Brent Holt
Member
The average ship continued to be built to a minimum standard of 2 compartments flooded before a ship would sink. That continues today.
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David, if the major flooding were confined to only the first four major watertight compartments ahead of watertight bulkhead D, the ship would have settled down by the head to a trim angle of 1.5° and taken in about 6,600 tons of sea water. We know this from step 4 of Wilding's flooding-by-compartment submission that was reproduced in the work of Hackett and Bedford. But the actual curve of trim versus time continues well beyond this, passing almost a 2° down angle within 30 minutes after the collision, and more than a 3° down angle 1 hour after the collision. Those angles are based on eyewitness observations of the flooding level in various locations within the vessel. The reason why the trim angle became greater than 1.5° was that there was a significant amount of flooding taking place in No. 6 boiler room as well as the flooding in the forepeak tank, No. 1, 2, and 3 holds, and a small amount of flooding in the forward bunker of No. 5 boiler room.
45 minutes after the collision water reached the level of E deck in the seaman’s quarters causing a wooden bulkhead to fail there. For that to have happened, the ship had to have trimmed down by the head 2.7° by that time. Only in No. 6 boiler room, the most forward boiler section of the ship just aft of No. 3 hold, would there be enough flooded volume to cause the ship to trim down by that amount within 45 minutes of the collision. At that time, the flooding in No. 1, 2, and 3 holds appeared to have reached close to the level of the outside waterline. From the total intake versus trim angle curves derived from the work of Hackett and Bedford, we know that the total water intake into the ship had to be close to 13,500 tons to produce that particular angle of trim 45 minutes after the collision. Of the 13,500 tons, all but 4,660 tons of water can be accounted for by the flooding in the forepeak, holds 1, 2, 3 , and very small amounts in BR 4 under the plates and the forward bunker in BR 5. That means that it 4,660 tons of water had to be in BR 6 at that time, reaching about 90% of what it would have flooded to if the water had reached as high as the outside waterline in 45 minutes.
My question (now that I answered my Barrett question), is could the flooding from boiler room 5 have been related to the flooding in boiler room 4?
So, if Beauchamps told the truth, what about Barrett? He claims to have issued several commands to his stokers about going to their posts, closing the dampers, etc. Curiously, Barrett was the immediate superior of Beauchamps who said he heard his leading stoker issue those same commands. Both men used virtually the same words about what Barrett ordered. The problem is that if the leading stoker had gone into boiler room #5, then he would have been shouting through a steel bulkhead and closed steel watertight door. Doubtful his voice could have been heard by Beauchamps. This means that Barrett and Beauchamps must have been in the same compartment -- boiler room #6. So much for Barrett's testimony about ducking into boiler room #5. His own words prove that's not where he went. Barrett may well have ducked under a closing watertight door, but not the on between boiler rooms #6 and #5.
My only sources for him is: Poverty Bay Herald June 12, 1912, Bridgewater Mercury April 1912, and Daily Mail, April, 29th, 1912 (this last one may only be partial, I don't know for sure, as it's actually printed in a book, as I cannot find an original)
I was wondering if you can point out any other sources that you may know of besides these three.