Mike Spooner
Member
Fleet excelled his job by picking up the phone to!
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PeterChappell
Member
Hi Keith, great post and a breath of fresh air!
I've recently been exploring what the effect of damming E deck would have been here. I had a quick search yesterday to see if anyone else had suggested the same, which led me to your post!
The Port corridor on E deck (Scotland Rd) was particularly important, because this was an open passage which allowed water to flow quickly into the ship and flood adjacent rooms & stairs simultaneously. Probably the best place for a dam would be above the same bulkhead which separates BR5 and BR6, near to where you suggested. You will see a plan in the thread. For maximum effectiveness, the 'dam' should include the walls and doors as near to the bulkhead as possible on E deck, or else it would work its way around the dams, and through the decks. In addition, they might have had to be shored up against the increasing height of water.
By the time water had reached this line on E deck, it's rate of ingress into the ship had reduced substantially, because the water level was gradually getting nearer to that outside, reducing the relative head difference. I've tried to estimate how high the water would reach up such a barrier based on the asymptotic trend up to that point from two studies, Stettler & Thomas which relates water flow to time, and angle of heel to time by Samuel Halpern. The asymptotic trend, suggests the water would stop between 1.5 to 2.5 metres above E deck, although it would take some time to reach that level. The chief architect at H&W Edward Wilding, also testified in the enquiry that raising the bulkhead to D deck (providing there were no significant breaches towards the rear) would have prevented the ship sinking. The enquiry concluded the small breach in BR5 & the mysterious flooding in BR4 played no significant part.
In reality, the water reached the stairs behind this line to circumvent the bulkheads and flood lower levels. Most importantly it was no longer constrained by the gradually increasing internal head of water working against the breaches, which would have eventually stopped its flow. So the flooding via the stairs caused a negative feedback to turn into a positive one as the water was able to reach the rest of the ship, pushing the ship down further. This also probably explains where the additional water came from in BR5, whose small breech was initially being adequately managed by the pumps until around the time the water could have seeped into it from above. The same goes for the mysterious rise of water in BR6.
Whilst its unlikely any of the crew would have considered blocking the corridors, it might of occurred to the ships architect Thomas Andrews who was on board advising the Captain. After all, placing barriers along these corridors is just a special case of what they eventually did due to this tragedy, extend the bulkheads upwards. I estimate an initial low strip of wood across the corridors would have had to be placed down in the corridors by around 50-60 minutes after the collision, although an initial block further up would have helped to delay further, and keep their feet dry. With regards to staff, there were two ships Carpenters, and many other practical men from the Guarantee group including a 3rd Carpenter. There also was a Carpentry workshop and Carpentry & Plumbers store, so we can assume there were plenty of tools and wood. Of course unscrewed tables, beds and doors could also have been used.
A technical difficulty may have arisen if only one of the barriers collapsed, this could have led to asymmetric flooding laterally. To some extent this is what happened when the open Scotland road flooded, whilst at the same time strong doors on the starboard corridor prevented rapid ingress on that side. So the initial starboard list was overcorrected to a port list. More controversially, it might have been decided to keep Scotland road open so they could send third class passengers from the front to the stern, rather than up the stairs to the lifeboats, which is discussed by David L. Gleicher here. However, there would be few people passing this way once the flood got there, and the stairs was the only other, and correct option.
I think these Engineering counterfactuals can be useful because they lead to introducing measures in future design, management and damage control. They also help to exercise lateral thinking in other situations. Unfortunately, suggesting anything could have happened differently can upset those who feel it's an attack on the integrity of the crew. My primary interest is a technical one, but it can't always be disentangled entirely from the management of the incident and standards of the time.
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PeterChappell
Member
Johnben, I've had a very quick scan of the literature. I came across this, which gives you an idea what happens to the wave around the stern of the hull, but I would take a closer look to see if its relevant.
What you are suggesting is sailing an old design backwards, so I doubt if anyone really knows what the pressure distribution is in that case without testing or modelling it. There's more to the pressure difference than just the height of the wave. Pressures changes occur due to relative water motion inside and outside the breech irrespective of height. It's a very interesting topic which deserves further study.
An alternative version of the idea is to sail round backwards on full rudder to try and create a low pressure area on the side of the breech. Of course there's no way a Captain would experiment doing this in the middle of a disaster, unless they had prior knowledge it might be helpful.
Thomas Krom
Member
There is one big issue with placing a wooden newly constructed watertight bulkhead in the long working alleyway (more commonly referred to Scotland road) and that is the piping there. Each watertight bulkhead was adapted to allow the pipes into the next or previous watertight compartment. In the long working alleyway (Scotland Road) there were more than ten different pipes, of which five went through the entire length of the corridor. This would mean they would have to saw the holes according to the diameter of these pipes, but there is a problem with that as well. There is no way they could have placed the wooden mold in one part around the pipes since they had no end where they could have placed it on and slide it towards the self made wooden watertight bulkhead. Even if they would have had that mold into place with the holes and all it wouldn't have guaranteed that the water would have flooded through openings in the molds for the pipe.
As mentioned before the steel watertight bulkheads were all modified to allow pipes through in either the next or previous watertight compartment which can be seen on the original watertight bulkhead plan. There also is a statement of Francis Carruthers, the surveyor of the Board of Trade, at the British inquiry related to this:
"23963. Would you tell his Lordship precisely what you did to test whether the bulkheads were watertight?
- As these bulkheads were built I followed their construction. When they were riveted I inspected them to see how they were riveted and if they were well riveted; and when they were finished I went round and tested the caulking of the bulkheads and at the end of the survey, a few days before she was finished I went round the bulkheads to see that all the small holes that are drilled for carrying through the heating pipes and the electric light wires were all properly made fast, and the boiler pipes -"
Even if this bulkhead was constructed it wouldn't have guaranteed the survival of the ship in the slightest, it could only have potentially given the ship more time but that depended on the rate of flooding. As you know the water started to flood on E-deck around 12:20, where it ultimately broke a wall between the third class accommodation and the seamen's dormitory at 12:25. If the water would have had successfully blocked for a while the water would ultimately rise up to D-deck at a faster rate than it did in real life with no water flooding anymore beyond that bulkhead for the time being. If the crew in this scenario would have successfully closed the dutch doors under the forecastle it would gave the water no other choice to flood the area under the forecastle, which could be accessed by a small stairwell meant for the able bodies seamen and lookouts to reach not just their mess but also the well deck so they could go to their positions. If the water would have had no other way to go the pressure would build up at the wooden crafted watertight bulkhead and I would believe it would have broken open because of this pressure if the water already didn't went through the holes which most likely had deviating diameter for the pipes. I personally believe it would have already broken open before the water would have fully flooded the third class open space. It is believed a non-watertight door of the coal bunker of boiler room number 5 broke open due the pressure of more than 180 tons of water that was trapped in the coal bunker.
I would like to point out however that the diagnosis I gave in this scenario is only a theory and must not be seen as factual, all except for the information I gave about the pipes and the steel watertight bulkheads that is.
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PeterChappell
Member
It doesn't work like this, there's no pump, pumping water in the ship at a certain rate. For fixed sized 'holes' or slits in the hull and throughout the superstructure, the rate the water comes in, is purely determined by the difference in head between the outside sea and the water inside (see below). As that diminishes (as it was) it will gradually reduce to zero at some height, this is fundamental. In the Titanic for real, it found the stairs so it was able to flood without increasing height further, so the ship got pushed down further, and the flow increased forming that S shaped curve. (positive feedback).
My calculations in that thread are a sort of semi-empirical attempt to model the rate the flow was reducing to determine the maximum height the water will come to at a particular time from two different methods and sources. It's doing exactly what we would expect from theory. It would eventually stop, unless the new 'bulkhead' gave way, which admittedly it might do, but at least time would have been gained.
I think the pipes are at the top of the corridor, where the water might not even have reached, but even if it went above that there would be plenty of time to deal with it at the slow rate of increase at that stage. They would have been trying to stop 90% of the water, not install something permanent or pretty. If the pipes are buried in the floor or arranged in some devilish way, at least they would have a skilled plumber in the guarantee team with his workshop conveniently placed near the dam!
Thomas Krom
Member
The element of water is very unpredictable, you never know what exactly it will do at any given time, especially on sinking vessels where the angle would change, a list will either increase or decrease and where there are many other elements against the buoyancy of the ship . It is comparable to what Richard Attenborough said about the parachute scenes of his 1977 movie “A bridge too far” during the stunning recreation of Operation Market Garden which took placed in the Dutch skies in September 1944:
“You couldn’t storyboard that, you never know what the wind would do, you would never know what that parachute would go left or right.”
Although this might seems a bit of an incomparable statement to the Titanic or any sinking vessel but it is true that we cannot say: “Oh, if this bulkhead was there the floodwater of the assuming bulkhead would have remained stabilized for more than 150.”,we’ll cannot say for certain what the water would have done if this improvised bulkhead was there or not and what I stated about the water would have flooded up to D-deck was only a theory, nothing more nothing less, comparable to your calculations and suggestions here. We can do as many calculated we’ll like but we’ll always have things wrong in this manner no matter what we do, we never could be 100% on point with alternative scenarios on the likes of this.
For the same story in this scenario the practicality of this improvised bulkhead could have had depended on the type of wood used or the amount of nails used by the carpenters. In the Edwardian area a carpenter his duties on ships often were maintenance and repairs (along with keeping an eye out over the hull and water tanks of the ship).
I meant to state with my statement that IF there was no other way for the water. The water was flooding up the cargo hatches as far back as in the early stages of the sinking, which is believed to have been the cause of the flooding of the mail room on the orlop deck when it flooded up the so called “bunker hatch”. There is documented accounts that it flooded up the other two forward cargo hatches as well into both the spiral staircases of the engineering department forward (the firemen, trimmers, greasers and leading firemen) and the third class accommodation on G-deck.
I do not believe that with the materials and the time the carpenters Maxwell and Hutchinson had in this scenario you proposed able to create an improved watertight bulkhead that would have been proven practical in the scenario the ship was in, even if they had more people assisting them. You also had to worry about the water that would have come from the firemen’s escape since the water was flooding there since the dutch doors of the number 3 cargo hold were open for the reserve coal that was stored there. There were plenty of areas where the water was still flooding up.
The long working alleyway/Scotland road in 2005, the pipes aren't connected to the roof anymore as you can see due the deterioration of the wreck.
How the pipes went through a watertight bulkhead on-board the Olympic class liners (this is the Olympic on E-deck in the alternative first/second class section)
These pipes weren’t on the floor but attached to the roof of the long working alleyway. Referring to the pipes I stated that I wasn’t worried about some water that could have gone through those pipes but rather through the holes created to accommodate the pipes at this improvised bulkhead, or dam as you call it. The disadvantage of this improvised bulkhead, as you know, is that the carpenters (With the proposed assistance as well) would have had no time to perfect this bulkhead with the holes different pipes on the roof.
In my humble opinion theories should be stated as theories, including in alternative scenarios. We can come with as many arguments in favor or against this scenario but we can never be 100 precent certain about anything. If you like I can send you the plan of the watertight bulkheads of the Olympic class liners to give some more insight on the matter but I personally believe that an improvised wooden bulkhead could not have made a different in the survival of the ship that fateful April night, that is my theory on the matter at least.
Jim Currie
Senior Member
Not really, Keith.
The water was pouring into BR 6 and the ship was down by the head. Because of the locations and number of the hull breaches, she would always be down by the head until she finally sank. Consequently, water in BR 6 would eventually free-flow across the top of WTB"E" and into BR 5. From there, it was free to rise vertically within the boiler room casing - much like the vertical trunk ways between the tween decks in the holds. At that moment, the ship would have been near to10 degrees by the bow
You are describing collision mats that use external water pressure. This was normally done using a rope from each corner and passing the mat along the bottom or side from the bow aft while holding it in place from the deck using the ropes. However, you need to know exactly where the holes in the sides are and how many there are of them for that to be successful and even to this day, we do not know where they all are. You also need a minimum of 8 men per mat.
If the pumps had been able to control the rate of down flooding, then the ship could have stayed afloat for as long as that was the situation, but to determine this, accurate, continuous soundings were necessary.
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PeterChappell
Member
We can be 100% certain that at least half the people of the Titanic die without some efforts at damage control.
We can also be certain that anything which restricts the inflow whether it be the increasing head of internal water, or a physical restriction will buy more time. Even allowing the water to creep up E deck but preventing it reaching the staircases would buy time, but I don't think it's the best method.
BTW The time taken to reach D deck IF the flow didn't keep on decreasing AS IT MUST according to the laws of physics, was included as a worst case scenario in my first calculation at the start of the other thread. It would reach around the top of the corridor in that implausible scenario just past 04:00 hrs. According to the reducing trend of flow in Stettler & Thomas, it would eventually reach a maximum of about 1.8 metres above E deck if a a barrier was placed above E bulkhead.
I'm not arguing any more about issues I've already addressed, usually in the attachments which people haven't even bothered to look at.
We can also be certain that anything which restricts the inflow whether it be the increasing head of internal water, or a physical restriction will buy more time. Even allowing the water to creep up E deck but preventing it reaching the staircases would buy time, but I don't think it's the best method.
BTW The time taken to reach D deck IF the flow didn't keep on decreasing AS IT MUST according to the laws of physics, was included as a worst case scenario in my first calculation at the start of the other thread. It would reach around the top of the corridor in that implausible scenario just past 04:00 hrs. According to the reducing trend of flow in Stettler & Thomas, it would eventually reach a maximum of about 1.8 metres above E deck if a a barrier was placed above E bulkhead.
I'm not arguing any more about issues I've already addressed, usually in the attachments which people haven't even bothered to look at.
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