I completely agree with Dave regarding the need to formulate a complete picture of what happened and not just to focus on isolated events. The derivation of an equivalent hole opening based on assumed initial flooding rates does not tell the complete story. And I do like his description of those types of details as just "curiosities" in the total story.
To get the total story, however, you need to look at many inputs and then put them through some checks and integration steps. So to add to the list that Dave has started of different considerations I would like to include the following:
Regarding the heeling to port noticed by Lee while the ship was on the ice we should add the heeling to port noticed by Fleet. The difference is that Fleet said the list came not when the she struck the ice but just afterward. They both said she struck just in front of the foremast, that would be in the vicinity of bulkhead B. So the heeling to port would have started about that point and going aft. Both associated the heeling to port with underwater contact with the berg. It should also be pointed out that if the ship was still going at close to 20 knots and turning to starboard after the collision, it would carry a slight heel to port until it steadied up and/or slowed down significantly.
Regarding the list to starboard that most people believe took place immediately after the collision, we have to look at the source. In the US Inquiry it was QM Hichens who said that Capt. Smith looked at the "commutator" which showed a 5° list to starboard only 5 to 10 minutes after the collision. However, in the BOT Inquiry Hichens' time frame changed. There he said it was after 12 that the captain had looked at the commutator and found that the ship was carrying a list to starboard. Also, there were others that noticed a starboard list besides Hichens. Norman Chambers had said he went up from E deck to A deck to investigate after the crash. After noticing nothing unusual, he went back down to his cabin on E deck to get his wife and then they both went back up to A deck where he then he said there was "a noticeable list to starboard, with probably a few degrees of pitch." And he was not the only passenger who noticed the list to starboard early on. Maj. Peuchen was another. "I happened to look and noticed the boat was listing, probably half an hour after my first visit to the upper deck....She listed to the starboard side; the side she was struck on." When Senator Smith asked how long after the collision did he notice the list, Peuchen guessed at 25 minutes. So if we take Chambers and Peuchen as well as both accounts by Hichens, what time do we say the ship developed a noticeable list to starboard? To me it looks like about 20 to 30 minutes, not the 5-10 minutes in Hichen's US testimony.
As far as the impact is concerned, there are many different accounts from hardly noticeable to more severe in nature. Beesley for example said in his book: "there came what seemed to me nothing more than an extra heave of the engines and a more than usually obvious dancing motion of the mattress on which I sat. Nothing more than that--no sound of a crash or of anything else: no sense of shock, no jar that felt like one heavy body meeting another. And presently the same thing repeated with about the same intensity."
Maj. Peuchen described it as: "I felt as though a heavy wave had struck our ship. She quivered under it somewhat. If there had been a sea running I would simply have thought it was an unusual wave which had struck the boat."
Thomas Ranger described it as: "There was just a slight jar - just lifted us off our feet."
It should be noted that in the Beesley description there appears to be two slight impacts. I had found two other sources that also came up with a two impact type of event besides the longer 7 to 10 seconds of grinding sounds that seemed to go along with the collision. One was from Mrs. Churchill Candee who mentioned "There were two distinct shocks" in describing the collision to a reporter. The other is our man at the wheel QM Hichens who apparently told a reporter: "I ain't likely to forget, sir, how the crash came. There was a light grating on the port bow, then a heavy crash on the port bow, then a heavy crash on the starboard side. I could hear the engines stop, and the lever closing the watertight emergency doors." And the Beesley account taken in an interview by a Truro Daily News reporter came out as: "I felt a slight jar and then soon after a second one, but not sufficiently large enough to cause any anxiety to anyone, however nervous they may have been."
Although non of these made it into the testimonies, somehow we (or at least I) get a feeling that there was a lot more to it than a just a simple, constant, underwater grounding event, or a series of little strikes along the side. And I think that is what Dave is getting at. A more complex encounter.
As far as correlating the 12 square feet of openings to the size of the automatic watertight bulkhead doors, that is the one thing I don't get. Dave, you may wish to go a check your data again. The WTDs on the tank top were 4'x5'6" which is 22 sq ft of area. The coal bunker doors were 2'9"x5' which is 13.75 sq ft. So 12 sq ft has nothing to do with the area of the WTDs or bunker doors as far as I can tell.