Did only 2 ft doom the Titanic?

They might have noticed the general area from where the water was coming in, but I doubt if most of them would have had time to see the actual breaches before the (the damaged areas) became submerged. Putting ourselves in the positions of the crew of BR6, the alarm bells would have been their first warning that anything was wrong. Then they would have been busy shutting dampers and other tasks before the actual impact. A few might have seen the first jets of water gush-in but BR6 flooded so rapidly that the force of the water would have made access very difficult before the breaches went underwater.
Are you forgetting we have a witness from that boiler room? We know precisely where the water came in and it was on the side two feet above the stockhold plates. Which exactly matches the damage surveyed on the outside. And the damage on the outside goes back to the first couple feet past the watertight bulkhead which led to where the same witness saw water coming in to boiler room 5.
 
Are you forgetting we have a witness from that boiler room?
Actually two. Beachamp was there too. He was working in the same stokehold as Barrett but probably on the port side. Beachamp described the water as "coming through the bunker door like." BR 6 flooded quite quickly. In about the first 10 minutes, or thereabouts, the water was as high as half the diameter of the boilers there according to Barrett. Reaching the locations of the breach would have been impossible by then. I covered this in quite a bit of detail in Ch 6 of: http://www.titanicology.com/Centennial/CentennialBookPage.html.
 
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I have always accepted Sam's excellent paper "Why The Low Angle Break?" with its carefully detailed analysis and that telling "Bending Moment vs Angle of Trim" graph. Sam clearly demonstrates how the bending force on the keel rose sharply as the bow trimmed down, till reaching a maximum somewhere between 11 & 12 degrees at about 02:16am. It was about a minute after that the ship lost its longitudinal stability and the bow plunged sharply, generating the wave.

That said, most survivor accounts suggest that the stern was higher when the break-up as those few who saw it occurred and it was more likely around 02:18am. I believe that this apparent discrepancy is due to what actually constituted the "break" as we know it. The Titanic was made up of a keel, double bottom and several deck levels, all of which had to come apart visibly to justify statements of those survivors who saw the ship break in two. Although a catastrophic event, I believe the break-up extended over a couple of minutes at least that started when the Titanic was at a relatively low angle of between 11 and 12 degrees but being subject to the peak of the bending force. During those 2 minutes the bow continued to dip and the stern rose, even though the two "parts" were steadily coming apart. It is quite possible that the stern reached an angle of 23 to 24 degrees before the final separation occurred and that would have been what most survivors who reported the break-up would have noticed.
I have to nearly totally agree with your post. Years ago when I first saw it, I recognized some important truths in Roger Long's breakup theory. But while he had the crushing damage and the double bottom accounted for, the rest of his theory no longer matches what has been found. Thanks for calling my attention to Sam's paper (Why A Low Angle Break?). It was an excellent read. I find that the one part I can't get behind is the idea that the ship suddenly started to tip over. I think that at 2:15 the double bottom broke and started a 2-3 minute sequence of cascading damage that resulted in the final break at 2:17-18. I think Jack Thayer was mistaken about which funnel shot up sparks. A number of other survivors call out the 3rd, not 2nd funnel. That fits with the area of damage and a sudden flooding of the boilers causing sparks and smoke to fly up. I've doused enough camp fires and grill coals to recognize the description. I think the key is Baker Joughin and Trimmer Dillon, both on the stern as the ship broke. Joughin made it to the starboard poop rail. Both felt the stern take a sudden dip to port. Most of the people were thrown to port and Dillon ended up overboard. And with the horrible extent of the damage in the middle section and the multiple description of an explosion with pieces flying off and killing people in the water and with the analysis of the "Big Piece" - that it bent and broke outward, I think there is ample evidence for an unequal breaking that came from inside out. The visible break happened at the same time the "Big Piece" snapped. But that description is EXACTLY the way Roger Long described it in his theory. He is the only one whose theory has a complex multipart process that truly fits the damage. So much wrong with it, yet so much right.
 
This diagram brings up an interesting question. We know the ship was designed to have these bulkheads be water tight up to a certain level. But when water goes over that level, by what means does water take to get to the other side? If Compartment A is not filling fast, how does water get in to fill it. The deck plans often do not show ways in water can get through. The chain locker in is Compartment A so we know there is access from the forcastle B deck, but water cannot just flow over when it reaches the top of the bulkhead. It has to find a way to go. In some locations this is obvious - doors and hatches - but in other areas there is no obvious way for water to get through. I'm sure some of the partitions are wood and could not hold up to the force of the water, but others are going to be metal and while they may leak, water cannot just flow freely. This is one reason why I think the break hastened the end and why I don't think the angle was that high when the ship broke.
 
Beachamp described the water as "coming through the bunker door like." BR 6 flooded quite quickly. In about the first 10 minutes, or thereabouts, the water was as high as half the diameter of the boilers there according to Barrett
Thanks Sam. That was what I meant by saying that they could probably note the general area where the water was pouring in before the water level got too high.

Reaching the locations of the breach would have been impossible by then.
Agreed completely.
 
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This diagram brings up an interesting question. We know the ship was designed to have these bulkheads be water tight up to a certain level. But when water goes over that level, by what means does water take to get to the other side? If Compartment A is not filling fast, how does water get in to fill it. The deck plans often do not show ways in water can get through. The chain locker in is Compartment A so we know there is access from the forcastle B deck, but water cannot just flow over when it reaches the top of the bulkhead. It has to find a way to go. In some locations this is obvious - doors and hatches - but in other areas there is no obvious way for water to get through. I'm sure some of the partitions are wood and could not hold up to the force of the water, but others are going to be metal and while they may leak, water cannot just flow freely. This is one reason why I think the break hastened the end and why I don't think the angle was that high when the ship broke.
I suspect that most of the water progressed in two ways, either by wooden walls collapsing, or by doors being forced open by the pressure of water. The doors leading to the various stairs are particularly important, because this is a quick route to by-pass the bulkheads. There is eyewitness account of walls collapsing in the early stages of the sinking. This would be expected, because the height of water increased so rapidly there wasn't time for it to seep into adjacent areas via the cracks between boards under doors etc. However, between 12:30 to 13:00 the water flow was much less, I except most walls would have remained intact because the water would have time to gradually build up on the other side. So you might have say 6ft of water in one room and 4ft in the next, and 2 ft in the next. However, the open Scotland Rd corridor would have enabled the water to move down the ship and flood many rooms simultaneously. Another possibility is that the weight of water over an unsupported area might collapse that deck. It depends on the exact design, and strength of materials.

It raises the question as to why the stairway doors weren't forced shut by supports. Where they frightened of the ship becoming top heavy, concerned this might block the evacuation, or if it was simply over-looked? If the water was forced to seep through narrow cracks, and what water that did seep through was being removed by pumps, the ship would have taken a very long time to sink, providing it remained stable. However with water rushing down the stairs the pumps would have been quickly overwhelmed.
 
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I suspect that most of the water progressed in two ways, either by wooden walls collapsing, or by doors being forced open by the pressure of water. The doors leading to the various stairs are particularly important, because this is a quick route to by-pass the bulkheads. There is eyewitness account of walls collapsing in the early stages of the sinking. This would be expected, because the height of water increased so rapidly there wasn't time for it to seep into adjacent areas via the cracks between boards under doors etc. However, between 12:30 to 13:00 the water flow was much less, I except most walls would have remained intact because the water would have time to gradually build up on the other side. So you might have say 6ft of water in one room and 4ft in the next, and 2 ft in the next. However, the open Scotland Rd corridor would have enabled the water to move down the ship and flood many rooms simultaneously. Another possibility is that the weight of water over an unsupported area might collapse that deck. It depends on the exact design, and strength of materials.

It raises the question as to why the stairway doors weren't forced shut by supports. Where they frightened of the ship becoming top heavy, concerned this might block the evacuation, or if it was simply over-looked? If the water was forced to seep through narrow cracks, and what water that did seep through was being removed by pumps, the ship would have taken a very long time to sink, providing it remained stable. However with water rushing down the stairs the pumps would have been quickly overwhelmed.
The only problem with stairs is that none of them lead to the boiler rooms. Only the doors on Scotland Road lead there and those doors had high sills and I doubt they were wood. Water would have to find another way down.
 
The problem with damage control for Titanic that night was the extent of the damage. Too many compartments and the water was coming in too fast. Had it been a survivable level of damage, I think they could have patched up most of the damage and made it to NYC. But they had two compartments that filled far too quickly and too deep to make any repairs and the other compartments were too damaged to tackle in the time available. It was just too much. I think it was too much even if the damage hadn't extended into Boiler Room 5. I don't think those 2 feet of damage doomed the ship, but it likely hastened the end.
 
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The only problem with stairs is that none of them lead to the boiler rooms. Only the doors on Scotland Road lead there and those doors had high sills and I doubt they were wood. Water would have to find another way down.
I really mean stairs to the F deck from which it would accumulate and have to seep through to the boiler rooms. At 12:45-12:50am Wheat
saw water flowing down 1st class stairs from E deck to F deck just aft of WTB-F. I also recall someone reporting water pouring down the smaller porters stairs from e deck at 12:25 but I can't find the reference at the moment.

You might be interested in this thread which discusses how the water got through.
 
The last time that article was revised was 2017. One day I may update it a little bit based on some recent work I've done. But that would only tweak the curve of trim vs time by a very small amount. For example, Wheat's observation was probably closer to 12:55 since he was leaving his quarters on F deck and going back up the stairs when he saw that water. Also, Ray's observation had to be somewhat later than what I show since when Wheat was there the list of the vessel still over to starboard because water came from the E deck starboard side alleyway only, while when Ray was there, it was about equal on both the port and starboard alleyways and somewhat further back from the time that Wheat was there.
 
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I really mean stairs to the F deck from which it would accumulate and have to seep through to the boiler rooms. At 12:45-12:50am Wheat
saw water flowing down 1st class stairs from E deck to F deck just aft of WTB-F. I also recall someone reporting water pouring down the smaller porters stairs from e deck at 12:25 but I can't find the reference at the moment.

You might be interested in this thread which discusses how the water got through.
I really feel that the timed observations from the lifeboats about where the ship was sitting in the water and at what time is the most accurate indicator of where we should be finding water inside. I feel that the time for water on that stair has been listed in error. At 12:50 that would put water higher inside the ship than outside. In reading Wheat's testimony, his timing was an estimate after having been up to the boat deck. The UK hearing grilled him on where he saw water and really glossed over the time. Water should have been flowing in that area if ports were open and at about 1:15 from the external observations, 25 minutes after Wheat claimed.

And thanks for the link. Some great posts in that thread.
 
At 12:50 that would put water higher inside the ship than outside.
Not at all. The ship would have trimmed down to about 3.2° by that time, and was still carrying a list to starboard. Water would easily flow onto E deck from the stairs leading down to the mail room. It would have reached the level of E deck there about 12:15 and then find its way aft along the starboard-side alleyway as the bow sank lower and lower. And not just Wheat. Look also at what Ray had to say.
 
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Not at all. The ship would have trimmed down to about 3.2° by that time, and was still carrying a list to starboard. Water would easily flow onto E deck from the stairs leading down to the mail room. It would have reached the level of E deck there about 12:15 and then find its way aft along the starboard-side alleyway as the bow sank lower and lower. And not just Wheat. Look also at what Ray had to say.
Ray went down sometime after 12:55 (LB 7 in the water and rowing away) and before 1:30 (LB 9 lowered). That is a sizable window. And his testimony was that the water was on both port and starboard of deck E. So he was enough after Wheat. Neither one identify exactly what time they were below, but Ray's testimony places him on E deck about the time the ship had righted itself before listing to port. That was closer to 1:30 and we know he was on the boat deck at 1:30 when LB 9 was lowered. So what he saw puts him below closer to 1:30 than to 12:55. That would fit if he was 5 to 10 minutes later than Wheat in seeing water on E deck and closer to 1:15.
 
Note, I derived the graph of flowrate from the one in Settler & Thomas, which shows total volume of water into the ship. I recall there were three curves, and this is based on the middle, or average one.
1676017292593 jpeg

Peter, I have become really interested in this graph and would like to know how it correlated to the actual physical flooding, compartment by compartment. Perhaps Sam Halpern would like to opine on this too.

My own knowledge of physics is limited to High School in the 1960s and so I am not able to work it out for myself. But I assumed that the point where the water no longer needed to gain height to continue flooding meant that it had either overtopped all the higher bulkheads or was flooding through other channels.
 
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It's based on measuring heights from Figure 10: Time history of total floodwater in Stettler & Thomas. That is the solid red curve (Labelled as Best Estimate permeability) and dividing it by increments of time in a spreadsheet. It's not generally good practice to read of graphs in this way, it's best to use the actual figures if they are available. So if anyone has them, I'm happy to recalculate it. There's really a broad range from 'Max permeability fast' and 'min permeability slow' anyway.

Water 'not needing to rise' to flood the ship only applies if the water can freely flood the rear compartments over the bulkheads which would be the case if the various stairs were open, or forced open. In practice, the level would rise on E deck, after each stairway filled and encountered resistance from entering the boiler rooms.

Stettler & Thomas describe it thus:

Near Equalization. As the flooding in the forward holds and Boiler Room 6 approached the E-Deck, the rate of ingress slowed dramatically as the differential head across the openings was reduced. This near-equalization is clearly visible in the flattening of the best estimate permeability (solid red) curve between 50 and 90 minutes in Figure 8 through Figure 11. The spill-over from Boiler Room 6 into Boiler Room 5 and the upward flooding of E-Deck drive the increase in draft and trim
which increase the flooding rates again after 90 minutes.

 
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