
Hitchens only hears telegraph bells and a hard a starboard order. He does not know where the object is in relation to the ship, nor what Murdoch's full intentions are with the order given, and has no idea what engine order was given.
That means, that in the end you can't answer the question with any remote chance of being accurate.
However, when you begin to delve into the damage as described directly after the ship makes contact and where that damage is...you can get a general idea...based off what those who did survive say, and paint a hazy (no pun intended) picture of what happened, but as Dave and Sam both point out is speculation.
So the question can not be accurately answered.
Now having said all that recall that I said in the begining that every publically discussed theory involves this 2 point turn, which is based off Hitchens and partially Fleet's testimony. Notice that every theory sites these two men, niether of whom actually know what Murdoch saw and know what he was trying to do. Yet some theories come close (as close as we can guess) to matching dent for dent, hole for hole the damage on the bottom....using this two point turn. Yet this turn is just speculation...so...why does it fit so well??
All the Best,
Capt. Erik D. Wood
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Michael H. Standart
Moderator
Username: mstandart
Post Number: 12039
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 24, 2005 - 5:35 am: |
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>>I'm hoping to get some input on this odd little snippet from Scarrott's London testimony.<<
How do we know that Scarrot saw THE berg what done the foul deed? He may have but I understand there was a lot of ice seen come daybreak. How does he distinguish one from all the others?
>>Yet this turn is just speculation...so...why does it fit so well??<<
If the two point turn to port was the only thing that happened, I've a sense that it doesn't. It would fit a lot better if at some point a turn to starboard was underway. That or the ice shelf broke away and with it any contact with the ice itself.
Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
Equal Opportunity Curmudgeon
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Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 554
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 24, 2005 - 5:09 pm: |
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No Capt. Eric, you are not being difficult. But I would like to answer the one question at the end concerning the 2 point turn. The 2 points come as you say from only two individuals, Hichens and Fleet. That was the quantitative answer. But the turn of the ship's head to port as the first action taken comes from Hichens, Fleet, Lee, and Boxhall. Fleet's estimated 1 to 2 points by watching the berg, while I have to believe that Hichens' about 2 points came from watching the steering compass. (He had nothing else to really look at.) There has been some question as to whether Fleet and Lee actually saw any turn in the ship's head, but just the relative bearing to the berg open to right as it came closer. It can be shown that if the peak of the berg, which according to Scarrott and others was highest on one side, was only 50 feet off the center line of the ship, it's relative bearing would be about 2 points to starboard when it came up in line with the forepeak and then glided down the starboard side. That leaves Hichens' testimony about seeing a 2 point turn to port (on the compass), which he initially said he saw just as he received the order hard-astarboard from Murdoch, and later changed to say it was just after Moody acknowledge the helm was hard over when she crashed. If you believe Hichens, and Boxhall for that matter, you can forget about those 37 seconds which comes from Olympic trial data.
One possibility is that there never was any hard-astarboard turn ordered (e.g., Nate Robinson). But for some reason people think they have to put a port turn into the scenario. And when they do they have to invent reasons for it, like two icebergs being sighted (Brown), or the need to go south of an ice field seen by Murdoch ahead of them (Robinson), or that ship turn 2 points because of bow contact with the fatal berg (Trinque). In the Brown and Robinson scenarios, the ship is steadied up before the collision (or to be more accurate allision) takes place.
It is hard to let go of that port turn, but it is not needed for the accident to do what it did. However, some turn to starboard (port helm) after contact was noted by Olliver and visually confirmed by Scarrott, Shiers, and to a somewhat lesser extent by Rowe. It also helps explain somewhat why the damage was confined to where it was.
But none of what I just said proves that a hard-astarboard order wasn't given. Just that it is not needed for the accident to happen. And along with that, a two berg scenario is not needed.
To answer Michael, the snippet was taken from the latter part of Scarrott's testimony concerning what he saw in the morning from the lifeboat. The earlier part of his testimony was concerned with what he saw when he came up on deck when the crash took place. By the way, the same shape iceberg described by Scarrott was also described by Stengel, Hart, and Osman.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Roy Kristiansen
Member
Username: whh
Post Number: 248
Registered: 2-2004
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 24, 2005 - 9:11 pm: |
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>>To answer Michael [Roy, actually], the snippet was taken from the latter part of Scarrott's testimony concerning what he saw in the morning from the lifeboat.
>>569. I want to ask you about the two icebergs. Can you tell his Lordship how far you were able after the collision to see that iceberg distinctly[?]
I give it a slightly different reading, Sam; but that's the way with printed testimony, isn't it? In any event, Quilliam proposed discussing "two icebergs," then he followed up by asked about only "one," and within 4 questions he'd gone off on a different subject entirely. It's difficult to have a slip of the tongue over "the two icebergs", even if one is drunk. It takes a little bit of effort and predetermination to say it. What I don't get from the transcript is, if once having said it, were there any meaningful glances exchanged, or any significant clearings of throat from his Lordship?
'-)
Roy |
Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 556
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 24, 2005 - 11:18 pm: |
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Roy, I was answering Michael's question on how Scarrott was able to distinguish one iceberg from all the others in the morning. The answer is that he saw the berg at the time of the collision and gave a pretty detailed description at that. The same berg as described by Scarrott was described by 3 other people. The berg was somewhat isolated and had two peaks, one higher than the other.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Erik Wood
Moderator
Username: ewood
Post Number: 2649
Registered: 4-2001
| | Posted on Wednesday, May 25, 2005 - 2:20 am: |
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Boxhalls testimony is suspect. As Inger Sheil has pointed out many a times, and correctly so, Boxhall didn't see anything. He was walking to the bridge, his testimony is by his own admission an estimate. Boxhall didn't see the berg until it approached the starboard bridge wing. How the ship came into that situation was pure speculation on his part. He does testify that he heard the order. But it is hard for me to believe that he heard that from where he claimed to be with a 22 knot head wind. I have no doubt that he heard in order, but what it was and what it was in relation to, he can not say with any certainty because he was not on the bridge.
In addition, Boxhall has no vantage point. He has the raised bridge wing bulwark to contend with for his forward view as well as the 22 knot head wind. He can't see anything until he gets to the bridge, and here in lies the problem.
Boxhalls testimony is specific and describes very well the location of the majority of the damage, yet the man says he was not on the bridge. This specific testimony is just his thoughts or his assumptions...not what he saw or heard. He describes the accident fairly well, but a little to well for someone who didn't see anything.
I disagree with the no port helm theory as I understand it from above. Titanc's forward motion required that the rudder be in the neutral position or over to the right directly before and during the majority of contact in order for what happened to have happened. The additional question then becomes how the ship came to be in the position that she was in prior to the accident.
The object damaged the right side of the vessel, which means according to the lookouts the ship had to have moved left...or the looks didn't see the berg where they thought they did, or there where to bergs..or...or...or...
Point being, damage as Sam states is confined to a relatively small area on the forward portion of the ship. The questions are now (from a forensic point of view):
1. How did the ship meet the object??
2. What was the ships reaction to contact??
3. Where orders given and what where there result??
4. What is the end result??
Boy this just gets tougher and tougher.
.
All the Best,
Capt. Erik D. Wood
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Michael H. Standart
Moderator
Username: mstandart
Post Number: 12044
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Wednesday, May 25, 2005 - 4:04 am: |
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>>I give it a slightly different reading, Sam;<<
So did I but Sam answered the question, so I'm cool with it.
>>This specific testimony is just his thoughts or his assumptions...not what he saw or heard. He describes the accident fairly well, but a little to well for someone who didn't see anything.<<
I was about to make that same point. For somebody who was supposed *not* to have seen anything and who was supposed to have arrived on the bridge after the fact, Joe Boxhall gives the best description of the accident of all of the surviving witnesses. These *could* be little more then anomolies in the testimony and the gaps *could* be the result of questions that were never asked and which he had the good sense not to volunteer.
In point of fact, that may explain some other gaps as well. Porting the helm just befor impact and the ship actually being under port helm (Turning to starboard by 1912 conventions) is the only way I can think of that damage can be confined to the bow while sparing the stern. (Unless that shelf broke away at a certain point as I mooted earler.)
While porting the helm would be the sensible thing to do under the circumstances, to the non-mariner who doesn't understand why this is so, it would appear as if the ship was deliberately turned in to the iceberg. (That this would prevent an even worse accident would probably be lost on such people.)
Would you be anxious to explain that to an investigator?
Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
Equal Opportunity Curmudgeon
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Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 559
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Wednesday, May 25, 2005 - 4:22 pm: |
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Yes, Boxhall did not see what the ship did or the berg when it struck as he was walking to the bridge, but he did hear a few things on the way to and see a few things after he arrived there.
Boxhall claims to have heard the 3 bells. Where he was when he heard them is another story. In 1912 he said he was just coming out of the officer's quarters. In 1962 he said he was in his cabin drinking tea, which if true, one can understand why he would leave that detail out when testifying in 1912. He said he heard Murdoch give the order "Hard-astarboard" and heard the telegraph ring. It may be entirely possible that he did. Murdoch would have yelled the order out so that it would be heard by Hichens and Moody who were in an enclosed wheelhouse. (And sound is carried with the relative wind.) He said in 1912 he saw the position of the telegraphs when he came onto the bridge, "Full speed astern, both." In 1962 he said Murdoch told Smith he reversed the port engine. He said he saw Murdoch closing the WTD switch when Capt Smith came up from behind him and asked Murdoch what happened, etc.
There are things he also apparently left out like the hard-aport order that Olliver claimed he heard as the berg was passing aft of the bridge. So either you choose to discount what Boxhall said he saw and heard or accept that there is some basis for some of it. If you want to discount some, if not all, of his testimony, then I think the burden is to show where it conflicts with what someone else said, that something he said is physically not possible, or that he left out something that we can fill in from others to get a more complete picture.
In my opinion, we have many pieces of the puzzle. We are just having a difficult time putting them all together. Everyone who tries gets a different picture. Throwing out some pieces may leave you with a picture that you like, but it may not be the picture of what really happened, or even a complete picture at that. If you have to create missing pieces, you need to show how they can be backed up. If your missing piece is in conflict with an existing piece, the burden is on you to show why the existing piece should be discarded.
The interesting thing to me in all this is the search for that perfect fit. Unfortunately, it will never happen.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Monica Hall
Moderator
Username: monica
Post Number: 1416
Registered: 1-2003
| | Posted on Wednesday, May 25, 2005 - 7:24 pm: |
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After the rescue, they had days aboard the Carpathia. They knew there would be an Inquiry, if not actually two, and they had the reputation of perished comrades to look after, not to mention their own futures (a relatively futile consideration, but they weren't to know that then).
You'd have had to be super-human not to have tried to put it all together on the Carpathia, relatively coherently, and then sing off the same hymn-sheet. I'm not saying anyone deliberately lied, but Inquiries can only be rather blunt instruments when seeking the truth. Look at modern ones. The very fact of being summoned before an Inquiry would make anyone extremely wary. Lawyers and politicians in charge, who had no idea of a seaman's life and problems, with an agenda which is deliberately obscure, and probably political? I'd certainly feel that way. As Sam says, who's going to admit to drinking tea at the critical moment? Much better to say what you really believed to have happened, even if you are stretching it a bit, and you might be wrong. Boxhall was in a very difficult position - he was in the vicinity, and the only surviving officer from the Bridge, as Lowe and Lightoller weren't yet there. It must have been hair-raising, with Senator Smith seeking to establish his reputation, and then Lord Mersey 'managing' the evidence, and looking for scapegoats who couldn't answer back. Sorting out the truth and the facts from this cauldron of fear and uncertainty is almost impossible. No wonder we're still at it nearly 90 years on. |
Erik Wood
Moderator
Username: ewood
Post Number: 2652
Registered: 4-2001
| | Posted on Wednesday, May 25, 2005 - 8:42 pm: |
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Boxhall saw nothing, and what he heard was here say. The orders where not issued to him and he was not in the location where the orders where given, did not see them carried out and has only second hand information to guess about what they where in reference to, this according to his own admission.
Remeber that Boxhall sees the berg as it approachs the starboard side bridge wing, he does not know what Murdoch was reacting to, nor does he know what the situation was prior to his arrival on the bridge.
By today's standard Boxhalls testimony is useless, it proves nothing and only gives incomplete pieces of possible evidence. The fact that he does not mentions Oliver's version to me isn't necessarily suspect, mainly because he left out so many other things.
I find the 1962 interview interesting. If he was indeed in his cabin drinking tea and not on the bridge, that is an extreme case of derlication of duty (spelled WAY wrong), even in 1912. The ramifications are a billion times worse in today's standard. His version of walking from the officers quarters is far more believeable.
There is only one witness whose testimony regarding the actions taken is somewhat creditable, and that is Hitchens. He was issued an order which he carried out. Even this isn't very helpful. He does not know what the order was in reference to, or what Murdochs full intentions where (other then assuming and probably correctly that he was trying to avoid something). Outside of being issued this order (and after being directed to only discuss what happened prior to contact) he knows nothing.
Boxhall does describe remarkabley well the location of damage caused the berg and the ships reaction to the incident. Part of this probably because he did damage inspections and had the rest of the night and some other underway time before being required to testify. So either Boxhall saw more then he said he did, or was able to put all of the rest of the information that he got later that night into his theory and just so happened to be remarkabley close to what happened.
We really only know for certain a few things.
1. The ship hit an iceberg.
2. Hitchens was issued an order by Murdoch to put his helm hard a starboard.
3. The ship sank.
The rest is open to debate. My own theory uses pieces of Boxhalls testimony and discounts other portions but uses other testimony and basic seamanship and physics to come up with a theory. Which is all it is. But it comes some what close to what occured.
I think that there is more to Boxhalls story then any of us will ever know.
But this 2 point turn (the basis for this thread) seems to be the one "fact" of the story. Some version of it occured.
All the Best,
Capt. Erik D. Wood
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Paul Rogers
Moderator
Username: progers
Post Number: 548
Registered: 11-2000
| | Posted on Wednesday, May 25, 2005 - 10:58 pm: |
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quote:We really only know for certain a few things.
1. The ship hit an iceberg...
Even that is debatable, if Captain L.M. Collins is to be believed. Not that I doubt it personally, you understand.
It's always darkest just before it goes pitch black.
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Roy Kristiansen
Member
Username: whh
Post Number: 249
Registered: 2-2004
| | Posted on Wednesday, May 25, 2005 - 11:53 pm: |
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Has anyone checked in with Captain Nemo recently?
'-) |
Inger Sheil
Moderator
Username: isheil
Post Number: 3907
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Thursday, May 26, 2005 - 12:30 am: |
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quote:I find the 1962 interview interesting. If he was indeed in his cabin drinking tea and not on the bridge, that is an extreme case of derlication of duty (spelled WAY wrong), even in 1912. The ramifications are a billion times worse in today's standard. His version of walking from the officers quarters is far more believeable.
I don't understand what you mean by 'far more believable' - the 1912, 1959 and 1962 accounts he gave are consistent in that he had been in the officers quarters, and was moving from them to the bridge as the collision was underway. That there should be some differences in the accounts is understandable, as there is a gap of up to 60 years between them! As for 'dereliction of duty', this has been discussed here at length in other threads, and I've also gone over this territory and my own theories as to why he might have been in his cabin after what he described in both 1959 and 1962 as 'going around' or 'a tour' of the decks. The paraphrased report of his 1959 account does not mention tea, but rather that he had 'just looked into his cabin' when he heard the lookout sound three bells.
Boxhall developed pleurisy following the disaster that was so severe his evidence at the inquiry was curtailed. He was still feeling the effects on his return to the UK. I believe there may have been some underlying upper respiratory tract infection that he was suffering from that night, which - exacerbated by exposure in the lifeboats and stress - developed into full-blown pleurisy. |
Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 561
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Thursday, May 26, 2005 - 12:49 am: |
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Capt. Eric: How do know that Hichens received an order for hard-astarboard? Because he said so? Discount what boxhall said he heard, Hichens had a very good reason for coming up with that. He heard the 3 bells. He heard Moody take the phone call. He heard Moody repeat to Murdoch that an iceberg was right ahead. He learned that the ship was struck on the starboard side. He was at the wheel and since he lived and Murdoch and Moody both died, guess who will get the blame for steering the ship into an iceberg? Better say you were given an order to turn away from the berg instead of trying to explain why the only order you received was hard-aport which would turn ship into the berg. What Fleet and Lee saw could have been the relative bearing to the berg open to starboard as the ship got closer. This gave the impression of that the ship was turning to port. When it hit, the side of the berg where the peak was was 2 points off the port bow. Now Fleet tells this to Hichens on the Carpathia and Hichens decides that he best say he was given an order for hard-astarboard just before the crash. Boxhall buys into this story and adds the part about full speed astern. Even suggests that murdoch wanted to port around it but was too close. Olliver tells what heard after coming onto the bridge at the moment of collision. Never heard any previous order, just the hard-aport order which was carried out.
So you see, not only do not need two icebergs to make the accident, but you don't need a hard-astarboard order either.
OK, so why you ask did Murdoch not take action to avoid. Answer, misjudgement of how close the ship would come to the iceberg's side. He was in perfect position out on the right wing (assuming he was there) to see the bearing open up as the berg approach. Best thing to do, hold the course. A turn either way would cause contact. Problem was he did not expect an under ice spur extending about 50 feet or so into their path. The rest is history.
BTW, I not saying I believe this is what happened. Just a possibility.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 563
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Thursday, May 26, 2005 - 4:15 am: |
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Inger: I have always been bothered by the timing of events as described by Boxhall in the inquiries. The door from the officers quarters to the bridge was only about 60 feet. To walk that distance at an average walking rate would take less than 15 seconds, not counting the time to close the door behind you. But being in his cabin when the 3 bells were struck makes the time frame more believable. Time to get up and get on a coat, then get out of the cabin and close the door, get out onto the deck and close that door behind you, and now the seconds add up more reasonably.
Personally, I believe Boxhall was more candid in his later years. As for drinking tea, he probably would have gotten Murdoch's OK to do so after making the rounds. And who knows, maybe he was going to bring a cup for Murdoch when he finished. It was cold out there. My guess is the last thing he did before going to his cabin was attending to the standard compass about 11:30. He was probably the one who told Olliver that the lamps there needed to be trimmed which explains why Olliver was on the platform at the time the accident happened. But again, that is just a guess. Olliver's walk from the platform to the bridge would have taken about 50 seconds, and if Boxhall was in his cabin at the time of 3 bells, it could well have taken him about the same amount of time to get to the bridge.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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David G. Brown
Member
Username: brown
Post Number: 1584
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Saturday, May 28, 2005 - 5:43 am: |
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Folks, I've been away doing money-making writing and getting boats in the water (no, not lifeboats).
You cannot make the conventional story fit together into a cohesive whole because the one-berg, hard a-starboard, 35 to 50 second time frame is poppycock created just to confuse things. Allow an example:
Boxhall's tea story is pure sea story. I'd use stronger words, but there are those who revere the man. He was a damned fine officer and a loyal one to boot. That explains the tea fabrication. But, if his story were true, he was admitting dereliction of duty that should have subjected him to criminal prosecution for material participation (by failure to do his duty)in the subsequent accident. He was on duty, which means Boxhall was legally and morally bound to be on deck. His cabin by definition was "below," and therefore off limits unless Boxhall had been formally relieved of duty--which he never claimed because it didn't happen.
Another absurdity in conventional wisdom:
The conventional story has built-in proof of its own improbability. It is impossible to put the obligatory left turn under starboard helm into context with a head-on approach to the fatal berg. It can't be done any more than you can strike a match on a wet cake of soap -- unless the hard-over maneuver was completed and the ship steadied up on a new course. A ship making a hard-left turn cannot strike an iceberg in the manner of Titanic--forefoot first--and not have damage along the entire side. Laws of physics rule here, not opinion.
And, conventional wisdom makes a fool of Murdoch:
If you accept the left-turn-starboard-bow strike, then you are absolutely forcing Murdoch to have turned left to dodge an object on the port bow. Even a junior officer would know better than that. Again, the conventional story has lead to an absurdity. Murdoch did not turn left for an object to his port.
Now for some rational thought:
There seems little doubt, however, that the ship did turn to port under hard-astarboard helm. Now, apply logic. If the physical evidence on the hull combined with the laws of physics require a head-on approach--as described by the lookouts--and, if Murdoch did not turn left to dodge something to his port, then what the hell did happen?
The answer is plain as the nose on J.P. Morgan. Titanic turned left two points (per Hichens) and steadied up aimed at the fatal berg. The ship struck and turned to starboard due to a combination of friction, Newtonian physics, engine orders, and port helm (per Olliver) to create damage in the pattern reported by various witnesses.
Now, why would Murdoch have turned left using a "hard a-starboard" helm order? Obviously, to dodge something else than the deadly iceberg. And, since as far as we know Titanic struck on only one iceberg, this object which caused Murdoch's helm order must have been passed without incident. That is, the object for which "hard a-starboard" was issued was not the object which the ship hit.
What sort of "objects" big enough to be a danger to Titanic were within range that night? We know of only icebergs. Yes icebergS. Look at the photos taken from Carpathia in the morning and read the descriptions of the survivors to find out how many bergs there were. BergS. Lots of 'em, plural.
All of the defences of conventional wisdom ignore the procedures and practices of operating a White Star Liner at sea. This is perhaps an honest oversight, but none-the-less it prevents an honest historical assessment of events. Quite simply, you have to know what each member of the bridge team should have been doing at the time of the accident. And, you have to understand how and why their actions would have influenced Murdoch's decisions and/or the accident.
At 11:30 p.m. Boxhall and Olliver should have been gone from the forebridge. By IMM/White Star regulation they had to be on the standard compass platform. And, Moody had to be in the wheelhouse with Hichens. All four men were to be engaged in steadying the ship by standard compass for the purpose of insuring accurate navigation. Please note that during the minutes leading up to the accident Olliver admitted to being on the platform while Boxhall waffled on this point. Tea in his room? Balderdash. Boxhall was on the platform doing his required duty. To think otherwise is to believe in fairy tales.
Scarrott's 6 to 8 minutes between the lookout's warning bell and impact fits perfectly into the timing of the compass evolution described in the above paragraph. George Behe unearthed considerable information about how the lookouts spoke of being ignored by the bridge. Some of that frustration seems to appear in their testimonies.
At about 22 knots, Titanic would have gone 2 to 3 miles during Scarrott's 6 to 8 minutes. This fits nicely the anticipated distance over which icebergs were expected to be seen by mariners.
The obvious conclusion is that Murdoch took note of the first iceberg upon the lookout's report. He took no action, however, because of the ongoing compass evolution. What Murdoch could not know because of the p-poor internal communications system was that the oil lamps in the standard compass needed trimming. An evolution that should have taken a minute or two became three times that long. Finally, Murdoch had no choice but to order a "hard a-starboard" turn to dodge the first berg.
It now becomes necessary to look again at the physics of the way ships maneuver. In a turn, the stern swings out. This means toward the object Murdoch was dodging. If he had begun his maneuver at a greater distance, he would not have required a "hard over" command. The use of hard over rudder indicates he needed a lot of turn quickly. The only reason for that would have been because the danger was close aboard. Using "hard over" for a close-aboard object invites swinging the stern into it, thereby defeating the avoidance maneuver. It follows, therefore, that Murdoch's call for "hard a-port" required an additional limitation on the angular rotation of the hull to prevent swinging the stern into harm's way.
Thanks to Hichens we know that Titanic completed about a two--point turn prior to impact. His knowledge of the exact rotation indicates he needed to know that information to obey Murdoch's orders. By confirming the degrees of the turn, Hichens unwittingly gave circumstantial evidence that Murdoch's full helm order was "hard a-starboard two points." Such an order would have satisfied the two requirements for successfully dodging a close aboard object--changing the heading and limiting the stern swing.
This leads back to what the lookouts saw, and gives a logical explanation for the discussion which took place between Fleet and Lee prior to Fleet's phoning the bridge. They saw the ship finally turn left to avoid the visible first berg and then the bow steadied up pointed at the second berg. There was no bell code for what they saw happening. Fleet had no choice but to use the telephone.
At this point we have to examine the descriptions of the fatal berg. The eyewitnesses were consistent in saying that it had a dark appearance as the ship approached. Then, it seemed to have a light outline around the dark mass of ice as it passed abeam. Finally, it appeared light in color (like other icebergs) as it went astern. This amazing color-changing iceberg wasn't really all that unusual, however. The descriptions are consistent with the appearance of an iceberg which has recently capsized. The underbelly now exposed would be black as the ship approached. A white edge would appear as it came abeam because the viewer would see both the old weathered (white) ice and the dark underbelly. Finally, as the ship passed the observer would see only the white weathered ice.
A capsized berg presenting its dark underbelly to the liner would have stood a good chance of not being perceived. However, that chance grows to an almost certainty if it were in close proximity to a brighter berg. The way the human eye works would almost guarantee that the second, darker spot would be unnoticed until the whiter first object was removed from the picture.
And, so hangs the tale. Titanic turned left to avoid one danger only to run over a second.
Boxhall was loyal. He knew what happened, but he stood by the company regulations against airing IMM/White Star problems in public. His absurd story of tea in his room is just one example. It was such a preposterous story that it cannot be considered a lie. But, he must have told someone exactly what happened. The proof was in the modifications to Olympic.
While it was in H&W's yard for Titanic-related refits, the standard compass was quietly moved from amidships to the more conventional location on the wheelhouse roof. Or, to be more precise, a new standard compass was installed above the wheelhouse. White Star ordered that the old compass and platform remain in position even though it was functionally useless. Britannic was built with only one standard compass above the wheelhouse--but an eyewash compass platform was added, most likely to avoid answering embarrassing questions.
-- David G. Brown |
Paul Rogers
Moderator
Username: progers
Post Number: 549
Registered: 11-2000
| | Posted on Saturday, May 28, 2005 - 10:48 am: |
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quote:The obvious conclusion is that Murdoch took note of the first iceberg upon the lookout's report. He took no action, however, because of the ongoing compass evolution. What Murdoch could not know because of the p-poor internal communications system was that the oil lamps in the standard compass needed trimming. An evolution that should have taken a minute or two became three times that long. Finally, Murdoch had no choice but to order a "hard a-starboard" turn to dodge the first berg.
I know nothing about seamanship. However, the problem I have with the above statement is that it appears counter-intuitive. I am struggling to accept that a ship will be driven straight towards a known obstacle, to the point that an emergency evasive manoeuvre is required (hard a-starboard must be considered such, surely?) to avoid a collision. Furthermore, the purpose of the initial inaction was, it is alleged, to allow the completion of a compass check that was not, in itself, vital to the safety of the ship at that time. In other words, an unnecessary risk was taken to allow a non-vital task to take place. And all this was apparently happening whilst the bridge team knew they were amongst ice and therefore in some danger.
It just doesn't seem an "obvious conclusion" to me. The theory as presented makes Murdoch appear grossly derelict in his duty, never mind Boxhall and his 'tea'.
It's always darkest just before it goes pitch black.
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Michael H. Standart
Moderator
Username: mstandart
Post Number: 12057
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Saturday, May 28, 2005 - 5:48 pm: |
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>>The theory as presented makes Murdoch appear grossly derelict in his duty, never mind Boxhall and his 'tea'.<<
I don't know if I'd make that leap. If David is right, then it would appear to me that Murdoch was caught between something of a rock and a hard place here. He was one of three people who could actually see where the ship was heading...Fleet and Lee being the other two...whereas the guy who was the de facto driver (Boxhall) couldn't see squat and who could only operate the steering wheel (Hichens) by way of bell signals from 250 feet away.
At two to three miles, you have some measure of time on your side so if you only expect an evolution to take a minute, there's no reason for a knee jerk reaction to something that's looming up ahead in your path if it's at a respectable range. You still have to deal with it, but you have *some* wiggle room. Not much, but some.
The problem here...if David is correct...is that apparently they ran out of wiggle room and into a roadblock that for some reason, they failed to notice or which they noticed to late because they got so wrapped up in dealing with one problem that they lost sight of the whole picture.
Now allowing for the possibility that he could be mistaken, if anybody has a plausible alternative, by all means, offer it up and let's kick it around some.
Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
Equal Opportunity Curmudgeon
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Steve Hall
Member
Username: ss400
Post Number: 208
Registered: 1-2002
| | Posted on Saturday, May 28, 2005 - 6:05 pm: |
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Boxhall perhaps went to spend a penny.
Would have been a little chilly that night.
One passenger did say she ran into an officer that noted an iceberg. It could have only been one bloke ! |
Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 564
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Saturday, May 28, 2005 - 7:48 pm: |
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I noticed that I had wrote “port bow” in my earlier post above. It should have been “starboard bow.” Murdoch’s turn to port, assuming he ordered such a turn, would have been because the iceberg was either dead ahead or slightly off the starboard bow.
I'll not directly comment on Dave's recent post right now. His take on what happened is a bit different from mine, and that is OK. I have the most respect for his opinions and views, and they do get one to think things through, and sometimes think things differently. What I do want to say is that one must be careful before drawing firm conclusions. I have no problem with anyone putting forth an opinion or a theory. But to say that something had to happen one particular way needs to be backed up with very strong evidence.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Erik Wood
Moderator
Username: ewood
Post Number: 2653
Registered: 4-2001
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 1:57 am: |
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I have a lot to cover, and not much time to do it in, so I will brief and to the point.
From Inger:
quote: don't understand what you mean by 'far more believable' - the 1912, 1959 and 1962 accounts he gave are consistent in that he had been in the officers quarters, and was moving from them to the bridge as the collision was underway. That there should be some differences in the accounts is understandable, as there is a gap of up to 60 years between them! As for 'dereliction of duty', this has been discussed here at length in other threads, and I've also gone over this territory and my own theories as to why he might have been in his cabin after what he described in both 1959 and 1962 as 'going around' or 'a tour' of the decks. The paraphrased report of his 1959 account does not mention tea, but rather that he had 'just looked into his cabin' when he heard the lookout sound three bells.
Perhaps believable was not the right choice of words. I have no doubt and have never had any doubt that Mr. Boxhall is a straight forward man. However, purely from an investigative point of view his testimony directly after and years after is extremely suspect. As has been discussed if he was in his cabin drinking tea, or if he was in his cabin, or if he was in smoking room, the loo, was about doing his rounds, or the general area, or not on the bridge, and not on an official errand as sent by Mr. Murdoch, as an officer of the watch, and not being at his place of duty when disaster struck is at best curious. The placement of his rounds or any set of rounds 15 minutes before the end of watch, that just so happens to be in the time frame of ice, that he suspected or plotted that they would be in...is just to many pieces of a puzzle that are missing.
Having heard the bells he reported to his duty station as anybody would expect. But since or resident (meant purely respectfully) Boxhall expert is watching, I would ask that she again replay a discussion that we have had regarding Boxhall's testimony. Specifically the testimony regarding what he describes of the accident. His words given the impression that he saw it, but as Inger has pointed he states that he didn't. He gave an extemely good description of the damage, where it occured, and the ships reaction for not having seen anything.
Of course the trip home, and the moments after where probably filled with chit chat and being the intelligent man that he was, he probably was able to put the pieces together.
------------
This next quote is from Sam, it isn't the entire portion but the portion that I feel that I need to address, although it says quote is not the quote as it was written, but his questions and statements in order that they where written and in the order that I am going to attempt to respond to.
From Sam Part I:
quote:How do know that Hichens received an order for hard-astarboard? Because he said so? Discount what boxhall said he heard, Hichens had a very good reason for coming up with that. He heard the 3 bells. He heard Moody take the phone call. He heard Moody repeat to Murdoch that an iceberg was right ahead. He learned that the ship was struck on the starboard side. He was at the wheel and since he lived and Murdoch and Moody both died, guess who will get the blame for steering the ship into an iceberg? Better say you were given an order to turn away from the berg instead of trying to explain why the only order you received was hard-aport which would turn ship into the berg.
You will find no argument from me on anything you wrote. However, let me address the phone call, Moody and Moody's relay to Murdoch.
The phone call was late, by Fleet's own admission he saw no response so he called the bridge. On that call, he told Moody that the berg was right ahead, Moody, relayed this information to Murdoch. That is the extent of Hitchen's knowledge, he does not know the bergs true position, Murdoch's intentions, Murdoch's reactions, or the true relative bearing of the berg. He only knows that the lookouts called, Moody answered and assumes (as do I) that Moody relayed that exact information to Murdoch. We do not know what Murdoch's intentions where going to be, or what they where prior to receiving that phone call. We don't know if he had spotted it before or after, we don't know that he (Murdoch) saw it at all until it was pointed out to him. Hitchens still knows nothing. Hitchens could very well have made up the hard to starboard thing, it just happened to agree with Fleet, Lee and Boxhall and that is why it is the "truth".
Part II from Sam:
quote: What Fleet and Lee saw could have been the relative bearing to the berg open to starboard as the ship got closer. This gave the impression of that the ship was turning to port. When it hit, the side of the berg where the peak was was 2 points off the port bow. Now Fleet tells this to Hichens on the Carpathia and Hichens decides that he best say he was given an order for hard-astarboard just before the crash. Boxhall buys into this story and adds the part about full speed astern. Even suggests that murdoch wanted to port around it but was too close. Olliver tells what heard after coming onto the bridge at the moment of collision. Never heard any previous order, just the hard-aport order which was carried out.
For the purpose of debate and for only that purpose, I am going to ask a question:
Why would Hitchens lie about his actions, and why would Fleet and Lee lie about there's??
I have my own answer as all of us do.
As to relative bearing....I am going to (when the time permits) going to plot your suggestion and post it here in some written form. My purpose for doing so and not doing it privately is that most won't believe what I come up with.
I too will not comment on David's post in public. If anyone has questions send them to me privately.
All the Best,
Capt. Erik D. Wood
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Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 570
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 3:52 pm: |
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Capt. Eric asked: "Why would Hitchens lie about his actions, and why would Fleet and Lee lie about there's??"
The only people who actually saw what happened before the collision and lived to tell about it were Fleet and Lee. If they lied a bit, it would be because they were afraid of blame. Fleet was obviously concerned about being blamed for not seeing or reporting the iceberg in time from the way he answered several questions in the inquiries. And then there was this haze all around thing that Lee mentioned which was seen right through by Lord Mersey for what it really was. As for Hichens, as I said in the quote above, "guess who will get the blame for steering the ship into an iceberg?" Hichens seemed to developed a case of paranoia by time he went into the lifeboat as can be seen by his subsequent actions there.
I could also save you the time of doing that plot. I've done it for the "no hard-astarboard" scenario and will send it to you in an email. And just for the record, I have NOT concluded that that must be the way it happened. Just one of several possibilities that would be consistent with what we know did result.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 571
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 3:56 pm: |
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And just for the record, I have NOT concluded that that must be the way it happened. Just one of several possibilities that would be consistent with what we know did result.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Jon Hollis
Member
Username: jonships
Post Number: 436
Registered: 1-2004
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 7:11 pm: |
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Did Fleet not testify at the Brit hearings that the ship had already started to turn as he reached for the phone??? See Brit Hearings Fleet Testimony. Also engine room personnel stated that there was only 4 to 5 seconds after hearing the order for full astern that impact happened again Brit Hearings |
Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 572
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 9:10 pm: |
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Jon: Fleet said many things about that. According to Lightoller it was as you described. Fleet's own testimony had the ship turning while he was at the phone, but when asked how he knew that, he said it was Lee who told him that it appeared to be swinging after he got off the phone. Fleet also said he himself saw the ship veering to port when he looked up after getting off the phone. Lee said they must have put the helm hard-astarboard after Fleet got off the phone.
But what they saw for sure was the bearing to the berg opening up on their right. For the lookouts the definitive way of knowing if the ship was turning would be two things.
1. the bow of the ship would fall off to port relative to the stars in the sky.
2. under starboard helm (port turn) the ship would heel to starboard, something that should be noticed high up in the nest.
Don't know if they took notice of the stars, and they did not mention anything about heeling before the collision. They both said she listed to port after the impact as the berg passed by.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Jon Hollis
Member
Username: jonships
Post Number: 437
Registered: 1-2004
| | Posted on Tuesday, May 31, 2005 - 9:32 pm: |
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> [Hi Sam Hope all has been well with you these past few months. Thanks for your reply. Now more conjectons, if they say the ship rolled to Port then perhaps she might have ridden up on a shelf of the berg which might explain boiler room #4 problems later on?] |
Samuel Halpern
Member
Username: cmdrsam
Post Number: 573
Registered: 3-2003
| | Posted on Wednesday, June 1, 2005 - 2:19 am: |
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I agree! And maybe further aft as well. She did split in two later on didn't she.
There are no Unsinkable Theories.
Sam Halpern
40° 23' 50'' N, 74° 13' 55'' W.
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Michael H. Standart
Moderator
Username: mstandart
Post Number: 12085
Registered: 12-2000
| | Posted on Wednesday, June 1, 2005 - 3:30 am: |
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Excerpts from Fleet's testimony;
17292. We must get it from the events. Did you notice any change in the heading of your vessel after you gave this report? - After I rang them up on the 'phone and looked over the nest she was going to port.
17293. You were looking over the nest. Were you still on the starboard side of the nest? - No; my place is on the port, but I went to starboard to telephone.
17294. Did you remain there when you dropped the telephone, or did you go back to your own place? - I went back to my own place again.
17295. It would be on the port side of the crow's-nest? - On the port side.
17296. You saw her head turn to port, I think I understood you to say? - Yes.
Was the vessel still turning to port when she struck the berg, can you tell us?
(After a pause.)
17297. (The Commissioner.) Do not say you can if you cannot? - She went to port all right, and the berg hit her on the starboard bow.
17298. (The Attorney-General.) She went to port. Do you mean she had a slight turn to port? - Well, going to port.
17299. She was still going to port when the berg struck her? - On the starboard bow.
17300. When you saw the vessel strike you felt it, did you; could you see it? - Certainly.
17301. What did you see when that happened? Your vessel, as I understand you, was going to port. Then you say she struck an iceberg. Tell us what you saw. You were in the crow's-nest, watching it were you not? - Yes.
Later, he also said:
17472. (Sir Robert Finlay.) Yes, my Lord, exactly. (To the Witness.) Did the “Titanic” answer the helm, going to port, while you were still at the telephone? - I do not know.
17473. Well, just let me recall to your memory what you appear to have said in America. On the 23rd April, at page 18, you are asked this: “Do you know whether her engines were reversed?” That is the “Titanic’s” engines. You say, “Well, she started to go to port while I was at the telephone. (Q.) She started to go to port? - (A.) Yes; the wheel was put to starboard. (Q.) How do you know that? - (A.) My mate saw it and told me. He told me he could see the bow coming round.” Is that right, that the ship was going round to port while you were still at the telephone? - Yes.
17474. And then the same thing on the 24th April, page 3, “Did you notice how quickly they turned the course of the boat after you sounded the gongs? - No, Sir; they did not do it until I went to the telephone. While I was at the telephone the ship started to move.” That means to answer her helm to answer the starboard helm and turn to port? - Yes.
Eventually, it concluded with this;
17479. Did I understand rightly that when you left the boat deck there were some women left behind on the boat deck? - [No Answer.]
The Witness: (After a pause.) Is there any more likes to have a go at me?
The Commissioner: Well, I rather sympathise with him. Do you want to ask him anything more?
The Attorney-General: Oh, no.
The Witness: A good job, too.
17480. (The Commissioner.) I am much obliged to you. I think you have given your evidence very well, although you seem to distrust us all.
The Witness: Thank you.
Overall, it looks like his answers were short, choppy, and I daresay even evasive insofar as he avoided volunteering information and even avoided answering some questions at all. Make of it what you will. As I may have missed some things, the whole of his testimony starts HERE.
Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
Equal Opportunity Curmudgeon
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Erik Wood
Moderator
Username: ewood
Post Number: 2657
Registered: 4-2001
| | Posted on Sunday, June 5, 2005 - 3:28 pm: |
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Sam, I did receive your email, however my version was slightly different then yours. When I figure out how to post the paper version of what I did, here, I will.
When I say different....it wasn't by much.
I also deleted my double post.
All the Best,
Capt. Erik D. Wood
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RJ Emery
Member
Username: rjemery
Post Number: 3
Registered: 12-2007
| | Posted on Monday, December 24, 2007 - 12:14 am: |
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When the bridge crew reacted to the sighting of the iceberg, how much actual time elapsed before the ship struck the iceberg?
The engine room reacted to the Full Astern order by shutting off steam to the engines. This in turn signaled all the boiler rooms, by the flashing red light (and a ringing bell not depicted in the movie), to draw the boilers and that something was amiss. A change order from Full Ahead to Full Astern generally does mean imminent collision of some sort, but the crews in the Boiler Rooms would only have the red light as an indicator.
In Boiler Room #6, Lead Stoker Barrett shouts "Shut all the dampers," but the crew does not have time to complete that task before the hull is breached and water enters the room.
And so the timing is of some interest to me.
FWIW, the Boiler Room scenes shows at least one crewman trapped by the closing watertight doors, but in fact, all crewmen who could not get out in time could simply climb a sloping ladder to a catwalk or passageway to go forward or aft. In fact, IIRC from reading the Board of Inquiry transcripts, some crew and officers remained behind and other crew and officers tried to re-enter Boiler Room #6 to man the pumps before all had to abandoned.
Thereafter, Boiler Room #5 was soon breached, apparently by a collapsing bulkhead between #5 and #6.
[Moderator's Note: This message, originally a new thread in a different topic, has been moved to this pre-existing thread addressing the same subject. MAB] |
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