Did Captain Smith post the message from the Baltic?

[Arun Vajpey]

I started this separate thread because whether or not Captain Smith eventually posted the crucial ice-related MSG message from the Baltic on the notice board of the chart room of the Titanic is somewhat separate from to the ongoing discussion in another thread about Smith’s motives in giving the message to Ismay in the first place. Both Lightoller and Boxhall categorically denied any knowledge of that message, even though the former was the OOW during the time that Smith might have posted it and the latter, who came on duty a bit later, testified that he spent most of that time in the chart room. That said, while testifying at the British Inquiry, Lightoller said that he had ordered Moody to calculate the approximate time when the Titanic would reach the region of ice and that the latter came-up with 11pm of that fateful Sunday 14th April 1912. Lightoller testified that Moody must have used “some other message” (other than the Caronia one) which he, Lightoller, had not known about and never found out. Based on those statements, some have opined that Moody could only have used the message from the Baltic, which in turn would mean that Captain Smith had indeed posted it in the chart room. However, after laboriously going through both testimonies by Lightoller and related discussions, I was not convinced and believe the 2/O’s statements do not add up and he could have made-up at least some of them.

One of the points that I am making is that the idea that Moody must have used the Baltic message to calculate that the Titanic would encounter ice around 11pm came from Lightoller’s comments during the British Inquiry. While professing not to have known anything about the Baltic message, Lightoller stated that Moody must have used “some other message” – ie other than the one from Caronia that Lightoller knew about – to calculate the time of possible ice encounter. With hindsight, some have argued that Moody could only have used the Baltic message to arrive at the time of 11pm, with which is true only if Lightoller was telling the truth about the whole thing. But was he?

As far I can make out, Lightoller did not mention Moody’s involvement at all during the earlier American Inquiry where he had to testify in Day 1. He told Senator Smith:

Senator SMITH.
No one called your attention to any telegram or wireless from any ship warning you of ice?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Yes.

Senator SMITH.
Who?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I do not know what the telegram was. The commander came out when I was relieved for lunch, I think it was. It may have been earlier; I do not remember what time it was. I remember the commander coming out to me some time that day and showing me a telegram, and this had reference to the position of ice.

Senator SMITH.
Did it warn you?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
It informed us, naturally, and warned us.

Senator SMITH.
What did you do about it?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Worked approximately the time we should be up to this position.

Senator SMITH.
What did you find?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Somewhere around 11 o'clock.

As far as is known, the message that Captain Smith showed Lightoller in the afternoon was from Caronia and here the 2/O appears to be saying that he worked out from that message that the Titanic could encounter ice by 11pm that night. No mention of either Moody or ‘other’ messages. But later at the British Inquiry Lightoller said that his estimate based on the Caronia message was 9:30pm and it was Moody who came up with the 11pm calculation by using ‘some other message’. Lightoller even went on to tell Senator Smith that he informed Murdoch when the latter returned from lunch that "We will be up around the ice somewhere about 11 o'clock, I suppose."

Later during his American testimony, Lightoller responded to the scene when Murdoch took over from him at 10pm.

Senator SMITH.
About 10 o'clock?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
And Murdoch took command?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Did you know at the time?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH.
Can you give us any idea?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
When I ended the watch we roughly judged that we should be getting toward the vicinity of the ice, as reported by that Marconigram that I saw, somewhere about 11 o'clock.

Here Lightoller appears to be saying again that the 11pm estimate was based on the Marconigram that he saw (which was from the Caronia). Again no mention of either Moody or use of other messages for that calculation, but he did mention that he ordered the 6/O to communicate with the lookouts in the Crow’s Nest about watching out for ice; in fact, Lightoller said that he was not satisfied with the way Moody did it the first time and made him do it again correctly.

I’ll stop this post here for now lest it becomes too long but there are other anomalies between what Lightoller said in America and then in Britain and also within the British testimony itself. But at this stage I wanted to highlight the fact that during his American testimony, Lightoller never mentioned Moody in relation to calculating the time that the Titanic could encounter ice but twice said that he estimated the 11pm time based on the (Caronia) message that the Captain showed him that afternoon.

Can someone like @Samuel Halpern please throw some light on this?

 

[Richard C Elliott]

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
It informed us, naturally, and warned us.

Senator SMITH.
What did you do about it?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Worked approximately the time we should be up to this position.

Senator SMITH.
What did you find?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Somewhere around 11 o'clock.

As far as is known, the message that Captain Smith showed Lightoller in the afternoon was from Caronia and here the 2/O appears to be saying that he worked out

What I have done here is to remove your emphasis on Senator Smith's use of the word "you" and instead emphasise Lightoller's words "us" and "we". One could also consider that Senator Smith's "you" could be either singlar or plural. Now the exchange reads in a more general sense and no longer implies that Lightoller personally worked out the time of encountering ice.

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
When I ended the watch we roughly judged that we should be getting toward the vicinity of the ice, as reported by that Marconigram that I saw, somewhere about 11 o'clock.

Here Lightoller appears to be saying again that the 11pm estimate was based on the Marconigram that he saw

Again I've emphasised Lightoller's plural, and I suggest that "as reported by that Marconigram I saw" could simply refer to the general position of the ice region and carries no specific implication that Lightoller personally worked out a time based on any particular Marconigram.

I'm not trying to present an alternative reconstruction of my own here. I am just urging caution about reading too much into the exact wording of testimonial exchanges that may be a bit ambiguous. I think that particular caution is applicable to many examples of Lightoller's testimony at both inquiries. He often comes across as reporting in the passive voice what "was done" (or what he expected was done or even what normal practice said should have been done) rather than actively stating who actually did what.

More generally, though, I doubt whether anybody at the time made a specific point of committing to memory which specific ice warnings were used to estimate encounter times. As I said in the other thread, if Lightoller asked Moody to work out a time he would just assume Moody would check for the most up to date ice information, Moody would do so and neither of them would discuss the warnings by name.

I am really not convinced we can draw any firm conclusions about whether or not the Baltic message was posted from this. I think the time of Moody's estimate and the position of the Baltic warning lend support to the view the message was available to him.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I am really not convinced we can draw any firm conclusions about whether or not the Baltic message was posted from this. I think the time of Moody's estimate and the position of the Baltic warning lend support to the view the message was available to him.

That is assuming that Lightoller was telling the truth when he told the British Inquiry that it was Moody who estimated the possible time of ice encounter that night. Other than Lightoller himself, we only have indirect references by Boxhall about Moody's involvement, and again only at the British Inquiry.

I've emphasised Lightoller's plural, and I suggest that "as reported by that Marconigram I saw" could simply refer to the general position of the ice region and carries no specific implication that Lightoller personally worked out a time based on any particular Marconigram.

I am sorry, but I do not agree. I believe Lightoller was quite clear in the US that the time of 11pm was worked out based on the Marconigram that he had seen and he saw only that from the Caronia. He was testifying at an official inquiry about the main cause that sank the Titanic and he cannot be vague like that and you cannot apply "could simply refer" meanings to such ambiguity.

And how do you explain this:

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I do not know what the telegram was. The commander came out when I was relieved for lunch, I think it was. It may have been earlier; I do not remember what time it was. I remember the commander coming out to me some time that day and showing me a telegram, and this had reference to the position of ice.

Senator SMITH.
Did it warn you?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
It informed us, naturally, and warned us.

Senator SMITH.
What did you do about it?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Worked approximately the time we should be up to this position.

Senator SMITH.
What did you find?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Somewhere around 11 o'clock.

Senator SMITH.
Did you report that fact to anyone?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I did.

Senator SMITH.
To whom?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
The first officer.

Senator SMITH.
What time?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I think when he relieved me at lunch time I spoke about it first. I spoke about it in the quarters, unofficially and I also spoke about it, naturally, when he relieved me at 10 o'clock.

Senator SMITH.
What time did you lunch?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Half-past 12.

Senator SMITH.
What was the conversation between you?

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
I remarked on the general condition of the weather, and so on, etc., and then I just mentioned as I had done previously, "We will be up around the ice somewhere about 11 o'clock, I suppose." That is all.

Lightoller is clearly saying there that he had worked out the time of 11pm by the time Murdoch returned to his position as OOW after lunch and then again "unofficially" in the quarters. I know that he would not have had either the time or leave to do that as the relieving OOW, but am saying it as an example of how I believe Lightoller was making up certain things as he went along. He did not have much time to do that very effectively in the US, but certainly did - and under advice perhaps - to "fine tune" his responses to ice related question that he knew would come-up again during the British Inquiry.

I am just urging caution about reading too much into the exact wording of testimonial exchanges that may be a bit ambiguous. I think that particular caution is applicable to many examples of Lightoller's testimony at both inquiries. He often comes across as reporting in the passive voice what "was done" (or what he expected was done or even what normal practice said should have been done) rather than actively stating who actually did what.

With respect, I believe you are overthinking here to brings things around to your line of analysis. As I said, my first post was only part of what I researched and made notes about Lightoller's testimony; heading to the British Inquiry, there were many other discrepancies, about which I'll discuss as we go along.

With regard to us not taking statements made during an official inquiry into a major disaster by the only senior surviving officer by their exact wording, I have to disagree. While micro-dissection would be unfair, I believe that broad meanings have to make sense and tally with other supportive statements. While Lightoller's Testimonies were largely correct and to the point, there were ambiguous or even complely contrasting interjections at vital points.

But the point of this thread is that the answer to the entire question of what Captain Smith did with the Baltic message after he got it back from Ismay at about 7:15pm that Sunday evening hinges on Lightoller's indirect suggestion that Moody must have worked out the 11pm encounter based on "some other message" that he did not know about himself. He had said nothing of the kind in the US, but had time to take-in and think about both the contents and the "scenic route" that the Baltic message took after it was received, before he testified in Britain. My suspicion is that with limited information available before the US Inquiry, Lightoller committed himself to the 11pm ice encounter time to make it appear that they had all been "ice aware" for several hours leading up to the accident. But in the interim between the two inquiries, Lightoller realized that there were holes in the statements that he had made in the US, but because he could not retract certain points, further embellished the scenario for the British Inquiry "to fit" by bringing Moody's angle in. If Lightoller had done that, it creates an entirely different picture about whether on not Captain Smith posted the Baltic message in the chart room before heading to the Wideners' party.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

I am sorry, but I do not agree. I believe Lightoller was quite clear in the US that the time of 11pm was worked out based on the Marconigram that he had seen and he saw only that from the Caronia. He was testifying at an official inquiry about the main cause that sank the Titanic and he cannot be vague like that and you cannot apply "could simply refer" meanings to such ambiguity.

But was he really trying to give as complete and honest account as possible? You, yourself, have expressed doubt that he was, as in:

That is assuming that Lightoller was telling the truth

You can't have it both ways. If there is doubt about his complete honesty there must also be uncertainty in attempting to assign meaning to his exact form of words.

With respect, I believe you are overthinking here to brings things around to your line of analysis.

And with equal respect I suggest that you may be guilty of the same thing.

I don't actually have a definite "line of analysis" of my own on this though I tend to agree with the analysis of @Samuel Halpern on the question. I am not pushing an opinion here, just urging great caution about overturning one based on examining the minutiae of the testimony of a single witness who many of us suspect may not have been entirely trustworthy.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I've emphasised Lightoller's plural, and I suggest that "as reported by that Marconigram I saw" could simply refer to the general position of the ice region and carries no specific implication that Lightoller personally worked out a time based on any particular Marconigram. I am just urging caution about reading too much into the exact wording of testimonial exchanges that may be a bit ambiguous.

With respect Richard, Lightoller was testifying as the only surviving senior officer at an Official Inquiry into a major marine disaster that had claimed almost 1500 lives. Moreover, in that part of his testimony, the line of questioning was about how the incoming wireless messages containing ice warnings were handled which was both relevant and important to the investigation of the accident, despite what you personally believe. Under those circumstances, the investigator has to consider the witness’ statements as close as possible by the precise wording used and quiz him further for explanation or clarification if the need arose; not worry about singulars and plurals or try to assume what unsaid thing the witness could have been referring to in the statement.

As for overthinking, one does not have to think at all just to quote the official statements made during the testimony. But since those statements remain and cannot now be withdrawn, thinking analytically based on them and forming conclusions is fair game.

But was he really trying to give as complete and honest account as possible?

That's the million dollar question (or pounds, if you prefer; I certainly do) isn't it? If Lightoller was not being completely honest, then the admittedly few deviations might be in any part of his very long testimony. In opining on that, one tends to look at statements which have obvious contradictions or discrepancies from likely facts and question them.

I firmly believe that the fact that Lightoller testified at least twice in the US that the 11pm ice encounter estimate was calculated through the information obtained from a Marconigram that Captain Smith had showed him at lunch time (Caronia) is very significant. Not right then on its own, but certainly when compared with what he testified later in Britain about the same event. Furthermore, Lightoller testified that he had discussed this with Murdoch after the latter returned from lunch, mentioning the estimated 11pm ice encounter possibility. Lightoller even said that he spoke to his colleagues (no names mentioned) unofficially after he went off the relief watch. Also significant IMO is that throughout his US testimony, Lightoller never mentioned Moody in relation to the 11pm estimate calculation, despite alluding to the 6/O for other reasons eg passing the ice watch warning to the lookouts later that evening. And yet, when the question of ice warnings came up during the British inquiry a few weeks later, the Moody connection was one of the first things that Lightoller testified about and then reiterated it more than once later. With that sort of evidence to hand, one cannot help but question Lightoller’s veracity as far as the Baltic and other ice messages were concerned; once that is done, the question of whether Captain Smith really posted the Baltic message crops up again and personally I do not think that he did.

I think the time of Moody's estimate and the position of the Baltic warning lend support to the view the message was available to him.

That is assuming that there really was a "Moody's Estimate" in the manner that Lightoller testified in the first place. I mentioned that there were ambiguities about that in Lightoller's British Testimony as well; comparisons with what he had said earlier in the US about specific events will be inevitable.

Lightoller in the US Inquiry said that he had spoken to Murdoch about the 11pm estimate when the latter returned to his post after the lunch break. I personally doubt Lightoller could have done that while being the relief OOW but he testified to that effect all the same. He also testified that he spoke about it 'unofficially' in the quarters (did not specify to whom), which one assumes was during his 'off' period between handing back to Murdoch in the afternoon and the 2/O's own 6pm to 10pm shift.

AFAIK, at no stage during the US Inquiry did Lightoller allude to an estimation of 9:30pm as the time that he had calculated that the Titanic could encounter ice; it had beem 11pm throughout.

But by the time he testified at the British Inquiry a few weeks later, the pitch had changed. That 9:30pm time miraculously made its appearance when Lightoller was asked about his calculations based on the message that the captain had shown him - from Caronia and the 11pm calculation was passed on to Moody, who did not survive and so could not comment.

13487. That is longitude. Did you form any sort of impression at that time as to what time of day or night you were likely to reach the area indicated?
- Not at that time. [But Lightoller had told the US Inquiry that he not only worked it out soon after the Captain showed him the message, but also informed the 11pm ice encounter time to Murdoch when the latter returned from lunch]

13488. I know you worked it out, or helped to work it out later?
- It was worked out.

13491. (The Commissioner.) At the time this message was given to you by Captain Smith, how many hours steaming would you be away from the ice-field?
- I did not calculate it at that time; later I told one of the Junior Officers to work out about what time we should reach the ice region, and he told me about 11 o'clock. [This was the very first time that Lightoller even introduced a suggestion that someone else was involved in that calculation]

This was clarified a bit further down the testimony on the same day:

13531. Then when you had taken the ship over from Mr. Wilde and gathered this information, I think you gave some directions to one of the Junior Officers?
- I directed the sixth Officer to let me know at what time we should reach the vicinity of the ice. The Junior Officer reported to me, "About 11 o'clock."

13532. Do you recollect which of the Junior Officers it was?
- Yes, Mr. Moody, the sixth. [The first time that Moody's name was mentioned in connection with calculation of the time that the Titanic could encounter that Sunday night.]

But it is now that Lightoller's testimony does not seem to tally with known facts:

13551. I do not know what time it was that Moody told you that you would reach the ice at 11?
- It was some time shortly after that I came on deck. I cannot remember the exact time.

13582. What you have described hitherto, noticing the course and speed and giving directions to the Junior Officer and getting his calculations, did that happen before you went off to dinner?
- As far as I remember I asked for these calculations immediately after coming on deck. Yes, I think I am right in saying that I asked for these calculations immediately after coming on deck.

13583. That would be just after six o'clock?
- Yes, I have got it, I think. I asked for the calculations immediately after coming on deck and they were given to me about half-an-hour or three-quarters of an hour afterwards. It is very difficult to remember.

Those responses are rather puzzling to me, especially #13583. Lightoller came on Watch at 6pm that evening; as far as I am aware, Pitman and Lowe were on the 6pm to 8pm 'Dog Watch' and Moody was off between 5pm and 8pm that Sunday. But what Lightoller was saying above was that immediately after he came on watch at 6pm he ordered Moody (who was off at the time) to do those calculations and not more than 45 minutes later the 6/O, according to Lightoller, came up with that 11pm ice encounter time.

But if Lightoller was telling the truth, it would mean that Moody had told Lightoller about that 11pm time by 7pm at the latest. But if so, the 6/O could not have been using the Baltic message for his calculations because it was still with Ismay and it was not until 7:15pm that the Chairman returned it to Captain Smith! So, how could Moody have been aware of its contents and completed the calculations within the timeframe that Lightoller said that he did?

That was on Day 11 of the British Inquiry. 3 days later on Day 14, Lightoller was asked a lot of ice related questions and once again he stated this among other things:

16887. You have been asked about the instructions you gave as to working out the time when you would get to the ice?
- Yes.

16888. About what time was it you gave those instructions?
- Soon after I came on deck. That is, soon after 6 o'clock.

16889. And when did you get the report?
- It was some time later, because they were working stars; probably shortly before 7 o'clock. [By that time Captain Smith had not yet recovered the Baltic message from Ismay]

I wonder how significant it was that Sir Robert Finlay, who was representing the White Star Line at the British Inquiry, specifically requested permission to ask a few questions at that stage and started with #16887, #16888 and #16889. Finlay appeared to want to take the later ice message from the Mesaba out of the equation at the time, but I am not sure if Lightoller's responses to those 3 questions just before they got to the Mesaba helped him or Finlay as far as the ice estimation time was concerned.

IMO Lightoller's testimony statements about the time that the Titanic could encounter ice had enough contradictions and discrepancies for one to doubt his veracity on that matter including the "Moody Estimate". That would also lend support to the probabilty that Captain Smith did not post the Baltic ice message after Ismay returned it.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

IMO, we are simply dealing with a witness who, in reality, was very unsure about the times that certain events had happened, but seemed to feel that he owed some answers to those who were asking him for these details. It just shows the unreliability of placing too much weight on subjective estimates such as specific times or time durations mentioned. Remember, there was no particular reason why someone should remember those specifics times. In Lightoller's case, he could not have come up with an 11pm ETA if that was based off of the Caronia message. He also could not have asked Moody for an estimate when he, Lightoller, first came on duty because Moody was going off duty at that time. What does fit is his asking Moody for an ETA when Moody came back on duty at 8pm. Also remember, Lightoller came back from dinner about the time that he and Pitman were to take those star sights around 7:30pm. They finished taking with those before 8pm because Pitman started the preliminary work-up calculations before Boxhall came on at 8pm, and then gave them to Boxhall to complete the work out. Moody, coming on at 8pm, would have had the Baltic information to work from by that time, assuming Smith posted it before then. That an 11pm ETA was derived tells me that it was most probably the Baltic ice that was used. If Lightoller told Murdoch anything about 11pm, it had to have happened IMO when Murdoch came on at 10pm.
There were a lot of comings and goings at various times which somehow people expect witnesses to recall without mixing things up. That's a lot to expect. Even the 7:15 time from Ismay, as to when he gave back the Baltic message to Smith, should be taken with some caution.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

With respect @Samuel Halpern I think you might be missing the point that I am trying to make, probably because I used the word "veracity" which was perhaps harsh and not always applicable, even with this ice enounter issue. What I am trying to say is that there were a lot of contradictory statements that Lightoller made with his two testimonies, some of which were clearly improbable. I am not trying to explore the reasoning behind such inaccuracies - it might have been memory mixup, self-preservation, a desire to cover for WSL or even a genuine mistaken belief - but it does not matter. What I am saying is that once a combination of statements related to a particular event is shown to be improbable, then building on those eventualities could - and often does - lead to further improbabilities distorting the whole picture.

So, for whatever reason he made them, the facts remain that some of Lightoller's tesimony statements raise big questions:

• The fact that during his entire testimony at the US Inquiry, Lightoller never mentioned Moody in relation to the estimation of the time that the Titanic would encounter ice that Sunday evening/night. But he freely alluded to the 6/O in relation to other events, such as passing the warning to watch out for icebergs and growlers to the Lookouts. It was always as though he, Lightoller, had calculated that 11pm time based on the ice warning message (Caronia) that Captain Smith had shown him very soon afterwards (but which I accept that he could NOT have done). But by the time he got to the British Inquiry, Lightoller did an about turn and started suggesting that he had not made the calculations himself or right away but it was done by Moody later, thus bringing the 6/O into it for the first time.
• The fact that throughout his US testimony, Lightoller stuck to 11pm as the estimated time when the Titanic would encounter ice and based on the message that Captain Smith had shown him; no allusion that any other message might be involved. You can see that he repeated those statements many times and seemed quite certain of the details. There was never any mention of 9:30pm at any stage in the US but it miraculously popped up during the British Inquiry as the time that Lightoller had calculated based on the same message that the Captain had shown him. The 11pm time was passed on to Moody who was introduced into the equation for the first time, as was the idea that "some other messages" - the details of which Lightoller said he did not know - were involved.
• Having introduced Moody into the picture in Britain, Lightoller said clearly 3 times that he was certain that it was soon after he arrived on the bridge for his 6pm to 10pm shift, he ordered Moody to calculate the co-ordinates, which the latter is supposed to have done and submitted within the next 45 minutes or less. That would have taken them to 7pm at most and by then the Baltic message was still with Ismay even if the latter 7:15pm return time to Smith might be approximate (see below).

There were a lot of comings and goings at various times which somehow people expect witnesses to recall without mixing things up. That's a lot to expect. Even the 7:15 time from Ismay, as to when he gave back the Baltic message to Smith, should be taken with some caution.

Absolutely true, but if the so-called "mixed-up recollection" started to show a pattern - which IMO it certainly did in Lightoller's case - then one has to question it. I believe that there is such a pattern with the Baltic message that makes me believe that Lightoller was knowingly deviating from some facts although his motives for doing so were not sinister. First of all, the 7:10 to 7:15pm time for Ismay returning the message to Captain Smith is likely to be correct - or at least very close. Ismay himself had no particular interest nor facing potential liability about that time because as far as he was concerned, he was just a passenger and had no navigational responsibilities. We all agree that Ismay returned the message to Captain Smith late that evening and as far as the WSL Chairman was concerned, the specific time did not matter. He did not know the specific activities on the bridge and in any case, things like who was relieving who on duty were irrelevant to him. Those things were even less relevant to Major Peuchen who said that he saw the Captain emerge from the First Class Smoking Room at the time the Major was going to his cabin to dress for dinner, a timing that tallies with what Ismay testified. Neither man had any reason whatsoever to make that one up.

I do not believe that Lightoller was so confused that he said 3 times at the British Inquiry that he ordered Moody to calculate the ETEI (Estimated Time of Encountering Ice ) soon after the 2/O himself came on deck for his 6pm to 10pm shift. Lightoller would have remembered that Pitman and Lowe were on the Dog Watch and Moody was off duty at the time. But having testified in the US that the 11pm ETEI was calculated quite early on, he could not modify too much what he had already said. By the time he testified in England, Lightoller would have known about the other ice warning messages and it would have been in the interest of all concerned to make it appear that he ordered the ETEI calculated as soon as he came on duty and not 2 hours later (when Moody actually came back on duty himself) or based on those later messages. But at the same time, Lightoller could not involve either Pitman or Lowe - both of whom also reported for duty with him - in this because of a different reason, which I have opined about in the last part of its post.

IMO, we are simply dealing with a witness who, in reality, was very unsure about the times that certain events had happened, but seemed to feel that he owed some answers to those who were asking him for these details. It just shows the unreliability of placing too much weight on subjective estimates such as specific times or time durations mentioned. Remember, there was no particular reason why someone should remember those specifics times.

Yes but as I said above, Lightoller's uncertainty with times showed patterns on a few but significant occasions which made them appear to be made-up for a "best possible fit" to quote our friend @Richard C Elliott. The reasons do not matter because if he had made an incorrect statement - irrespective of whether it was deliberate or due to confusion - subsequent statements built upon that inaccuracy would continue to be incorrect in themselves. The best example is the supposition that Moody must have had access to the Baltic message since he appeared to calculate the 11pm time for the ice encounter. It follows that Moody could only have had access to the Baltic message if Captain Smith had posted it on the notice board in the chart room. But both the above two conjectures hinge completely on Lightoller's own statement that Moody indeed did those calculations and came up with the 11pm estimate, something that I have expressed doubts about and given my reasons for in this and previous posts of this thread.

In Lightoller's case, he could not have come up with an 11pm ETA if that was based off of the Caronia message. He also could not have asked Moody for an estimate when he, Lightoller, first came on duty because Moody was going off duty at that time. What does fit is his asking Moody for an ETA when Moody came back on duty at 8pm.

Yes, I know that Lightoller could not have come-up with the 11pm ETEI based on the Caronia message but that did not stop him from testifying practically to that effect in the US where, if I may remind you again, that the 9:30pm time was not mentioned at all. At the time, Lightoller was testifying on the very 1st day of the Inquiry and would not yet have known completely how things would pan out as the Inquiry progressed. I believe that he mentioned the 11pm ETEI as an off the wall general time to make it appear that all of them - the Captain, Officers etc - were quite aware that an encounter with ice was possible and had taken all necessary measures at a time that turned out to be just 40 minutes before the accident occurred. But as the Inquiry progressed and both he and others were questioned further, Lightoller started to realize that his earlier statement had holes that could be seen through and so started to embellish the sequence of events; but he was stuck with the 11pm ETEI and had to fit that in while at the same time coming up with a more plausible explanation about what his own calculations were for the (Caronia) message that the Captain had shown him. IMO, that is why he had to invent both his own 9:30pm estimate and bring in Moody to do the 11pm one by the time they got to the British Inquiry.

Also remember, Lightoller came back from dinner about the time that he and Pitman were to take those star sights around 7:30pm. They finished taking with those before 8pm because Pitman started the preliminary work-up calculations before Boxhall came on at 8pm, and then gave them to Boxhall to complete the work out. Moody, coming on at 8pm, would have had the Baltic information to work from by that time, assuming Smith posted it before then. That an 11pm ETA was derived tells me that it was most probably the Baltic ice that was used.

Lightoller could not involve either Pitman or Lowe in his 11pm ETEI testimony because those gentlemen also survived and had already testified in the US but had not yet been questioned in England when the 2/O was called; but Moody was no more and so could not himself be called in to testify if he did such calculations or otherwise. Perhaps @Samuel Halpern can please tell me if there is the possibility that Moody could have calculated the 11pm ETEI based just on the work done earlier by Pitman and perhaps other related information if the Baltic message had been unavailable? Just asking because I personally do not think so; had that been the case, Lightoller would have known about it and testified to that effect in the US itself.

In summary, I do not believe that Captain Smith posted the Baltic ice message after he got it back from Ismay. Had he done so, all surviving officers - Pitman and Lowe who were on Dog Watch at the time, Boxhall who came on duty at 8pm and spent most of his time in the chart room and indeed Lightoller himself after he completed his handover to Murdoch at 10pm - would have seen it, or at the very least known about it. The fact that none of them seemed to and Lightoller testified the way he did makes me believe that the 11pm ETEI was the 2/O's invention to make it appear that all of them were "ice aware" and had done everything that they could but events simply overcame the situation leading up to the accident.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

Had he done so, all surviving officers - ... - would have seen it, or at the very least known about it.

I think that is questionable. All the officers would have been aware that ice warnings had been posted but, unless they were doing something specific such as calculating an expected encounter time, I doubt whether they would have paid much attention to which messages were posted and when.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I doubt whether they would have paid much attention to which messages were posted and when.

If that was their attitude - and I seriously doubt it - what would be the point of a protocol whereby navigation related messages were prioritized and taken ro the bridge ? Why provide a notice board in the chart room for messages to be posted?

I know that shipboard wireless was then still a new technology and not all officers were overly impressed by it but with respect Richard, aren't you being a bit too cynical about their outlook? Some of the younger officers like Moody come across as quie efficient and disciplined.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

I know that shipboard wireless was then still a new technology and not all officers were overly impressed by it

It isn't a question of them being unimpressed by the new technology. The problem was that they treated it as an extension of the existing navigational practice and had yet to see that it could be best used in conjunction with a change of SOP.

The belief remained that icebergs could be seen at a sufficient distance for avoidance manoeuvres so even if icebergs had been reported close to the ship's projected track they remained reliant on that strategy. They would have thought of the wireless messages as merely raising their awareness of when they might encounter ice but otherwise it didn't alter their navigational decisions. Thus once some ice warnings had been posted and everybody was aware of the probability of encountering ice it was a case of 'job done'. Further individual ice warnings added little.

What they didn't yet realise was that wireless was providing them with a very advanced warning of the possibility of encountering ice, many hours beforehand, and an opportunity to alter course much earlier so that they would never come near the ice and would not need to rely on the ineffective 'see and avoid' strategy. That kind of advance warning was not available before shipboard wireless which was, in large part, why deviating from the standard route was not a widespread practice.

I suspect you are still thinking in terms of the most recent ice warning as a possible inducement to take precautions like reducing speed or increasing the lookouts. That is not what they would have done and, as we have discussed in other threads, it wouldn't have made a significant difference anyway.

If Captain Smith had been triggered by the Baltic warning to alter his planned course he could have continued on the great circle route until, say, longitude 50 west before changing to a rhumb line towards the Ambrose light. He would have passed far south of the icefield at the fairly trivial cost of delaying his safe and uneventful arrival by about an hour and a half. That was how wireless ice warnings could have been used effectively, and in that context it really wouldn't matter whether the latest messages were posted in the chartroom.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

The belief remained that icebergs could be seen at a sufficient distance for avoidance manoeuvres

Yes, and I think we have some evdence of that misconception. Lightoller during his British Testimony said:

13566. Now when you were in the vicinity of the ice, as you believed you were at 9.30 entering the dangerous field, did not it occur to you that you might run foul of a growler?
- No, My Lord, I judged I should see it with sufficient distinctness to define it - any ice that was large enough to damage the ship.

13567. (The Solicitor-General.) 21 knots is about 700 yards a minute. Is your view that you could see a growler at a safe distance at nighttime going at that pace?
- I judged that I could see a growler at a mile and a half, More probably two miles.

13649. If you could see a low-lying growler in those conditions a mile and a half, how far off do you think you could see an iceberg?
- A good sized iceberg?

13650. Yes. An iceberg big enough to throw ice upon your fore deck?
- Well a matter of 50 feet.

13651. 50 feet? You mean an iceberg 50 feet out of the water?
- Yes.

13652. How far off would you have seen an iceberg as big as that?
- At least a mile and a half or two miles - that is more or less the minimum. You could very probably see it a far greater distance than that. If it were a very white berg, flat topped or the flat side towards you, under normal conditions you would probably see that berg 3 or 4 miles away.

In #13566 they had already specified that the questions (and so the expected answers) were related to entering an ice field at about 0930pm. Except for the difference in the ETEI, effectively the suggestion was that the conditions would be similar to like they were that Sunday night.

Thus once some ice warnings had been posted and everybody was aware of the probability of encountering ice it was a case of 'job done'. Further individual ice warnings added little.

You could be right, although I think there might have been individual (meaning human) differences.

But the point of my OP was not the question of whether anyone who saw the Baltic message would have felt that they should deviate from their SOP, but whether any of them saw it at all. If Captain Smith had the message posted after getting it back from Ismay, all 4 surviving officers had the opportunity of seeing it. Pitman and Lowe during the Dog Watch, Boxhall after he came on duty and worked mainly in the chart room and Lightoller, after being intially aware of it (by the Captain going into the chart room) and then checking it out after his 10pm handover to Murdoch. Since none of those 4 seemed to know anything about the Baltic message, IMO Smith never posted it there.

What they didn't yet realise was that wireless was providing them with a very advanced warning of the possibility of encountering ice, many hours beforehand, and an opportunity to alter course much earlier so that they would never come near the ice and would not need to rely on the ineffective 'see and avoid' strategy. That kind of advance warning was not available before shipboard wireless which was, in large part, why deviating from the standard route was not a widespread practice.

Yes, I can see your point and completely agree with it.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

Yes, I can see your point and completely agree with it.

Thank you for that.

But the point of my OP was not the question of whether anyone who saw the Baltic message would have felt that they should deviate from their SOP, but whether any of them saw it at all.

And I can see your point. I wasn't trying to deny the possibility that it was never posted, just pointing out the weakness of relying too strongly on Lightoller's exact words.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

if there is the possibility that Moody could have calculated the 11pm ETEI based just on the work done earlier by Pitman and perhaps other related information if the Baltic message had been unavailable?

No, nothing at all. He need the coordinates from a reported ice sighting, the ship's estimated speed, and the time the ship turned the corner. Simple stuff. The work done done by Pitman was doing the setup calculations needed to reduce the star sights. For example, adjusting for sextant index errors, dip of the horizon, star altitude refraction errors, chronometer error, etc. The easy stuff. He knew that Boxall's watch was only about10 minutes away, and gave the tedious calculations for him to do.

The fact that none of them seemed to and Lightoller testified the way he did makes me believe that the 11pm ETEI was the 2/O's invention to make it appear that all of them were "ice aware" and had done everything that they could but events simply overcame the situation leading up to the accident.

I don't buy into your reasoning. Sorry.

I suspect you are still thinking in terms of the most recent ice warning as a possible inducement to take precautions like reducing speed or increasing the lookouts. That is not what they would have done and, as we have discussed in other threads, it wouldn't have made a significant difference anyway. If Captain Smith had been triggered by the Baltic warning to alter his planned course he could have continued on the great circle route until, say, longitude 50 west before changing to a rhumb line towards the Ambrose light. He would have passed far south of the icefield at the fairly trivial cost of delaying his safe and uneventful arrival by about an hour and a half. That was how wireless ice warnings could have been used effectively, and in that context it really wouldn't matter whether the latest messages were posted in the chartroom.

Fully agree. The ice positions were plotted as a matter of operational protocol. As Lowe remarked about the 8pm DR being put on the chart, it was nothing of great importance, or words tothateffect.

Since none of those 4 seemed to know anything about the Baltic message, IMO Smith never posted it there.

As I wrote before, an 11pm ETA could only have come from ice reported in the Baltic message. But hey, believe what you want.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

11pm ETA could only have come from ice reported in the Baltic message.

Assuming that there was a 11pm ETA in the first place. We have only Lightoller's word for that and there were a LOT of inconsistencies in his testimonies about that matter on both sides of the Atlantic.

Samuel Halpern: I don't buy into your reasoning. Sorry.

That is your privilege, Sam. But personally, I remain very skeptical about Lightoller's story as far as the ice encounter calculations were concerned. BUT as I said earlier, if he had made it up as I believe that he did, there was no sinister motive involved. IMO, it was an attempt to indicate that the duty officers did not ignore the ice messages and did their calculations.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Lightoller was aware that the officer's chart room would be the place where all messages with navigational interest were posted, knew that the information that he himself used for his own ETA estimate was old and not necessarily the most current, and therefore asked Moody to come up with another estimate. Lightoller may have asked him to to estimate when it could be expected that the ship might reach ice, and said that Moody probably used information from some message that he had not seen. IMO, Boxhall probably became aware of the information in the Baltic message about the same time as Moody, shortly after coming back on duty at 8pm.

That suggests that Lightoller was aware that there was at least one other message that came after the Coronia one that had a more accurate information about the time that the Titanic might encounter ice that night; his testimony also retrospectively suggests it (allusion to "some other message"). But Sam does not make it clear if he believes that Lightoller himself was aware of the actual Baltic message or just asked Moody to work out the time based on "some" message that he believed would be in the chart room. And Sam says that in his opinion Boxhall saw the Baltic message about the same time as Moody did after they came on duty at 8pm, which I accept they both would have done if it had been posted by Captain Smith. But then so would have Pitman and Lowe who did the 6pm to 8pm Dog Watch.

The reason that I doubt it is because both Lightoller and Boxhall denied any knowledge of the Baltic message on both sides of the Atlantic; Lightoller went on to testify that he was not aware of any other message himself, although in Britain (and not before) he conceded that Moody might have used some other message for his calculations. But if that is true, it would mean that Boxhall certainly and Lightoller probably was denying that they knew about the vital Baltic message even though they actually did. Since they would have known about the ice related co-ordinates on that message during the American Inquiry (if they had not known about it already), both would have realized that denying any knowledge about it would point the finger at Captain Smith. That is something that I seriously doubt either man would have done, which in turn means that they really had not known about it till it was brought up ay the American Inquiry. That was the line of my reasoning when I opined that Captain Smith did not post the Baltic message in the chart room and Lightoller, realizing the implications, hastily invented the 11pm estimation first apparently by himself (American Inquiry) and then bringing Moody in (British Testimony) as some sort of 'insurance' for all of them.

Of course, it is just one line of argument. We will never know for certain.