After having reflected on the wreck, and on all information provided over my lifetime, I am moved to conclusions which heretofore may not have been emphasized collectively, albeit, individually, they may have been noted. I further must include the irony that, had the ship not been so strongly built, she might not have sunk.
In the short version, based on currents and ship's course, the relative movement of the berg would have been athwart and opposite to ship's course, from an angle 10° to 20° off the port bow. At the time of collision, helm was hard over, and the ship was heeling to starboard. Stem was shifting to port, pivot was heading to object, stern was shifting to starboard. First contact was with the flare of the starboard bow, abaft the anchor, which would have induced a counterclockwise torsion, facing forward, and a flexion to port.
The stiff keel would most have resisted flexion, and the bottom in way of deep floors and doubled plating, but just at the turn from double bottom to single thickness, shear forces would have multiplied. A compounding factor enters play here: on this night, the immersed hull, both outer plates and wetted inner plates, in flooded ballast zones, would have been less elastic than those plates warmed by heated air within the ship. Even a fraction of an inch in expansion differential, under the imposed loads, could have resulted in deformation sufficient to leave mechanically caulked seams opened, once the load was removed. Of course, it is possible that some brittle rivets could have failed, but most of those would have been inside the peak tank or double bottom, right forward, and the higher likelihood is that narrow caulking gaps, aggregated over several hundred feet, could have allowed sufficient flooding to endanger the ship. It is not inconceivable that the stretching of starboard plates and compression of port plates, may have induced lesser leakage to port.
The key component in taking the ship down involved the same factors, further aft: as the ship's bow flexed to port, the after section was still driven by momentum, leading to a stretching of the starboard side, laying in a strain that suddenly was disrupted in way of the engine room, where the bed plate webs further dissipated the load, spread among outer plates, inner bottom, and bed plates. But here, elastic differential was greater. Where forward, the inner bottom was in the 30's, and the hold likely was in the 60's, in the engine room, temperatures would have been above 120°, and when we contrast the steel's elasticity there, as well as the dispersion of load at the sudden increase in load-bearing surface, we get a drastic concentration in the outer plates, just forward of the engines, and a second one aft of the engine beds. Rupture of these seams caused the loss of bottom plates shown in the debris field.
Absent this section, the stiffness was reduced so, instead of extra leverage against forward flooding, this allowed the pivot point to be farther forward, thus increasing the speed of depth increase forward and, by extension, the rate of influx as the multiple of the depth. This, joined with the inner plate damage and flooding, may have cost 30 minutes or more in time afloat. Had the pumps only had to contend with overflow into compartment 5, it is possible the ship could have lived another hour, the sea being calm. But with bottom being breached right aft, there was no way to save the ship.
In the short version, based on currents and ship's course, the relative movement of the berg would have been athwart and opposite to ship's course, from an angle 10° to 20° off the port bow. At the time of collision, helm was hard over, and the ship was heeling to starboard. Stem was shifting to port, pivot was heading to object, stern was shifting to starboard. First contact was with the flare of the starboard bow, abaft the anchor, which would have induced a counterclockwise torsion, facing forward, and a flexion to port.
The stiff keel would most have resisted flexion, and the bottom in way of deep floors and doubled plating, but just at the turn from double bottom to single thickness, shear forces would have multiplied. A compounding factor enters play here: on this night, the immersed hull, both outer plates and wetted inner plates, in flooded ballast zones, would have been less elastic than those plates warmed by heated air within the ship. Even a fraction of an inch in expansion differential, under the imposed loads, could have resulted in deformation sufficient to leave mechanically caulked seams opened, once the load was removed. Of course, it is possible that some brittle rivets could have failed, but most of those would have been inside the peak tank or double bottom, right forward, and the higher likelihood is that narrow caulking gaps, aggregated over several hundred feet, could have allowed sufficient flooding to endanger the ship. It is not inconceivable that the stretching of starboard plates and compression of port plates, may have induced lesser leakage to port.
The key component in taking the ship down involved the same factors, further aft: as the ship's bow flexed to port, the after section was still driven by momentum, leading to a stretching of the starboard side, laying in a strain that suddenly was disrupted in way of the engine room, where the bed plate webs further dissipated the load, spread among outer plates, inner bottom, and bed plates. But here, elastic differential was greater. Where forward, the inner bottom was in the 30's, and the hold likely was in the 60's, in the engine room, temperatures would have been above 120°, and when we contrast the steel's elasticity there, as well as the dispersion of load at the sudden increase in load-bearing surface, we get a drastic concentration in the outer plates, just forward of the engines, and a second one aft of the engine beds. Rupture of these seams caused the loss of bottom plates shown in the debris field.
Absent this section, the stiffness was reduced so, instead of extra leverage against forward flooding, this allowed the pivot point to be farther forward, thus increasing the speed of depth increase forward and, by extension, the rate of influx as the multiple of the depth. This, joined with the inner plate damage and flooding, may have cost 30 minutes or more in time afloat. Had the pumps only had to contend with overflow into compartment 5, it is possible the ship could have lived another hour, the sea being calm. But with bottom being breached right aft, there was no way to save the ship.
