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Message: [QUOTE="Arun Vajpey, post: 402971, member: 146608"] Sam, I have read your exceedingly interesting article on the subject of the collision between the [I]Andrea Doria[/I] and [I]Stockholm [/I]several times in the past year[I]. [/I]Accepting your analysis as correct, I would like to quote some lines from your KEY POINTS leading up to the collision and subsequent CONCLUSIONS. My own points are in [I]italics [/I]and mentioned in terms of apportioning blame for the accident. [B][U]KEY EVENTS[/U][/B] [B]22:40 [/B]- Carstens-Johannsen orders a course change from 089° to 091° for [I]Stockholm [/I]to further compensate for a northerly current drift. [B]22:45:30[/B] - [I]Stockholm [/I]is picked up on [I]Andrea Doria’s [/I]radar at a distance of about 17 nautical miles bearing slightly to the right of the heading flasher. [B]22:53[/B] - [I]Andrea Doria [/I]is picked up on [I]Stockholm’s [/I]radar at a distance of about 12 nautical miles bearing slightly to the left of the heading flasher. [B]22:56[/B] - Carstens-Johannsen plots [I]Andrea Doria [/I]at 10 miles bearing 2° to port. In reality, [I]Andrea Doria [/I]was close to dead ahead [B]23:02[/B] - Carstens-Johannsen plots [I]Andrea Doria [/I]at 6 miles bearing 4° to port. In reality, [I]Andrea Doria [/I]was only 2° to port. [B][I][U]My Point:[/U][/I][/B][I] Although Carstens-Johanssen seems to have made an error of 2-degrees in his estimation – which could be attributed to the Andrea Doria emerging from the fog – he at least spotted correctly that the other ship was to the Stockholm’s port at that stage.[/I] [B]23:05[/B] - Capt. Calamai orders a course change of "4° to the left, nothing to the right" for [I]Andrea Doria[/I]. The two ships are 3.6 miles apart when [I]Andrea Doria [/I]comes on to a heading of 264° 30 seconds later. [B][I][U]My Point[/U]: [/I][/B][I]How could Calamai explain this? If Carstens-Johanssen on board the Stockholm could see that the Andrea Doria was to his ship’s port (albiet not as much as he estimated), then it should be safe to assume that Calamai should have seen that the Stockholm was not very far from a head-on course. In that case, how can a 4-degree change of course to port (left) be justified as it would be directly against the International Maritime Regulations of both ships turning starboard (right) so as to pass each other port-to-port under such conditions?[/I] 23:09 - Carstens-Johannsen orders a 2-point starboard turn on [I]Stockholm[/I]. Distance between ships now at 1.3 nautical miles. [B][I][U]My Point[/U]: [/I][/B][I]At least this can be explained. As per regulations, when there was the risk of 2 vessels being close to head-on, each was supposed to turn to starboard, which Carstens-Johanssen did at that stage.[/I] 23:10 - [I]Stockholm [/I]completes 24° turn. Lookout Johansson calls bridge to tell Carstens that he sees lights about 20 degrees to port. Lights of the [I]Stockholm [/I]starting to appear to Capt. Calamai and 3/O Giannini out on [I]Andrea Doria's [/I]starboard bridge wing and to the lookout out on the bow. [I]Andrea Doria's [/I]2/O Franchini leaves the radar when hearing reports of lights being seen. The ships are now just 0.6 miles apart. [B]23:10:30[/B] - Carstens hangs up the phone and goes out onto [I]Stockholm's [/I]port bridge wing and sees [I]Andrea Doria [/I]showing a green sidelight about to cross his bow from left to right. He orders full right rudder and goes to the engine telegraphs to signal full astern. [B][I][U]My Point[/U]: [/I][/B][I]At that stage Carstens-Johannsen could not have done anything else. Already committed to and completing the starboard turn, he could only ‘hard-right’ further when he saw the Andrea Doria crossing his bows from left to right. Perhaps the ‘full astern’ order was questionable but with the two ships so close to each other by then, would it have made much difference?[/I] Capt. Calamai sees [I]Stockholm [/I]showing a red sidelight and her forward masthead light swinging out to the left of the higher aft masthead light. Calamai orders hard left rudder and calls for a whistle signal be given to indicate a turn to port. [B][I][U]My Point[/U]: [/I][/B][I]At that stage hardening the starboard turn would have been Calamai’s only choice but if [U]he [/U]had ordered a full astern instead of ploughing on at near full speed, was there a possibility that the Andrea Doria might have slowed just enough in those 30 seconds to avoid impact?[/I] [B]23:11[/B] - Impact! The bow of [I]Stockholm [/I]strikes into [I]Andrea Doria [/I]just aft of the starboard bridge wing. [B][U]CONCLUSIONS - WHY DID IT HAPPEN?[/U][/B] 1. The choice of using an eastbound route putting [I]Stockholm [/I]directly into the path of westbound shipping heading to New York just to save a little time and distance. 2. The failure of the [I]Stockholm's [/I]Third Officer to call his captain or suspect fog when he could not see the lights of the fast approaching ship as it came under 6 miles almost dead ahead on his radar. 3. Dependence on an inattentive helmsman (Larsen, who was known to have a tendency to allow his ship to yaw a bit) to keep a steady course and provide accurate heading reports while the third officer was trying to plot the radar picture on [I]Stockholm[/I]. This may also have distracted the Third Officer from concentrating on the approaching vessel once it appeared on the radar. 4. The failure of those on the bridge of [I]Andrea Doria [/I]to plot the radar picture as the situation developed, and the lack of special training by those manning the radar. 5. A possible breakdown in bridge team management on the [I]Andrea Doria [/I]as the Second Officer left the radar upon hearing that lights were becoming visible. Also loss of situation awareness by the OOW of [I]Stockholm [/I]caused by a phone call distraction during critical moments. [B][I][U]My Point[/U]: [/I][/B][I]In my opinion, while considering the levels of responsibility, the first 3 points of error by the crew of the Stockholm would be more than cancelled out with the more serious error by the crew of Andrea Doria of a failure to plot the radar picture as the two ships closed on each other. In the last 30 seconds or so, there were distracting factors on both sides. Taking all above points into account, while there were doubtless errors made on both ships, it seems to me that those made by Captain Calamai of the [/I]Andrea Doria [I]were collectively more serious - ie that left turn against regulations in a tight situations and failure to plot the radar picture. (oddly enough, it reminded me of KLM Captain van Zanten's decision to start his take-off run without clearance from the control tower that led to that awful 1977 Tenerife runway crash). In my opinion therefore Calamai should accept 75% of the blame and Carstens-Johanssen the remaining 25%.[/I] [/QUOTE]

Verification: In which year did the Titanic sail?