WHAT time did the first lifeboat depart the Titanic?
Many will immediately offer: ‘12.45am.’ But this response should be thought through a great deal more, as it seems terribly late.
This article argues that the conventional time for departure of the first Titanic boat (commonly agreed to be number 7) has no good basis and should be discarded.
The first lifeboat likely left much earlier. And certain things flow therefrom.
Let’s remember the bookend times of the entire drama: 11.40pm for the collision, with a 2.20am sinking. These are the parameters on which most witnesses are agreed. It makes sense to accept them.
11.40pm
Titanic Second Officer Charles Lightoller: ‘About 20 minutes to 12, I believe’ (US p.432); Steward George Crowe: ‘About 11.40… a little impact…’ (US p.614); passenger James McGough: ‘I was awakened at 11.40’ (US p.1143); W/o Harold Bride: ‘Twenty minutes to twelve’ (US p.905). Senator Smith concludes: ‘At 11.40; everybody seems to be agreed on that’ (US p.905).
All that is known is that the ship has struck. It takes time to assess the situation and realise how badly.
It seems that at about midnight, twenty minutes after the collision, Captain Smith fully knew (from personal inspection, reports and advice) that his ship would sink.
 |
| August H. "Gus" Weikman Daily Mirror |
 |
| Thomas Andrews Maunsell |
 |
| John T. Hardy Daily Sketch |
 |
| George Alfred Moore UK National Archives |
 |
| Frederick Dent Ray Philadelphia Evening Bulletin |
 |
| Bruce Ismay Contributor |
 |
|
Fourth Officer Boxhall The Graphic |
Barber Gus Weikman wore a wristwatch:
”I was sitting in my barber shop… at 11.40pm, when the collision occurred. I went forward… on G deck… Water was coming in the baggage room on the deck below...
I then went upstairs and met Mr [Thomas] Andrews, the builder, and he was giving instructions to get the steerage passengers on deck. I proceeded… to my room on C deck. I went on the [forward well deck] and saw some ice lying there. Orders were given, “All hands to man the lifeboats, also to put on life belts.”
[US p. 1099]
Mr Dodd, second steward, gave these orders, indicating the seriousness of the situation was grasped at an early stage. Earlier, on E Deck, Weikman said he “met the Captain returning from G deck… with Mr Andrews.”
Stewardess Annie Robinson, also on E Deck, saw the Captain too:
13282. “The mail man passed along first, and he returned with Mr McElroy and the Captain and they went in the direction of the mail room.”
Albert Haines, bosun's mate, was already dressed when the collision occurred. He heard air escaping and ran forward to the forepeak tank. There he found Sailor Hemming and Chief Officer Wilde – specifically identified.
Haines: The Chief Officer then went on the bridge to report.
Senator Smith: What time was that?
Haines: The right time, without putting the clock back, was 20 minutes to 12.
Smith: What was done then?
Haines: I went down to look at No. 1 hold… I went on the bridge and reported to the Chief Officer… He gave me an order then, to get the men up and get the boats out.
[US p.656/7]
Samuel Hemming stated in both America and Britain that he was alarmed within ten to 15 minutes of the collision:
17739. [The bosun] told us to turn out, that the ship had half an hour to live, from Mr Andrews; but not to tell anyone, but to keep it to ourselves.
(17740. Repeats same)
17741. When was this? how long after the jar which you heard? — About ten minutes, I should say.
“The bosun came, and he says, ‘Turn out, you fellows,’ he says; ‘you haven't half an hour to live.’ He said: ‘That is from Mr. Andrews.’ He said: ‘Keep it to yourselves, and let no one know.’”
Senator Smith: How long was that after the ship struck this ice?
Hemming: “It would be about a quarter of an hour, sir, from the time the ship struck.”
[US p. 664]
Second class steward John Hardy says:
”I went among the people and told those people to go on deck with their lifebelts on…
[US p.587/8]
Smith: What did you say?
Hardy: Just, "Everybody on deck with lifebelts on, at once."
...That was early… it was about a quarter to 12, I should say. [US p.593]
Senator Fletcher: You began giving this alarm about what time after the collision?
Hardy: I should think about between 20 minutes and a quarter to 12. I sent for all hands at once.
Fletcher: That was immediately after the collision? - Yes, sir…
Fletcher: Your recollection is that you had the order to give the alarm to put on lifebelts immediately after the collision?
Hardy: Yes, sir; within five minutes after the collision.
Smith: How did that order come?
Hardy: From Purser Barker; that is Purser Barker brought it himself personally to me.
Smith: How was it transmitted, do you know? Did it come from the Commander?
Hardy: Yes, sir; to the two pursers. There is a first class purser and a second class purser. They would get it direct from the bridge, I presume. They are our superiors aboard the ship, and we take our orders through them.
[US p. 594]
Hardy and Hemming agree on an early alert, but Steward F Dent Ray answered differently when asked about the order to get to the lifeboats:
Smith: How long was that after the impact?
Ray: As near as I could make out, it was about 20 minutes. It was around about 12 o'clock.
[US p.802]
Yet able seaman George Moore supports his fellow AB, Hemming, in that sailors were first ordered on deck, and this came extremely early:
”About 10 minutes to 12 the bosun came and piped all hands on the boat deck, and started to get out boats. ...So far as I can say, all the seamen from the forecastle were ordered up to clear away the boats... [US p. 559]
Lookout George Symons said:
11356. What time was this? — By the time I got on [C] deck, it must have been about one bell, a quarter to twelve.
11357. After you had this order from the bosun? — Yes.
11359. — I came on [C] deck and went into the mess room… From there I heard the water come into No. 1 hold… hardly had I looked down there when the order came for ‘All hands on the boat deck.’
…
11418. What time it was when you noticed this water? — I should think, roughly estimating it, it would be about five minutes to twelve, because, as I was on my way to the [boat] deck, they struck eight bells in the crow’s nest. [Midnight]
Lawrence Beesley went on deck immediately after the collision. The ship had stopped. “I stayed on deck some minutes, walking about vigorously... The ship had now resumed her course, moving very slowly through the water...
“I soon decided to go down again, and as I crossed from the starboard to the port side to go down... I saw an officer climb on the last lifeboat on the port side - number 16 - and begin to throw off the cover…”
This evidence all shows that it was long before midnight when sailors were sent to the boat deck to prepare the boats. Orders had already been given by the high command to prepare a full evacuation.
There is much evidence that the decision was taken at the most senior level before filtering down the chain of command, as Hardy indicates.
Bruce Ismay said he went on the bridge within ten minutes of impact and found Captain Smith, who was afraid the accident was serious. This would mean taking all necessary precautions.
Accounts by passengers, arriving on the boat deck, do not accurately record when lifeboats began to be readied. Smith gave that order to senior crew within a very short time, according to the evidence of subordinates.
Officer Joseph Boxhall went below a second time (after a fruitless earlier inspection) and found water rising rapidly. He reported this disturbing fact to Captain Smith, who had already heard similar bad news from Chief Officer Wilde, carpenter Maxwell, and others.
Boxhall afterwards roused officers Pitman and Lightoller.
15379 Could you form any opinion as to how long that [rousing the officers] was after the impact?
Boxhall: “No, but as near as I could judge, I have tried to place the time for it, and the nearest I can get to it is approximately 20 minutes to half an hour.
15380. I think those are the times which are given by Mr Pitman and Mr Lightoller. After calling those officers did you go on to the bridge again? — Yes, I think I went towards the bridge. I am not sure whether it was then that I heard the order given to clear the boats or unlace the covers. I might have been on the bridge for a few minutes and then heard this order given.”
Elsewhere Boxhall said:
15610. Did you hear the Captain say anything to anybody about the ship being doomed? — “The Captain did remark something to me in the earlier part of the evening after the order had been given to clear the boats. I encountered him when reporting something to him… [about water rising rapidly?]
“I said, ‘Is it really serious?’ He said: ‘Mr. Andrews tells me he gives her from an hour to an hour and a half.’ …Evidently Mr. Andrews had been down.”
15611. Can you tell us how long it was after the collision that the Captain said that? — “No, I have not the slightest idea.”
15612. Did you say, as a matter of fact, in America, that it was about 20 minutes after the collision? — “No, I do not think so.”
15613. You could not fix the time? — “I cannot fix the time; I have tried, but I cannot.”
Let’s assume this conversation occurs at midnight - conservative in light of both Hemming’s account of an early Andrews warning and Weikman’s prompt sighting of the builder and Captain together.
At midnight then, Smith learns the Titanic has from 60 to 90 minutes to live.
It is not clear whether this refers to when Boxhall or Smith was told, or from when the Titanic began rapidly taking water (11.40pm).
But as far as Smith should be concerned, he has - practically speaking - an hour from midnight to get his boats in the water. He cannot know his vessel will linger as she did. To the Master, it could even be that Andrews’ estimate is too optimistic and the time available is less than an hour.
Assuming that the Titanic has an hour to live, Captain Smith’s overriding imperative must be to get some lifeboats in the water as quickly as possible, no matter how well or poorly filled.
These are dire straits… and simply not compatible with the first lifeboat being launched at 12.45am – which is no less than an hour and five minutes after the collision!
Smith could not know his ship would live that long.
So why do we accept 12.45am for the first boat’s departure?
And think about this: No-one, in the entire canon of Titanic press reports, and not one single person in evidence at the American and British Inquiries, complains about the length of time taken if 12.45am is a correct time. Take this imaginary quote:
“It was a disgrace. The ship struck at twenty minutes to midnight, and it was over an hour later the first boat was lowered. Imagine! You call that a prompt evacuation? They should all be ashamed of themselves.”
Not a single person said it. Instead, the Times of London reported John Kuhl, a passenger on the Carpathia, on what he gleaned from discussions with survivors:
“They tell him that it was half an hour before a boat was launched.”
[The Times, April 20, 1912, p. 10.]
That it is unclear whether this 30mins runs from when passengers were roused - or from the time of impact - matters not a jot. Both points are absolutely incompatible with a 12.45am launch of the first boat.
What is the absence of ‘long delay’ complaints saying to us?
The Times of April 20th, 1912 indicates half-an-hour, not over an hour, to launch boats
***
 |
| Herbert John Pitman Lloyds Weekly News |
OFFICER Pitman, roused by Boxhall (citing 12-12.10am), was asked:
14949. How long do you think had elapsed between the [collision] and Mr Boxhall coming...? — I should think it must be 20 minutes. [Midnight: Pitman said he was first woken by the jar of impact.]
Later he was asked:
14992. …What [do] you think was the time between the striking of the iceberg and your getting to boat No. 5? Was it an hour, do you think? — No, I should think it would be about 12.20am.
14993. — It was being uncovered then, yes.
14994. Did you see Mr Ismay close to this boat? — I did.
14995. Was he… doing anything? — He remarked to me as we were uncovering the boat, “There is no time to lose.”
There is no time to lose. It has long been speculated (although the basis is hard to divine) that Ismay was privy to the Andrews forecast.
We can surmise that a hasty conference took place on the bridge when the scale of the crisis was grasped. Emergency orders were certainly given, but any briefing did not involve Lightoller or Pitman, who were later summoned by Boxhall. Boxhall himself may have been absent on his second inspection, or in rousing his fellow officers.
Lightoller and Pitman were certainly not aware of the Andrews forecast. As far as they knew, the ship was holed, yet she still appeared steady. They had every reason to believe a localised problem would be contained by bulkheads. Others knew differently.
Pitman said in America that “It was near my watch [from midnight], so I started dressing, and when I was partly dressed Mr Boxhall came in and said… there was water in the mail room. I said, ‘What happened?’ He said, ‘We struck an iceberg.’ So I put a coat on and went on deck, and saw the men uncovering the boats and clearing them away.”
Officer Pitman accounts for the gap between being his called and reaching boat 5 [he estimated at 12.20am] by the fact he first walked along to the after end of the boat deck, met Officer Moody, and heard of ice on the forward well deck. “So, to satisfy my curiosity, I went down there.”
He then went further, to the forecastle head, to see if there was any damage. There he saw a crowd of firemen leaving - since water was entering their quarters. “I said, ‘That’s funny.’ I looked down No.1 hatch, then, and saw the water flowing over the hatch.”
Pitman said he then immediately went to the boat deck, and assisted in getting boats ready. He finally stood by No. 5. “In the act of clearing away this boat a man said to me… very quietly, ‘There is no time to waste.’ I thought he did not know anything about it at all. So we carried on our work in the usual way.” [US p. 276/7]
If Pitman’s 12.20am time seems, if anything, a little late by his account of his actions, we nonetheless accept it. Now he continues that his boat was quickly lowered level:
”I had about five or six men there, and the boat was out in about two minutes.”
[US p. 277]
“The boat went out in two or three minutes…”
[ibid]
This brings the time to 12.23am. “I got her overboard all right, and lowered level with the rail… Then this man in the dressing gown said we had better get her loaded with women and children. So I said, ‘I await the Commander's orders,’ to which he replied, ‘Very well,’ or something like that. It then dawned on me that it might be Mr Ismay… so I went along to the bridge and saw Captain Smith, and I told him... So he said, ‘Go ahead; carry on.’
Pitman’s lack of urgency contrasts with Ismay, but the Captain backs the latter - and another two minutes may have elapsed by the time Pitman returned and stood in No. 5, saying “Come along, ladies.”
We stay with Pitman, because boat 5 determines the departure of boat 7, commonly cited as the first to go.
Lifeboat Seven (detail from Fr Browne photograph. Copyright Society of Jesus)
Pitman specifically says there was no reluctance to board. “I filled my boat fairly easily” [US p.277]. This important point is supported by others.
Mrs F. M. Warren, saved in boat 5 and cited by Gracie (p. 246 original edition) wrote: “People came in so rapidly in the darkness that it was impossible to distinguish them.” At boat 5 there were many, according to testimony, ready to embark. This willingness to go is amply demonstrated by the well-attested few who jumped from the deck as Pitman’s boat was lowering.
Pitman had climbed out a moment before, but Murdoch told him: ‘You go in charge of this boat.’…‘Go away in this boat, old man, and hang around the after gangway.’ Pitman: “I did not like the idea of going away at all, because I thought l was better off on the ship.”
Pitman does still not know. But Murdoch evidently does. “I quite thought we would have to return to the ship again, perhaps at daylight,” said Pitman, but here was Murdoch strangely shaking his hand and saying ‘Goodbye, good luck.’
Senator Smith: When you shook hands... did you ever expect to see him again?
Pitman: “Certainly I did.”
Smith: Do you think, from his manner, he ever expected to see you again?
Pitman: “Apparently not. I expected to get back to the ship again, perhaps two or three hours afterwards.”
[US p. 282]
Murdoch, who worked frenetically all night, must have been aware of the Andrews assessment.
Indeed he had already lowered a lifeboat – the first one to get away, number 7:
Senator Smith. Was it lowered at the same time yours was lowered?
Pitman: “Two or three minutes previously.”
[US p. 289]
We have already seen that it was possibly 12.25 when Pitman arrived back at No. 5. With no trouble or reluctance, the loading might have taken the two minutes he suggests elsewhere – bringing the time to 2.27am.
Senator Fletcher: How long did it take to lower the boat after you got the people into it?
Pitman: “It may have been a minute and it may have been two minutes.”
[US p. 304/5]
It is now 2.29am, and lifeboat 5 has been lowered into the water.
Boat 7, according to Pitman, had been lowered “two or three minutes previously.” Thus number 7 might have reached the water as early as 2.26am – virtually twenty minutes in advance of the time ascribed to it by the British Report.
Pitman was even more specific in Britain than he had been in America:
15036. …How long do you think it was between the time of striking the berg and your boat reaching the water…?
Pitman: “Well, I should think it would be about 12.30 when No. 5 boat reached the water.”
And
15041/2. Did you see any other [life]boat on the water anywhere near you after your boat had reached the water? —Yes, No. 7 was quite close to me.
15043. Was No. 7… in the water before yours or after? — No. 7 was before. It was the first boat launched on the starboard side.
If Boat 7 was lowered “two or three minutes previously” and boat 5 hit the water at 12.30, then No. 7 was away from the ship at 12.27 or 12.28am at the latest.
And Pitman, it should be said, was wearing a wristwatch.
15096. When you gave evidence in America you... were asked: “Can you fix the exact moment when the Titanic disappeared? — ‘Two-twenty exactly, ship’s time. I took my watch out at the time she disappeared, and I said: “It is 2.20,” and the passengers around me heard it.’”
15097. Do you remember giving that evidence? — That is true, yes.
15098. That is correct? — Yes.
There is something of a fetish among modern researchers for imagining that Titanic officers put back their watches at midnight to accommodate a planned adjustment of the ship’s clocks to reflect the likely noon of the following day.
Senator Smith: I neglected to ask you whether, in fixing the time when the Titanic disappeared beneath the water, you gave me ship’s time?
Pitman: Yes; that is ship's time.
Smith: You had the accurate ship’s time? – Yes, sir.
Smith: When were the ship’s clocks set…? – They are set at midnight every night.
Smith: And were they set at midnight Sunday night?
Pitman: No; we had something else to think of.
Smith: Exactly; so that you got the ship’s time …from midnight Saturday?
Pitman: Yes.
Smith: And your watch -
Pitman: Was correct.
Smith: Was correct?
Pitman: Yes, sir.
[US p. 294]
Look carefully at this. Pitman agrees that his watch ran on from midnight on the Saturday. He says his watch was correct from then, not “corrected” on Sunday night.
 |
| Annie Robinson Southampton City Collection |
 |
| Dickinson H. Bishop (University of Michigan) |
Stewardess Annie Robinson, quoted earlier, did put back her watch:
13302. Can you remember at all what time it was when your boat left?
Robinson: — Well, I looked at my watch when the ship went down and it was twenty minutes to two. That was by altered time. [1.40am, forty minutes back from run-on time of 2.20am.]
She put her watch back, but Pitman had “something else to think of.”
Consider the excitement of Ismay at boat 5. Contemplate the dread desperation in “Goodbye, Good luck.” Remember the Andrews’ assessment the Captain told Boxhall about, but of which Pitman was unaware… and see that Pitman’s account, with its careful estimates, and precision in relation to the bookend times, reflects a prompt lowering of lifeboat 5.
Pitman says his boat left at 12.30, and the first boat, No. 7, two or three minutes earlier.
***
WHAT is the basis for a 12.45am departure of boat 7?
Here is another epiphany: Just one Titanic passenger, at the American Inquiry, cited such a time for the first boat.
American passenger Dickinson H. Bishop said:
“I cannot tell, exactly. I imagine the time the boat [7] was lowered was about a quarter to 1.”
[US p.1003]
Yet immediately afterwards came this:
Senator Smith: …Lifeboat No. 7, in which Mrs Bishop and yourself left the Titanic, was the first boat lowered on the starboard side?
Bishop: It was. We had been on the boat deck in the neighbourhood of 10 minutes, watching them prepare the boats for lowering. At that time there were very few people up on deck…”
[ibid]
Ten minutes! Very few people on deck!
Contrast his wife’s testimony. Helen W. Bishop gave precise intervals in her initial evidence of their being re-awakened at midnight and arriving early on top.
“We went up onto the boat deck on the starboard side. We looked around, and there were so very few people up… my husband and I went to the port side to see if there was anyone there. There were only two people… and they followed us immediately to the starboard side. By that time an old man had come upstairs and found Mr and Mrs Harder… [he] told us …he would be back in a moment. We never saw him again. About five minutes later the boats were lowered, and we were pushed in. At the time our lifeboat was lowered I had no idea that it was time to get off.”
About five minutes later and I had no idea that it was time to get off - how does this square with her husband’s time? Both were saved in the same boat! One of them is wrong.
Mrs Bishop repeated her early-sounding phrase:
”We had no idea that it was time to get off, but the officer took my arm and told me to be very quiet and to get in immediately.”
[US p. 999]
Note that Mrs Bishop had ten days earlier told her hometown newspaper, the Dowagiac Daily News [April 20, 1912]: “We were afloat in the lifeboat from about 12.30 Sunday night…”
Passenger George Harder saw the Bishops, and was saved in boat 5, launched after boat 7.
What impression of time does he convey to the American Inquiry?
“I saw Mr and Mrs Bishop, and I saw Colonel and Mrs Astor, and they all seemed to be of the opinion that there was no danger. A little while after that an officer appeared at the foot of the stairs, and announced that everybody should go to their staterooms and put on lifebelts.
Senator Smith: How long was that after the collision?
Harder: …A little after 12 - about 12 o'clock… roughly. So, we immediately went down to our stateroom and took our lifebelts and coats and started up the stairs and went to the top deck. There we saw the crew manning the lifeboats; getting them ready; swinging them out. So we waited around there, and we were finally told ‘Go over this way’… So we followed and went over toward the first lifeboat, where Mr and Mrs Bishop were. That boat was filled, and so they told us to move on to the next one.”
 |
| James Robert McGough Philadelphia Inquirer |
Passenger James R. McGough was saved in boat 7 -
“I was awakened at 11.40pm, ship time; my stateroom was… shared by Mr Flynn… Soon after leaving our stateroom [it was] suggested that we go back to bed, which we did not… It was our intention to go up… but before doing so I rapped on the door of the stateroom opposite mine… Mr. Flynn and I then ascended to… deck A, and after being up there about 10 minutes were notified to put on life preservers… We then had to go all the way… back to our stateroom, which was on E deck.
After procuring our life preservers we went back again to the top deck, and after reaching there discovered that orders had been given to launch the lifeboats, and that they were already being launched at that time.
They called
Acknowledgements
Copyright Senan Molony 2008Courtesy of Senan Molony
© Encyclopedia Titanica (www.encyclopedia-titanica.org) 1996-2008 and third parties (ref: #6002, accessed 6th September 2008 08:23:22 AM)
URL : http://www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/a_time_to_go.html
