Alfred Nichols

[Arun Vajpey]

Senator SMITH. You did not see any of the other boats loaded?
Mr. HAINES. No, sir; I did not see any of them loaded. I came back just in time to take charge of my own boat.

This tends to suggest that Nichols was seen around #9 by Haines when he, Haines, came back and took charge of #9.

Of course, there is another way of looking at this scenario and that involves something that you disagree with Sam, but for the sake of this discussion I'll mention it anyway. It involves accepting the WFB Lifeboat Launching Timeline - which I still do - including the calculation that Lifeboat #9 was lowered at around 01:28am. But the overall conjecture is just that - considering one of the possibilities and no more.......and so please don't scold me .

After his trip below-decks to carry out Lightoller's gangway door order, Nichols would have returned to the boat deck, dismissed his men to other tasks and gone to the port side forward area which was where he had originally received the order. It would have been somewhere between 01:20 and 01:25am by then and Lightoller would not have been in that vicinity - he would have been further aft loading Lifeboat #12 in that timeframe. But Captain Smith would have been in the port side forward area around Lifeboat #2 and if (as I think is likely) he had been present when Lightoller originally gave the order, Nichols would have considered it suffice to inform the Captain what he did or didn't do. The Captain, knowing that Wilde, Lightoller and Lowe were on the port side aft at the time, could have ordered Nichols to go and help with the aft starboard lifeboats. If that was the case, Nichols' first stop would naturally have been Lifeboat #9 at a time when it was filled and ready to be lowered and just as Haines arrived to take charge of it (quote: "I came back just in time to take charge of my own boat").

Of course, Murdoch and Moody would also have been present and it would have been the 1/O who ordered Haines to get into Lifeboat #9 and take charge. But that's besides to the point of reconstructing Nichols' movements and in any case, all 3 of them - Murdoch, Moody and Nichols - were lost in the sinking.

That possibility also fits in with Nichols being seen about 10 to 12 minutes later by Barrett on A-deck just as Lifeboat #13 was about to be lowered.

 

[Roger Southern]

I'll just punt this out there and it has no relevance to the open (or closed) outer door. From my reading of Titanic: The Ship Magnificent, the inner grilles were secured when the doors were open to prevent people falling out. Thus it is possible that (excluding the First Class doors) the grilles were stored secured to the overhead until needed i.e. when the doors were opened for ventilation in service. They pivoted from the top as seen in more than one photo of Titanic. Hence their absence wouldn't directly indicate that they'd been swung up prior to opening the outer door.
Just a thought.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I did not even know about the existence of those inner grilles till Thomas Krom posted about them about 2 weeks ago; I must have missed getting the correct mental picture while reading BB's book (I don't have my copies here in Bangalore; they're back in the UK). From what I have understood by the information provided, the grilles of all other gangway doors or the wreck are reportedly in the locked position; the only exception is the one within the open D-deck door on the port side, the one that Nichols and his men are most likely to have handled.

I hope Thomas is able to clarify and expand on this issue when he reads these posts.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

I have read somewhere that Lifeboat #9 was being swung out as early as 01:00am and since Murdoch, Lowe and Nichols were still with Lifeboat #1 at the time, it is possible that McElroy (who spent almost all his time on the starboard side during the sinking) was in charge of that task. After leaving the vicinity of Lifeboat #1 (perhaps when Symons arrived), Nichols could have very briefly gone to where Lifeboat #9 was being prepared, was seen by Haines and then crossed over to the port side where Lightoller was loading Lifeboat #6.

Arun, No. 9 was uncovered and swung out much earlier than that. Read Ward's testimony. He was by No. 7 as it was being filled because that was his assigned boat. Then when they had enough men to man the boat, and did not want him for it, Ward went to No. 9 and helped them get the cover off and swing it out. That started about the time No. 7 was lowered, which you know was around 12:40. . This observation is supported by Ray who came on deck and was by No. 9 as it was being swung out. Ray mentioned an officer who did not survive being there (and said it was not Murdoch who he knew). He then looked over the rail and saw what he believed to be the 1st boat on the starboard side leaving the ship. Ray then went below to get an overcoat because he was very cold.
Back to Ward. After No. 9 was swung out, he saw a sailor come by and throw a bag into the boat. That sailor was QM Wynn, who said that Moody ordered him into the boat to take charge. He then started to load the boat with women and relinquished control later to Haines after he arrived. Ward also mentioned Murdoch, McElroy and even Ismay around No. 9 as it was being loaded up. Haines said he arrived back at No. 9 with his boat crew (of Peters and McGough) after swinging out all the aft starboard boats (apparently they started with 9, then went to 11, then 13 and then 15 in that order) and took control of the boat as Murdoch came by with a group of women from the port side to complete the loading. It was then lowered to the sea.

By the way, Ward was specifically asked about there being a list when No. 9 was lowered. He said there was no list at all, but the ship was down by the head by a few degrees at that time.

You may also want to read what Wheat had to say about what he saw when he came up to the boat deck after seeing water run down the staircase from E deck to F deck around 12:50-12:55, or thereabouts. Even allowing him a generous 10 minutes to come out on deck, it puts the time that No. 9 was being loaded some time close to 1 o'clock, probably during the time that Lowe was busy lowering No. 1. Also, look at MacKay's testimony to get feel for the time element.

I strongly suggest that you need to stop trying to fit things into a published timeline of boat launchings, and look at all the available evidence first and develop a timeline after.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

Not sure I agree with Sam about this starboard list preventing the D deck door being opened. If it swung out to being near the edge of the hull, the starboard list would keep it open

It's OK not to agree. But we are talking about a relatively heavy port side door being swung out against a starboard list, which would tend to keep the door closed against the ship's side and keep it from being opened easily. On the other had, a starboard side hinged door would, if unlocked, tend to swing open by a starboard. list.

 

[Julian Atkins]

Hi Arun,

Lightoller knew who survived from a number of days on the Carpathia. There was ample time for him to consider matters before the USA Inquiry started and he was summoned.

Consider also the part that Andrews could have played in the launching of the lifeboats. Did he know the capacity of the lifeboats when being launched? I would think he clearly did.

That is all I will comment at this stage, and I would remind you of your disbelief of Lightoller's evidence on other earlier threads.

 

[Thomas Krom]

Consider also the part that Andrews could have played in the launching of the lifeboats. Did he know the capacity of the lifeboats when being launched? I would think he clearly did.

While I am more focusing on my exams right now, I would like to talk a bit about this. Thomas Andrews Jr assisted with the loading of three lifeboats, lifeboat number 5 (in which he helped Eleanor Cassebeer), lifeboat number 3 (in which he helped Albert and Vera Dick) and lifeboat number 12 (in which he helped first class stewardess Mary Sloan). e came onto deck shortly after lifeboat number 7 was lowered (he was seen by
First class saloon steward Edenser Edward Wheelton (1884-1949) down on B-deck opening doors as lifeboat number 7, which Wheelton misidentified as lifeboat number 5, was lowered down). Albert Dick recalled:

"The last that I saw of Mr. Andrews he was standing by the side of the navigating officer, apparently engrossed in a question of how many more women could be squeezed into the boats that remained."

This officer was most likely fifth officer Lowe. Based on his experiences with the Olympic and Welin Quadrant davits there was a considerable risk that the davits could break if a lifeboat was loaded at it's fully capacity from the deck. From most accounts it appears that the full capacity of the lifeboats were different than the recommended lowering capacity. The only thing he could have done was talking sense to the officers' in practice, since he had no authority over the loading not to mention reluctant passengers at the time. Unlike the 1997 movie he never scolded second officer Lightoller about it.

 

[Julian Atkins]

It would have been abundantly clear to Lightoller on the Carpathia that Lowe had loaded lifeboats to a much heavier loading than he had done.

It was probably also clear to Lightoller that Lowe wasn't going to go along with Lightoller's own 'whitewashing' at the Inquiries in all respects.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I strongly suggest that you need to stop trying to fit things into a published timeline of boat launchings, and look at all the available evidence first and develop a timeline after.

With respect Sam, I have been doing exactly that. But the available "evidence" is almost entirely based around survival accounts including testimonies at the Inquiries and as we all know, there are several of those that do not tally with each other. Therefore, it depends upon whose statement one chooses to accept to what extent, which in turn will be based on what else tallies with it and the conclusions one draws based on it. At present we seem to disagree on interpretation based on that kind of matching and I have to confess that so far I have not been able to convince myself to change my mind about the Lifeboat Launching Sequence. The reasons and statement permutations for that are way too detailed, have been discussed before elsewhere and I'd rather not go into all that again in this particular thread. But as you said yourself, nothing is set in stone and there is no harm in waiting for the jury to return with yet another verdict - which in a 'case' like this still may not be the final one.

I would remind you of your disbelief of Lightoller's evidence on other earlier threads.

Julian, if you read my recent Lightoller related posts, you will see that I have not changed my mind about him in the slightest. I still believe that First Officer Charles Lightoller was a very good "Corporate Yes Man" who believed first of all in taking care of number one and try to avoid being drawn into any controversy if at all possible. If anything, it is for those and similar reasons that I believe that Lightoller did not make-up the story about his Gangway Door to Nichols on the very first day of what he knew would be a long drawn-out investigation. There was too great a chance that something would have come-up that could have thrown his testimony out of the window if it was so blatantly false. Nichols might have died in the sinking but Lightoller would have had no idea at that stage who else the boatswain might have met and talked to during the sinking, much less the content of such conversation. And considering the scale of the disaster and the number of people and possible eventualities involved, the time and circumstances on board the Carpathia would hardly have been conducive for Lightoller to work out all the permutations and come-up with 'covering' answers for everything. Whatever else he might have been, Lightoller was not a fool.

It would have been abundantly clear to Lightoller on the Carpathia that Lowe had loaded lifeboats to a much heavier loading than he had done.

It was probably also clear to Lightoller that Lowe wasn't going to go along with Lightoller's own 'whitewashing' at the Inquiries in all respects.

I disagree that Lightoller would have looked at it that way. He was a Senior officer while Lowe was a Junior one, who stated a couple of times during his own testimony that he took his orders from the seniors. Lowe was "under" Murdoch during the loading and launching of the starboard forward lifeboats; later, when he and Lightoller worked alongside on Lifeboats #14 and #12 respectively, Wilde was there in an overall supervisory capacity. Lowe left on Lifeboat #14 nearly an hour before the Titanic sank completely whereas Lightoller was there till the very end. Finally, Lightoller always had Captain Smith and/or Chief Officer Wilde in the vicinity who outranked him and could have overruled any particular order or decision the 2/O made; since neither of those men survived, they were Lightoller's easiest "cover" that he would have needed for almost all his actions. So, I do NOT believe that under such circumstances Lightoller would have made-up what even he acknowledged was not a very clever idea about opening a gangway door on a sinking ship simply as an excuse to cover-up as a reason for only partially loaded lifeboats early on. As I said, he was no fool.

 

[Mike Spooner]

The one thing that puzzle me. If Thomas Andrews was helping out in loading the lifeboats, and was the only person to know that It was safe to load the boats to there full capacity before lowing down them to the water level. Why didn't inform the officers it was safe to do so?

 

[Thomas Krom]

If Thomas Andrews was helping out in loading the lifeboats, and was the only person to know that It was safe to load the boats to there full capacity before lowing down them to the water level. Why didn't inform the officers it was safe to do so?

During the loading of lifeboat number 5 and 3 there was still some hope help would arrive in time. Not to mention that there were a lot of passengers that were still reluctant to leave the ship, and not many people were about. Once again I would like to mention that there was a considerable risk with the Welin davits, even at lower capacities they tended to shake a lot while lowering and while there are some doubts based on that information is either being falsified or kept behind close doors it is believed they could have potentially failed too. From the accounts from all surviving officers, which I posted in another thread, it appears that the loading capacity from the davits was recommended differently than the full capacity of the lifeboats themselves.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

During the loading of lifeboat number 5 and 3 there was still some hope help would arrive in time. Not to mention that there were a lot of passengers that were still reluctant to leave the ship, and not many people were about.

Thanks Thomas. To some extent that would have applied to port side Lifeboats #8 and #6 as well and so the Officers in charge could not be entirely blamed for the partly filled lifeboats early on. It is my belief that it was that reluctance by the passengers, particularly women and children, on the starboard side was one of the main reasons that made Murdoch lower the first few lifeboats only partially filled. He would have wanted to both make a start and set an example for those who followed.

I would like to mention that there was a considerable risk with the Welin davits, even at lower capacities they tended to shake a lot while lowering and while there are some doubts based on that information is either being falsified or kept behind close doors it is believed they could have potentially failed too. From the accounts from all surviving officers, which I posted in another thread, it appears that the loading capacity from the davits was recommended differently than the full capacity of the lifeboats themselves.

Yes, and Lightoller had actually said somewhere early on in his US testimony that he did not consider it safe to load the lifeboats fully while they hung from the new Welin davits. Whether that was true or not, the fact that he believed and admitted to it was in itself a good enough reason to have given about partial loading of lifeboats. With that and the presence of Captain Smith and Wilde in the vicinity, Lightoller did not need to use the gangway door order as an excuse for limited loading of the boats.

But of course, the order he to Nichols was far more impractical and dangerous in itself.

 

[Mike Spooner]

When I read this statement from the B.I. the lifeboats where safe to load full capacity before water borne. Clearly I see this vital information was not passed on to captain or officers.
WILLIAM HENRY CHANTLER, Sworn. Examined by Mr. ROWLATT. 24031. You are a ship Surveyor in the Marine Department of the Board of Trade stationed at Belfast? - Yes. 24032. Your duties are to survey ships for various purposes, but in connection with the “Titanic,” I think your only duties were with regard to the boats? - Yes. 24033. All you did was with regard to the boats? - To inspect the boats while building in the boat builder’s shop. 24034. You have served your Apprenticeship as a shipwright? - Yes. 24035. Including boat building? - Including boat building. 24036. Then you were an Admiralty draughtsman? - Subsequently to my Apprenticeship, yes. 24037. And you have been ship Surveyor to the Board of Trade at Belfast from the 1st March, 1895? - Yes, from the 1st March, 1895, up to the present. 24038. On the 19th May, 1911, did you receive special instructions to look closely into the construction of all new boats? - From the Board of Trade, yes. 24039. That was the 19th May, 1911? - Yes, the 19th May, 1911. 24040. Did you begin to inspect the “Titanic’s” boats on the 30th May, 1911? -Yes. INQUIRY IN TO THE LOSS OF THE S. S. "TITANIC." pg. 1356 24041. After this? - Yes, ten days after. 24042. Did you inspect them carefully? - Yes. 24043. Fourteen lifeboats and the two other boats? - There were 14 section A boats and two of section D. 24044. Were they well made and of good material? - They were well made and of good material. 24045. Would they be safe to lower from the davits full of passengers? - I made a calculation and came to the conclusion that they would be. 24046. Now, what is the full capacity of those boats? - I think it was 618 cubic feet. 24047. How many people ought to be lowered in one of these lifeboats? - Under the statutory Rules they should carry 65. 24048. The boats that you saw, how many people would they take safely from the davits, in your judgment? -Well, as many as the statutory Rules would allow. 24049. How many; cannot you give me a number; it would save a lot of time? -A matter of 70. 24050. Is that marked on the boat in any way? - No, I do not think it is. I did not see the boats on leaving the shop, but my impression is it was not. 24051. You could produce the scantlings of the boats and the materials? - Yes, I can. Mr. Rowlatt: I do not think it is necessary to go further. The Commissioner: I do not think there has been any suggestion that the boats were not well built and of good material. Their capacity may be another thing. Mr. Rowlatt: It was with regard to their strength to carry down the passengers. The Commissioner: There is a suggestion that somebody thought there was a danger of buckling, but there was no buckling, and one of the boats is said to have gone down with seventy people in it? The Attorney-General: Your Lordship is quite right; that is the only explanation we have got of why some of the boats were lowered with comparatively few passengers; that is to say, they were not loaded with their full complement, and the explanation is what your Lordship says. The Commissioner: That is one explanation; but another is that they could not get the people into them. The Attorney-General: Yes; it does not apply to all, I agree. 24052. (Mr. Rowlatt - To the Witness.) Have you made a calculation to find what strain the boats would bear in being lowered? - Yes, I made such a calculation. The results I arrived at were that the stress at the gunwale would be 2 cwts. to the square inch, and at the keel about 2 ¼ cwts. 24053. When did you make that calculation? - After the casualty occurred. 24054. Is that more than the stress which would be brought to bear by the boat being lowered with 70 people in it? - That is the stress that would be brought to bear with 65 persons in the boat, and with the boat suspended from the davits, not water-borne. 24055. Do you say that you made a calculation that shows the boat would stand a greater stress than that produced by the people being in it or not? - The result of my calculation was that - 24056. That it would bear a greater stress? - That it would bear a greater stress. 24057. Much greater? - Considerably greater. 24058. Can you give us a percentage? - Twice as much!!!

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Obviously, the tests were carried out by those knowledgeable in such things. But considering that the Welin davits used on the Olympic class of ships were relatively knew, perhaps there was some uncertainty among the Officers about their safety.

I would like Thomas Krom's take on the information provided in the thread above, but I guess he is pre-occupied with his forthcoming examinations.

 

[yotsuya]

When I read this statement from the B.I. the lifeboats where safe to load full capacity before water borne. Clearly I see this vital information was not passed on to captain or officers.

The issue I see with the testimony you have shared is that virtually every statement applies to the construction and labeling of the lifeboats, not the Davits. The concern of the crew was evidently not the boats, but the davits themselves. Arjun has shared that Lightoller did not consider the new Welin davits capable of lowering a fully loaded boat. And I think the biggest issue in the early boats was a lack of urgency on the passengers part to get in the boats. I don't think the capacity of the perceived capacity of the boats was a factor.