This two-part article is primarily concerned with how the Titanic’s reported distress positions came about, and why they were so far west of the now known position of the Titanic wreck site.
Note to the reader: This two-part paper has recently appeared in the journal of the Titanic International Society, Voyage, Issues 64 and 65, and also in the journal of the British Titanic Society, Atlantic Daily Bulletin, September and December 2008. It is a revised work of my original two-part article, “A Minute of Time,” first published in 2005 in the Titanic Historical Society’s Titanic Commutator.1 The article deals with the issue of the two CQD distress positions transmitted from Titanic by wireless on the night of the disaster. Items written in quotations between brackets […] are insertions by this author. In the footnotes of this article, the notation AI are references to page numbers in the transcripts of the American Inquiry into the loss of Titanic, while the notation BI are references to question numbers in the transcripts of the British Inquiry into the loss of Titanic. -SWH
The author of this article has deftly drawn together the existing data and testimony to elegantly tie up the loose ends in this century old mystery of why the two CQD positions were so far west of the wreck site. As is still the case today, maritime disasters large and small are usually the result of a series of small missteps and oversights. In so thoroughly examining this portion of the Titanic story the author has outlined an entirely plausible error chain. That a misreading of the navigation watch and an easily made error in addition could contribute so much to the drama of April 14, 1912 is an important reminder to mariners today.
Captain Peg Brandon
Assistant Professor of Marine Transportation
On the night of April 14, 1912 at 10:35 p.m.,
CQD CQD SOS SOS CQD SOS. Come at once. We have struck a berg. CQDOM (It’s a CQD old man). Position 41.46 N., 50.14
W. CQD SOS.3
The position in the CQD message that Cottam received was worked up by Titanic’s fourth officer Joseph Boxhall. As it turned out, the position was about 13 miles to the west of the Titanic wreck site which was first discovered 73 years after the tragic event. But Boxhall’s position was not the position sent in the first set of distress messages from Titanic that night. Ten minutes earlier, at 10:25 p.m.
Titanic sends C. Q. D. Requires assistance. Position 41° 44' north, longitude 50° 24' west. Come at once. Iceberg.
Capt. Moore prepared to take action.
“Before we had laid the course off I received another position, which read 41º 46' north, 50º 14' west; so that was 10 miles farther to the eastward, and it was that position that I laid my course for.”
The position in the first message that Moore received, latitude 41° 44' north, longitude 50° 24' west, was some 7 miles further to the west of the Boxhall CQD location, or little over 20 miles west of the wreck site. This initial position, which is attributed to Capt. Smith, was being sent out by Phillips for almost 10 minutes before Boxhall’s revised position was sent out. In addition to the
One of the long standing mysteries surrounding Titanic was why were these two CQD positions so far west of the wreck site? How could this have come about?
There has been much speculation over the years since the discovery of the wreck to explain these positions. Some of these explanations are quite imaginative, almost bordering on the absurd. In 2002, Captain L. Marmaduke Collins suggested that Boxhall’s CQD position was correct, but it was the submerged hulk of the Titanic, still holding some buoyancy from trapped air inside, that was carried by strong underwater currents until it came to rest several miles to the east from the CQD position. Capt. Collins also believes Titanic did not strike an iceberg, but instead struck a patch of pack ice. He also believes that the ship later broke in two while on the bottom of the
More recently, David G. Brown put forth the idea that an undocumented course change took place to avoid ice at 11:30 p.m. which put the Titanic on a heading that connected the two CQD positions that were later sent out. He also stated that “misdirections like Boxhall’s claim of a late turn at the corner” effectively hid this 11:30 p.m. course change from researchers and historians for nearly a century. His article suggested that there was great confusion caused by the way clock adjustments were made on Titanic, confusion that has hidden the true time of the accident from researchers until his paper was published. Brown also suggested that fourth officer Boxhall may have misunderstood what Captain Smith had done when he was asked to work up Titanic's distress position. According to Brown, Captain Smith sent out a projected position for the ship that marked the beginning of April 15 on Titanic in that initial CQD message. Brown refers to that position as the ship’s projected “civil midnight” position, and corresponded to when midnight would occur on clocks that were set back 47 minutes, the expected clock adjustment that was to take place that night. In Brown’s scenario, this planned 47 minute adjustment had not taken place. However, he asserts that clocks used by the crew had gone back 24 minutes, half the total planned adjustment time, well before the accident happened. He then states that the reported time of the accident, 20 minutes to 12, was the time on the clocks used by the crew, and the real time of the accident was 4 minutes past twelve on unadjusted clocks still set for April 14. According to Brown's theory, Boxhall assumed that he was being asked by Captain Smith to simply move the initial CQD position back along the line that the ship was heading following that undocumented course change by 20 minutes of steaming at 22 knots. He even goes so far to suggest that Boxhall either did not compute or did not use the 7:30 p.m. celestial sights taken earlier by second officer Lightoller and third officer Pitman in working up any of the ship’s positions after that time.7
Other reasons suggested for why these distress positions were so far off included overestimating the ship’s speed, errors in time, and errors in calculations. After the discovery of the wreck, Dr. Robert Ballard suggested that fourth officer Boxhall may have overestimated Titanic’s speed by about 2 knots when he worked up his CQD position.8 In the 1992 report of the British Marine Accident Investigation Branch concerning the Californian affair and its relative location to Titanic, it was suggested that “Perhaps the error in the position as transmitted [by Titanic] was caused by the wrong distance being allowed along the course line from the last known position – a simple mistake to make under stress.”9 Another suggestion came from researcher and author Dave Gittins. In 1998 he suggested that Boxhall may have made an error in computing a change in longitude by reading from the wrong column of a traverse table. Instead of getting the longitude change for a latitude of 42°, Gittins suggested that Boxhall may have taken the longitude change for the complementary latitude angle of 48° instead. Such an error would push the CQD position 14 minutes-of-arc to the west of where it should have been.10
In 2005 this author wrote an article, “A Minute of Time” [referenced above in the note to the reader], in which I suggested that a misreading of the chronometer by third officer Pitman by just 1 minute may have caused the star sights taken by second officer Lightoller, and later worked up by fourth officer Boxhall, to be shifted westward by 15 minutes-of-arc.
In this article I will re-examine the issue of these two CQD positions. I will show that an error in the ‘7.30 star fix’ would not only cause Boxhall’s CQD position to be far off, but would have also caused the initial CQD position, which we will refer to as the Smith CQD, to be far off as well. Using the methods of obtaining changes in latitude and longitude that both Capt. Smith and fourth officer Boxhall would have used, I will show how the two positions were likely derived, and why they would differ from each other. The explanations presented in this article have nothing to do with projected midnight positions, undocumented course changes, or any clock setbacks that were due to take place later that night. Furthermore, there is no need to assume anything about miscommunications between individuals, or the highly implausible suggestion that a knowingly wrong position report was deliberately sent out in an attempt to get ships turned around before a valid distress position could be worked up. The basis of this work will be from evidence given within the historical record.
Walter Lord was reported to have said, "It is a rash man indeed who would set himself up as the final arbiter on all that happened the incredible night the Titanic went down." In this work, as in all works regarding Titanic, there is some degree of speculation that has to be made. Some things cannot, and most likely never will, be proven. But unlike the works of some others, evidence will not be simply dismissed because it doesn’t fit, nor will evidence be twisted in such a way to fit something that was never intended.
So let the journey begin. We will start with the course that Titanic was following since leaving Queenstown.
FROM DAUNT’S ROCK TO THE CORNER
The intended track of Titanic’s maiden voyage Atlantic crossing is shown on the chart below. The starting point was taking departure off the Duant’s Rock lightship outside of Queenstown harbor at 2:20 p.m. GMT on April 11, 1912. From there Titanic hugged the southern coast of
The reported distance traveled from Daunt’s Rock to local apparent noon (LAN) on April 14, 1912, was 1549 nautical miles.12 The remaining distance from noon to the corner was about 126 nautical miles. This comes about by two independent methods. The first is from information given by Titanic’s fifth officer Harold Godfrey Lowe at the American Inquiry. The second is from subtracting the distance traveled up until noon April 14 from the distance to the corner over the planned route Titanic traveled; a distance that is confirmed from log-card data taken from three westbound voyages of Titanic’s sister ship Olympic in 1911.13
At the American Inquiry, fifth officer Lowe was extensively questioned by Senator Smith about his role in working out the course and position of Titanic on Sunday afternoon. Lowe pointed out to Smith that he worked the course from noon to the corner, as well as working up the 8 p.m. dead reckoning (DR) position for the ship.
“I worked the course from noon until what we call the ‘corner’; that is, 42 north, 47 west. I really forget the course now. It is 60º 33 ½’ west [meaning S 60° 33.5’ W] - that is as near as I can remember - and 162 [nautical] miles to the corner.”
The 162 miles quoted in the transcript is clearly an error since we know how far the ship already had traveled by noon that day and the route that she was following. Most likely it was a transcription error resulting from the transposition of the last 2 digits. How do we know this? The evidence comes from an exchange between Senator Smith and fifth officer Lowe regarding the speed of the vessel.14
“Her speed from noon until we turned the corner was just a fraction under 21 knots…I used the speed for the position at 8 o'clock, and got it by dividing the distance from noon to the corner by the time that had elapsed from noon until the time we were at the corner…If you take the average speed from 12 to 6 - that is giving her a run of six hours - she will not jump up in two hours, from 12 to 6 o'clock, from that average speed. You have six hours in there to take a mean on.”
Lowe handed Smith a slip of paper and said, “This is the only figuring that is required to get the speed.” Smith then asked, “And you are able to say that the speed at that time was 21 knots?” Lowe then replied, “Twenty-one knots or under; it was really 20.95, about. If the speed had been increased or reduced during the interval when I was off duty, I would have been informed of it.”
What was written on the paper Lowe handed Smith? Lowe said he calculated the speed of the ship to get his 8 p.m. DR position by taking the distance from noon to the corner and dividing it by the time from noon to the corner. The time he said he used was from 12 to 6 o’clock, a six hour run. The speed he showed Senator Smith was 21 knots. If you now take that speed and multiply it by the time he used you will get 21 x 6 = 126 nautical miles.
The slip of paper that fifth officer Lowe handed to Senator Smith probably looked something like what is shown below.
We will revisit Lowe’s claim that the speed was really 20.95 knots later on, but there is a second method for verifying the distance from noon to the corner. If the remaining distance to the corner was 126 miles, then the total distance from Daunt’s Rock to the corner over the route Titanic traveled should work out to 1549 + 126 = 1675 miles. Luckily we have 1911 log card data from the first three westbound voyages of Olympic, Titanic’s sister ship, to compare this with.15 What we find is that Olympic’s first westbound crossing had a total distance run from Daunt’s Rock to the corner of 1677 miles. For Olympic’s second westbound crossing, the total distance to the corner came to 1674 miles. And for Olympic’s third westbound crossing, the total distance to the corner came to 1676 miles.
Noon positions and distance data for the first three days of each of these three Olympic crossings are given in the table below.16
What we see from all this data is that the distance from Daunt’s Rock to the corner falls between 1674 and 1677 nautical miles. The value we get for Titanic using the 126 miles derived from Lowe’s testimony is 1675 miles, a value which fits nicely within that narrow range. Knowing the route of travel and the distances ran for the first three days of Titanic’s maiden voyage, approximate positions for Titanic at local apparent noon for each day have been made. This data is provided in the table below.17
The chart below shows the noontime positions for each of Olympic’s first three westbound crossings of 1911, as well as approximate noontime positions for Titanic on her 1912 maiden voyage. Also included on the chart is the location of the Titanic wreck site, and Titanic’s reported position by wireless to the La Touraine at 7 p.m. GMT on April 12.
LOCAL APPARENT NOON TO THE CORNER
So what was Titanic’s likely position at local apparent noon April 14, 1912? To get the coordinates of local apparent noon we take the course given by fifth officer Lowe, 240.6° using modern notation, and go back 6 hours at 20.95 knots (125.7 nautical miles) on the reciprocal of that heading. When we do this we find Titanic’s noon position for Sunday, April 14, at 43° 01.7’ N, 44° 31.4’ W.18
According to second officer Charles Lightoller and third officer Herbert Pitman, Titanic’s course was set at noon that Sunday.19 The course heading given to the helmsman and marked on the course board was S 85° W (265°) by the steering compass in the wheelhouse.20 But we have just seen that the course to the corner from the ship’s noon position was about 240.6° true. The difference between the true heading and the compass heading, about 24.4° in this case, represents the compass error caused by magnetic variation and compass deviation. According to third officer Pitman and fourth officer Boxhall, Titanic’s course was altered at 5:50 p.m., a time that was also recorded in the night orders book.21 After the course was altered, Titanic was heading N 71° W (289°) by the steering compass in the wheelhouse.22 The change in compass heading from S 85° W to N 71° W was a change of 24 degrees to starboard on the steering compass. From this information it seems clear that the intended change in the ship’s true heading at 5:50 p.m. was to put the ship on a rhumb-line course close to 265° true taking it to a point south of the Nantucket Shoals lightship, the proper course from the corner to
At the British Inquiry second officer Lightoller was asked about the course that the ship was making when it was handed over to him at 6 p.m. His answer was: “I cannot remember the compass course. I know from calculations made afterwards [author’s emphasis] that we were making S. 86 true.”24
The calculations that Lightoller was referring to were made by fourth officer Boxhall after he worked up a set of celestial star sights taken by Lightoller and third officer Pitman about 7:30 p.m. As Boxhall explained to Senator Burton at the American Inquiry, “After I had worked these [stellar] observations of Mr. Lightoller's I was taking star bearings for compass error for myself, and was working those out. That is what kept me in the chart room most of the time. I was making computations most of the time.”25
From Boxhall’s testimony at the British Inquiry:26
15315. Between 4 and 6, while you were on watch do you remember the course being altered? – [Boxhall] The course was altered at 5.50.
15316. Do you remember what it was altered to? - I do not remember the compass course, but I remember the true course was S. 86 W. [266° true.]
15317. I think you worked that out yourself? - Yes, I had stellar observations afterwards [author’s emphasis].
It is quite clear from both Lightoller and Boxhall that the ship’s true heading after altering course at 5:50 p.m. was 266° true. However, it is also quite clear that a heading of 266° true was determined much later on when Boxhall was able to ascertain the ship’s correct heading after working up the ships position from the 7:30 p.m. star sights. When the ship’s course was altered at 5:50 p.m., the intent was to have her make 265° true for the Nantucket lightship, the charted course to
THE DELAYED TURN AT THE CORNER
On the fourth day of the American Inquiry, Titanic’s third officer Pitman was asked:28
Senator FLETCHER. Did you change the course of the ship after leaving Queenstown? Mr. PITMAN. Change the course of the ship?
Senator FLETCHER. Yes.
Mr. PITMAN. A number of times.
Senator FLETCHER. Where was the last change of direction made? Mr. PITMAN. 5.50 on Sunday night.
Senator FLETCHER. Sunday night? Mr. PITMAN. Yes.
Senator FLETCHER. Where was that change made? Mr. PITMAN. I can not remember the position.
Senator FLETCHER. Before that, were you traveling along the southerly track? Mr. PITMAN. Yes.
The southerly track for westbound ships to the coast of the
Pitman was further asked:
Senator FLETCHER. What course were you on, if you can remember, at 5.50 p. m., Sunday?
Mr. PITMAN. No, I can not remember. If I had the true course, I could make it.
Senator FLETCHER. What extent of change did you make in the course at 5.50 p.m., or about that time, Sunday?
Mr. PITMAN. I am not quite certain about that.
Senator FLETCHER. Do you know any such designation as the "corner?"
Mr. PITMAN. Yes, we were supposed to be at the corner at 5.50 [author’s emphasis].
Senator FLETCHER. What do you mean by that? Mr. PITMAN. That is 47° west and 42° north.
Senator FLETCHER. At 5.50 p. m. you turned what you call the “corner?'' Mr. PITMAN. The corner, yes.
Then 36 days later at the British Inquiry we have this from Mr. Pitman:
15174. And, so far as you know, was the steamer's course deflected at all from the course that had been marked out at noon; did it vary to the south, or in any way from the course which had been marked out at noon? – [Pitman] Yes, I considered we went at least 10 miles further south than was necessary.
15175. Do I understand you rightly that in marking the course at noon, the course was marked 10 miles further south than you considered necessary? - No. We had a certain distance to run to a corner, from noon to certain time, and we did not alter the course so early as I anticipated. Therefore we must have gone much further south [author’s emphasis].
15176. When did you alter the course? - 5.50.
15177. Who was responsible for the alteration? - The Commander. 15178. To whom did he give the order? - The Officers of the watch. 15179. Do you know their names? - Mr. Wilde.
15180. Were you there? - No.
15181. Do you know what conversation took place? - No.
15182. But you say he gave instructions to alter the course of the ship? - The course was altered at 5.50. They were the Commander's orders.
15183. Ten miles further south. Was any record made of that at the time? - No, and I thought that the course should have been altered at 5 p.m..
15184. Why did you think so? - Judging from the distance run from noon.
This is a very different story from what he told in
And Pitman was not alone in claiming that the ship turned the corner late. Fourth officer Boxhall had this to say about it at the British Inquiry:
15661. Am I right in thinking that the course as marked on the chart is S. 85 W. when you take your turn. I believe it is about S. 85 W. [265° true]? – [Boxhall] Yes.
15662. So that as I follow, the "Titanic" had run on, you say for 50 minutes longer than she otherwise would? - Did I say that?
15663. I thought you said 5.50? - I have not said that so far, but I wish to say it now. I wish to explain it. The night order book was written out and there was an order for the course to be altered at 5.50.
15664. You saw that in the order book? - Yes, I saw it and I remarked to the Chief Officer [Wilde] between 4 o'clock and 6 o'clock that I considered the course ought to have been altered some considerable time before 5.50 - that is, if it was meant to be altered at the corner, 42 N., 47 W. Whether we spoke to the Captain about it or not I do not know. I just remarked that to the Chief Officer, and the course was altered at 5.50. I consider that the ship was away to the southward and to the westward of that 42 N. 47 W. position when the course was altered [author’s emphasis].
A chart was then given to Boxhall and the questioning continued:
15666. We have all noticed there is a point on the course, as marked on the chart, where a westbound ship turns, what you call the corner, is that what you refer to as 42 N. 47 W.? - That is so.
15667. And then your view is that the ship, when she turned on her new course at 5.50 had run beyond that corner? - Yes.
15668. And, therefore, was to the south of it? - Yes, to the south and to the westward of it.
15669. Then when she is put on her new course, her new course you tell me was S. 86 W.? - S. 86. W. [266°]
15670. Though your impression is that as it is marked on the chart the course there marked is S. 86 W.? - I think it is about S. 84 3/4 W. [264.75° true] as a matter of fact.
The course line on the chart shown to him was the proper course from the corner to just south of the Nantucket lightship, a course that was very close to S 85° W (265°) true. Notice that Boxhall thought the proper course was just under 265°, but he knew that the ship was really making 266° true after he worked up the 7:30 star sights later that night.
15671. The effect would be she would have run a little bit further on the old course and then on the new course she is gradually making back to the line? - That is my impression of the idea which Captain Smith had in altering that course and setting it to that time.
15672. If she was going 22 knots and ran past the corner for 50 minutes that means she? - I did not say 50 minutes.
15673. No, I know you did not? - I do not remember what time it was but it was some considerable time; the difference I make between my time and the time that was given in the book - well there was such a big difference that I considered it worth mentioning to the Senior Officer of the watch.
Unlike Pitman, who said he thought the ship should have been at the corner 50 minutes before her course was actually altered, Boxhall was not about to get himself pinned down with any estimate for the overrun. But, like Pitman, he was claiming that the ship ran past the corner for some time before her course was altered, and believed that it was what Capt. Smith intended to do. Furthermore, he assumed that the 266° course that the ship was really on was intended to work the ship gradually back to the original 265° course line.
Before we examine why these two officers believed that the ship must have gone beyond the corner, let us consider the evidence as we know it.
Based on the total distance the ship traveled since taking departure off Daunt’s Rock lightship, and also from data independently supplied by fifth officer Lowe, we find that Titanic was about 126 miles from the corner at noon, April 14. The time from noon to when the ship’s course was subsequently altered was 5 hour and 50 minutes.
According to third officer Pitman, he thought the ship was making about 21 ½ knots Sunday afternoon. He said he based his estimate “by the log and the revolutions.” “I think about 75 [revolutions]. She never exceeded 76 revolutions at any part of the trip.”29 If Titanic was 126 miles before the corner at noon and traveling at a speed of 21.5 knots over ground as Pitman suggested, she would be at the corner 5 hours and 52 minutes past noon. If Titanic was making 22 knots over ground, as Boxhall later used when working up his CQD position, she would be just a little over 2 miles past the corner when her course was altered at 5:50 p.m. No matter how you look at it, it appears that Capt. Smith intended to be at the corner when he wrote 5:50 p.m. into the night orders book, baring any drift caused by the effects of leeway, steering error, or current.
So what did Capt. Smith assume about the speed of the ship Sunday afternoon? If we take 126 miles and divide it by 5 hour 50 minutes we get a speed of 21.6 knots over ground. But the Titanic ran 546 nautical miles from local apparent noon April 13 to local apparent noon April 14, a period of time that lasted 24 hours and 45 minutes.30 This means that the average speed over ground since noon the previous day was about 22.1 knots. Did Capt. Smith use a speed that was ½ a knot less for Sunday afternoon because of sea conditions that existed near noontime when the ship’s course was set? We know that the revolutions carried at that time had not changed much since noon Saturday.31
Evidence suggesting that sea conditions may have been a bit rougher that afternoon comes from Archie Jewell, one of the lookouts on Titanic and a witness called before the British Inquiry. Jewell was asked about the practice of conducting a lifeboat drill by the deck crew using the ship’s two emergency boats (lifeboats No. 1 and No. 2) that were always kept at the ready. Jewell explained that it was the practice on White Star Line vessels to do so on a Sunday, once on the outbound voyage, and once on the inbound voyage. However, that Sunday it was not done because of strong wind conditions. “It was blowing hard that day; there was a strong wind that day; that was the reason why it was not done.” He was then asked about the sea becoming smooth, to which he said that it was smooth at the time of the accident. When asked when was it that the wind had gone down, Jewell replied, “It went down as the sun began to go away.”32 We also have supporting evidence from the log of the Californian that indicates that there was a “fresh wind” (17-21 knots)33 out of the “north-northwest” with a “moderate sea” (6-8 ft)34 and “clear weather” in the vicinity of the corner just six hours before Titanic arrived there.35 These conditions are shown in the following photograph, courtesy of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
It would be no surprise that some small allowance for sea state may have affected what Capt. Smith assumed for a speed-made-good over ground in setting the time for the corner to 5:50 p.m. instead of allowing 5:44 p.m. by assuming the ship was still making close to 22 knots. Later that evening, after the ship entered calm conditions, an average speed-made-good of 22 knots was indeed used for dead reckoning work. As Boxhall said, “taking into consideration that it was smooth water and that there ought to have been a minimum of slip, I allowed 22 knots.”36
So we have just seen why Capt. Smith may have allowed 21.6 knots from noon to the corner, but what about fifth officer Lowe’s 20.95 knots? We have already seen that Lowe derived that speed by dividing the distance from noon to the corner by 6 hours of time. But the ship did not turn the corner at 6 p.m. as Lowe seemed to suggest. The course was altered at 5:50 p.m. If we divide 126 mile by 5 hours 50 minutes we get a speed over ground of 21.6 knots, which is close to Pitman’s estimate for the speed of the ship. Was Lowe trying to hide something from Senator Smith when he handed him his calculation? Not necessarily. Lowe was on duty from noon to 4 p.m., and then again from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m. When he came back on at 6 p.m. he replace sixth officer James Moody who was on duty when the ship’s course was altered. If Moody told Lowe that they just completed the turn minutes before without being any more specific than that, Lowe may have assumed that it was close enough to 6 p.m. that using the precise time, which was written in the night orders book, was just not worth worrying about. When he went to work up the 8 p.m. dead reckoning position for the night orders book he may have simply divided 125.7 miles by 6 hours to get 20.95 knots. He then multiplied this speed by 2 hours to get a distance of 41.9 miles from the corner on the 265° course line. If this is what he did to get the 8 p.m. DR position, then the coordinates that he would have given Capt. Smith to mark on the chart would be at 41° 56’ N, 47° 56’ W, on the rhumb line from the corner to the Nantucket Shoals lightship.
As fifth officer Lowe told Senator Smith at the American Inquiry:37
“From 6 to 8 I was busy working out this slip table…and working a dead-reckoning position for 8 o'clock p.m. to hand in to the captain, or the commander of the ship…That was to indicate the position of the ship at that time, 8 o'clock…We simply put the slip on the table; put a paper weight or something on it, and he comes in and sees it. It is nothing of any great importance [author’s emphasis]…It has always been done, so that the position of the ship might be filled in the night order book…I am saying that in the general run of things it is not of any importance [author’s emphasis].”
The chart below shows the ship’s likely position at local apparent noon for April 14, 1912. Also shown is the 8 p.m. DR position that was worked up by fifth officer Lowe from the information he provided. Position times on the chart are noted in ship’s time, called Apparent Time Ship (ATS), and is written using 24 hour format.38
We will come back to the question of why third officer Pitman and fourth officer Boxhall later believed that the ship had to have gone a significant distance past the corner after we consider the 7:30 p.m. stellar observations taken by Lightoller and Pitman, and the CQD position that was subsequently worked out by Boxhall from that position.
(Go to part 2)
Notes for Part One
1 Samuel Halpern, “A Minute of Time,” THS Titanic Commutator, Issue No. 171, 2005, and Issue No. 172, 2006.
2 Sir James Bisset, Tramps and Ladies, Angus & Robertson, 1959, p. 278.
3 The standard international call sign for distress had recently been changed from CQD to SOS. During the night of April 14 and morning of April 15, Jack Phillips was sending out both.
4 AI p. 759.
5 From the transcript of Robert Hunston's Wireless Document, "The Titanic Disaster as Viewed from Cape Race," we have: 10:25 pm (EST) - J.C.R. Goodwin on watch hears Titanic calling C.Q.D. giving position 41.44 N 50.24 W about 380 miles SSE of Cape Race; 10:35 pm (EST) - Titanic gives corrected position as 41.46N 50.14W. A matter of 5 or six miles difference. He says "have struck iceberg."
6 Capt. L. Marmaduke Collins, The Sinking of the Titanic – An Ice-Pilot’s Perspective, Breakwater Books, Ltd., 2002, pp. 179-182.
7 David G. Brown, “Titanic: Changing Course,” January 13, 2008, originally posted on the GLTS website [www.glts.org/articles/brown/changing_course.pdf].
8 Dr. Robert Ballard, The Discovery of the Titanic, Madison Publishing Inc., 1987, p. 199.
9 Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report, “RMS Titanic - Reappraisal of Evidence Relating to SS Californian,” March 12, 1992.
10 Dave Gittins, Titanic: Monument and Warning, an e-book, copyright 2005 by D. Gittins. Also refer to: "The SOS ‘Position.’ Boxhall gets all boxed up.," [users.senet.com.au/~gittins/sospos.html]
11 BI 15661 and BI 15670. Also from the Wreck Commission Report on the Loss of the Titanic: “Before the Titanic disaster the accepted mail steamers outward track between January 15th and August 14th followed the arc of a great circle between the Fastnet Light and a point in latitude 42° N. and 47° W. (sometimes termed the ‘turning point’), and from thence by Rhumb Line so as to pass just south of the Nantucket Shoal light vessel, and from this point on to New York. This track, usually called the Outward Southern Track, was that followed by the Titanic on her journey.”
12 Samuel Halpern, “Keeping Track of a Maiden Voyage,” ITHS’s White Star Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, August 2006. And also posted as an Encyclopedia Titanica Research Article
13 Courtesy of Mark Chirnside.
15 The departure dates and times for Olympic at the Daunt’s Rock lightship were: Voyage 1 - 4:22 p.m. GMT, June 15, 1911; Voyage 2 - 2:02 p.m. GMT, July 13, 1911; and Voyage 3 - 1:47 p.m. GMT, August 10, 1911.
16 The run distances from noon of the third day to the corner (42N,47W) that are shown were based on Olympic’s noontime position on the day she was at the corner.
18 Rounding off to the nearest whole minute-of-arc gives: 43° 02’ N, 44° 31’ W. Middle-latitude sailing computations are used here. The change in latitude is computed by multiplying the distance by the cosine of the course angle. The change in longitude is computed by multiplying the distance by the sine of the course angle and dividing the result by the cosine of the mean latitude. (Ref.: The American Practical Navigator [Bowditch], 2002, Bicentennial Edition, Ch. 24, section 2415.) Traverse tables can also be used in the solution, but because the traverse tables are for integral values of the course angle and distances, interpolation for intermediate values are required.
19 BI 13468 and BI 15173.
20 BI 17587.
21 BI 15663-15664, and BI 15176. It should be mentioned that QM George Rowe was at the wheel when Titanic’s course was altered for the
22 BI 17590. At the British Inquiry second officer Charles Lightoller said, “The [steering] compass course is not the compass we go by. I believe by standard [compass] we were steering N. 73…I think that works out as 73 by [standard] compass, and 71 was the steering compass.” If Lightoller was correct, it would indicate a 2° difference in deviation error between the standard compass amidships and the steering compass in the wheelhouse when the ship was on that particular heading (see BI 13501).
23 BI 15661. Adding 24° to Lowe’s 240.6° gives a course of 264.6° true which is very close to Boxhall’s S 84 ¾ W (264.75° true) when asked about the rhumb line course that was marked on the chart (see BI 15670).
24 BI 13498.
25 AI p. 932.
26 Boxhall also told the British Inquiry (on Day 13) that: “I had the 7.30 position in my work book...I had used that same position two or three times after giving it to the Captain, and that same course I used two or three times after giving it to the Captain as well, between 10 o'clock and the time of the collision, for the purpose of working up stellar deviations.. .checking the compass error.”
27 On page 27of the Wreck Commission Report they wrote: “At 5.50 p.m. the Titanic’s course (which had been S. 62° W.) was changed to bring her on a westerly course for New York…altering course at 5.50 p.m. about four or five miles south of the customary route on a course S. 86° W. true.” The course S 62° W is 242° true. They got that result by simply subtracting 24°, which was the change in magnetic heading that the ship took at 5:50 p.m., from the 266° true heading that Boxhall gave them. However, Lowe seemed very sure that that the course to the corner from noon was 240.6° true as we have seen. Some Titanic researchers have used 242° as the true course for the ship prior to the turn at 5:50 p.m. for same reason the Wreck Commission did. However, this is not necessarily the correct answer even if the true heading after the turn was later seen to be 266° true. The reason is that a change of 24° in compass heading may not correspond to a 24° change in true heading because compass deviation error is a function of the ship’s magnetic heading, which depends on the true heading and magnetic variation. Compass deviation is simply not a constant. We can easily see this in compass data taken from Olympic for both the standard compass and the steering compass. In one example, at 4:40 p.m. on March 29, 1931, Olympic turned from a heading 243.25° true to a heading of 260.75° true, a change of 17.5°in her true heading. However, on the steering compass the course went from 269° to 284°, a change of 15°. It was noted that the steering compass deviation was 1 ¼ degrees east when heading 269°, and changed to 3 degrees east when heading 284°; almost a 2 degree increase in compass deviation for a 17.5° change in true course.
28 AI p. 303.
29 AI p. 274.
30 The reason that the time was greater than 24 hours is that clocks were adjusted back by 45 minutes at midnight on April 13 because of the westward change in the ship’s longitude. Just like today you have to set your watches back by one hour for each time zone that you cross when traveling westward.
31 Samuel Halpern, "They Were Gradually Working Her Up" [www.geocities.com/samuel_halpern/WorkingThenUp.htm]
32 BI 272-280.
33 Beaufort Scale Force 5. See “Estimating Wind Speed and
37 AI p. 383.
38 To convert Titanic ATS for April 14 to GMT, you need to add 2 hours 58 minutes to the ATS times.
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Added to Encyclopedia Titanica Sunday 18th January 2009, last updated Tuesday 11th March 2014.