The problem with this thread is that it plays the "blame game" used by the legal profession to extort money from corporations and individuals. If blame can be assigned, a lawsuit can make a lawyer rich.
But, "blame" is only valuable in that regard. What is more critical is understanding how and why a group of professionals performing their jobs in the usual and customary manner still managed to run over something the size of a large building on a calm, clear night.
Getting away from "blame" clears the thinking process and allows real learning to take place. Smith, Murdoch, Fleet, Lee, Hichens, Olliver,
Boxhall and
Moody all participated in what must be called a fully-controlled allision with a recognized danger on a night when every one of them knew that danger existed. How did that happen? It wasn't one man's fault--in the blame sense--but rather a collective effort that also involved the IMM/White Star company rulebook, the ordinary practice of North Atlantic mail ships, and the expectations of the passengers.
To assert that Captain Smith willingly and knowingly on one night decided to become irrationally foolhardy is preposterous. And, the record speaks to him actually acting in a prudent manner for 1912. He returned early from dinner, conferred with his officers about the dangers, and proceeded to plot the ice (presumably) against the track of his ship.
Meanwhile, the OOW (
Lightoller) issued special orders to the lookouts to be watchful of smaller but dangerous ice.
The one wireless message that always raises questions is the warning from Mesaba. The BOT report made the claim it was not delivered to Captain Smith but that report failed to provide one scintilla of evidence supporting this claim.
Lightoller later expanded the story to include a paperweight, but again gave no evidence which can be corroborated by any other source.
My research shows the professionals of Titanic's bridge team were victims of a condition we now recognize as "loss of situational awareness." This problem was first recognized as a primary factor in aircraft incidents and was then found to apply to all transportation accidents, including marine casualties. A simple explanation of the condition is that everyone involved is performing their duties, but by doing so they all lose contact with the larger picture.
In Titanic, this loss of awareness was in part the result of the design of the bridge with placement of the critical standard compass 230 feet aft with no 2-way communications. It was also in part due to the expectations of sailors that ice could and would be seen at a distance of three miles or more. Wireless may also have played a role in that Captain Smith may have been a bit more confident because he had ice information than he would have been a decade earlier without those radio messages.
Titanic was not the first ship on which loss of situational awareness caused disaster. It is probable that many of the "ships gone missing" were victims of this problem. Nor was Titanic the last. I doubt there is an officer walking the deck of any ship who at one time or another has not experienced the condition, but been lucky enough to awaken in time to prevent disaster.
-- David G. Brown