Has anyone ever explained this contradiction in Lightoller's testimony?

[Rich Hayden]

At the British Inquiry, Lightoller says very explicitly in response to question 14197 about why the iceberg wasn't seen earlier:

"It is very difficult indeed to come to any conclusion. Of course, we know now the extraordinary combination of circumstances that existed at that time which you would not meet again once in 100 years; that they should all have existed just on that particular night shows, of course, that everything was against us."

'Everything was against us' - it's a phrase that's been used again and again.

The questioning continues:

"14200. Wait a minute: No moon, no wind, no swell?

- The moon we knew of, the wind we knew of, but the absence of swell we did not know of. [My emphasis]. You naturally conclude that you do not meet with a sea like it was, like a table top or a floor, a most extraordinary circumstance, and I guarantee that 99 men out of 100 could never call to mind actual proof of there having been such an absolutely smooth sea."

Let's just think about that - "the absence of swell we did not know of".

Really? The absence of swell wasn't known of at the time Lightoller was on the bridge during his watch? Let's cycle back a couple of days, and we find this:

"13571. Now let me follow. Was there any breeze on this night?

- When I left the deck at 10 o'clock there was a slight breeze - Oh, pardon me, no. I take that back. No it was calm, perfectly calm."

and this now infamous exchange:

"At five minutes to nine, when the Commander came on the bridge (I will give it to you as near as I remember.) he remarked that it was cold, and as far as I remember I said, "Yes, it is very cold, Sir. In fact," I said, "it is only one degree above freezing. I have sent word down to the carpenter and rung up the engine room and told them that it is freezing or will be during the night." We then commenced to speak about the He said, "There is not much wind." I said, "No, it is a flat calm as a matter of fact." He repeated it; he said, "A flat calm." I said, "Yes, quite flat, there is no wind." I said something about it was rather a pity the breeze had not kept up whilst we were going through the ice region. Of course, My reason was obvious; he knew I meant the water ripples breaking on the base of the berg.

13616. You said it was a pity there was not a breeze?

- Yes, I said, "It is a pity there is not a breeze," and we went on to discuss the weather. He was then getting his eyesight, you know, and he said, "Yes, it seems quite clear," and I said, "Yes, it is perfectly clear." It was a beautiful night, there was not a cloud in the sky. The sea was apparently smooth, and there was no wind, but at that time you could see the stars rising and setting with absolute distinctness."

My question is - how was Lightoller allowed to argue that they didn't know it was a flat calm when literally the previous day he'd testified than both him and Smith were aware that it was a flat calm?

Lightoller asserts that the lack of moon and the lack of wind and the lack of a swell created conditions that made seeing the iceberg impossible, but they were aware of all three, by his own testimony, prior to the ship hitting the iceberg. So why wasn't some remedial action taken?

 

[Thomas Krom]

So why wasn't some remedial action taken?

Despite the absence of moonlight (April the 14th 1912 was the darkest night of the month), wind and swell that night the elements were considered clear. It was the standard operating procedure of the period that if the weather remained calm that speed would be maintained even when near ice. Personally I blame the industry of the period that allowed this practice to continue instead of anyone individually, as more than a dozen captain's at British Inquiries testified it to be quite standard in operating a ship on a day-to-day basis at the time. The disaster seemed to change that perspective for the better.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

My question is - how was Lightoller allowed to argue that they didn't know it was a flat calm when literally the previous day he'd testified than both him and Smith were aware that it was a flat calm?

IMO, throughout his two testimonies, Lightoller gave carefully calculated "Good Company Man" responses that might have raised a few eyebrows at most but did not generate too much controversy. At the time he got away with it because it was the immediate aftermath of an up to then unprecedented disaster, there were too many witnesses to question, too much analysis to be made etc. There was simply no time - and perhaps not too much inclination - to dissect specific statements of any witness, even an important one like the only surviving senior officer. But over a century down the line and with the benefit of hindsight and forums like this one, it was a different story and the loopholes began to show up rather easily, like you are showing in your OP.

For example, IMO what Lightoller said here is in itself an oxymoron:

-14200. Wait a minute: No moon, no wind, no swell?

- The moon we knew of, the wind we knew of, but the absence of swell we did not know of.

One can ask how there could be swell if there had been no wind (I mean, it was understood). I would have thought that an experienced sailor and an officer at that would have known that an almost complete absence of wind would have meant no swell either; and so IMO Lightoller dropped a clanger when he said that they did not know about the absence of swell after asserting that there had been no wind.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

I would have thought that an experienced sailor and an officer at that would have known that an almost complete absence of wind would have meant no swell either;

Absence of wind does not mean absence of a swell. The opposite, however, is true. The presence of wind produces a swell and waves and wavelets that depend on wind strength. A swell can exist without wind because it reflects a state of the sea that had been caused by winds somewhere else and place. A perfectly flat sea is a rarity.

how was Lightoller allowed to argue that they didn't know it was a flat calm when literally the previous day he'd testified than both him and Smith were aware that it was a flat calm?

IMO, they simply failed to notice the contradiction.

Despite knowing about the lack of wind, moon and swell, both he and Smith still believed that they would be able to spot an iceberg in time to avoid, even if it presented what was called a blue side toward them (usually cause by a recently capsized berg). Lightoller was trying to come up with a reason for why the inexplicable happened, so the best he could come up with is that everything possible that could make sighting a berg more difficult had happened that night despite knowing about it at the time. In other words, he couldn't come up with a good reason why they failed to sight the berg early enough to void. What he didn't know is that icebergs and growlers on dark, clear, moonless nights cannot be seen at the distances that they assumed they could be seen.

IMO, he wasn't pressed hard enough. They should have asked, 'well you discussed the difficulties of seeing bergs under the prevailing circumstances that you encountered, so why was nothing else done to mitigate the situation that those increased difficulties caused you?'

 

[Richard C Elliott]

IMO, he wasn't pressed hard enough. They should have asked, 'well you discussed the difficulties of seeing bergs under the prevailing circumstances that you encountered, so why was nothing else done to mitigate the situation that those increased difficulties caused you?'

One can look at it that way but, paradoxically, that could end up reinforcing belief in the prevailing (erroneous) 'see and avoid' strategy. It encourages the assumption that icebergs could be seen in time to safely avoid them if sufficient precautions were taken.

If Lightoller (and other nautical witnesses) had been pressured to admit that their approach to maintaining a lookout was defective the accident could be blamed on that failure, the officers could be made scapegoats and everyone could feel the usual human smug satisfaction at having found a culprit. Future officers would from then on post additional lookouts and could continue to believe that icebergs could be safely seen and avoided. Same old strategy in principle, just beefed up a little but still erroneous.

Lightoller was taking his "everything was against us" line as a purely defensive strategy but, probably unintentionally, he was making the point that circumstances could exist in which it was not possible to see ice in time to avoid it. That could be interpreted as evidence against the whole 'see and avoid' principle and would reinforce the idea that a safer strategy would be to avoid known/forewarned ice areas by altering course premptively before seeing ice. Pressing him on that point might have been more useful in respect of future accident prevention.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Might you be overthinking this a bit? I have done that myself with other things (and might be doing so again below).

One can look at it that way but, paradoxically, that could end up reinforcing belief in the prevailing (erroneous) 'see and avoid' strategy. It encourages the assumption that icebergs could be seen in time to safely avoid them if sufficient precautions were taken.

It depends on the way one looks at what is really meant by "in time". Obviously, if one of those precautions had been to divert to a more southerly course earlier, they would not have seen that iceberg at all and so the question does not arise. So, I would like to discuss the option of reducing speed, which I know we have done to the death before but please indulge me once again. Let us not get back into the same old arguement about speed reduction when ice was around not being SOP at the time, how 14301.5 other Captains asserted that they would have maintained speed, how it could have had corporate repercussions etc. Let us look at just the scenario where Captain Edward Smith of the Titanic, having heard what Lightoller had to say, decided to only reduce the speed of his ship to about 12 knots but maintain the same course and make no other changes.

With the atmospheric conditions being the constant factor, the lookouts and/or Murdoch would have spotted the object on the horizon when the Titanic was the same distance as it was in actuality that night. Perhaps even a few seconds sooner with less wind blowing into the lookouts' faces. But then the closing time between the two objects would have been a lot longer at 12 knots and one can ask if Murdoch could have given orders that could have avoided an impact altogether or, even if an impact had still occurred, whether the resultant damage would still have been fatal.

 

[Steven Christian]

One can look at it that way but, paradoxically, that could end up reinforcing belief in the prevailing (erroneous) 'see and avoid' strategy. It encourages the assumption that icebergs could be seen in time to safely avoid them if sufficient precautions were taken.

If Lightoller (and other nautical witnesses) had been pressured to admit that their approach to maintaining a lookout was defective the accident could be blamed on that failure, the officers could be made scapegoats and everyone could feel the usual human smug satisfaction at having found a culprit. Future officers would from then on post additional lookouts and could continue to believe that icebergs could be safely seen and avoided. Same old strategy in principle, just beefed up a little but still erroneous.

Lightoller was taking his "everything was against us" line as a purely defensive strategy but, probably unintentionally, he was making the point that circumstances could exist in which it was not possible to see ice in time to avoid it. That could be interpreted as evidence against the whole 'see and avoid' principle and would reinforce the idea that a safer strategy would be to avoid known/forewarned ice areas by altering course premptively before seeing ice. Pressing him on that point might have been more useful in respect of future accident prevention.

Yes. Understandable from what I've read of the inquiries. And not just Titanic's. Lusitania comes to mind. It seems the general consensus of many mariners that have gone thru inquiries is that there is is often an ulterior motive at play. Hence the CYA. If I recall right some the members of this board who have gone thru them expressed similar thoughts.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

With the atmospheric conditions being the constant factor, the lookouts and/or Murdoch would have spotted the object on the horizon when the Titanic was the same distance as it was in actuality that night. Perhaps even a few seconds sooner with less wind blowing into the lookouts' faces. But then the closing time between the two objects would have been a lot longer at 12 knots and one can ask if Murdoch could have given orders that could have avoided an impact altogether or, even if an impact had still occurred, whether the resultant damage would still have been fatal.

We have discussed before the point that the manoeuvering characteristics of a ship depend much more on distance than on speed so the path taken by the ship after Murdoch gave his orders would have been much the same - just in slower motion. Most of the additional closing time would therefore have been of no value. I agree that he would have had a little more flexibility in how quickly he needed to respond, but only a matter of a few seconds. It might indeed have resulted in a narrow miss rather than a collision and if all we are interested in is the 'what ifs' of the Titanic accident that is fine. If, however, we are thinking about changes to future operating practice it would be a rather marginal point. If the outcome of the inquiry concentrated too much on speed then, again, it could have resulted in minor changes to the existing unsatisfactory SOP.

On your last sentence can I remind you that the kinetic energy absorbed in the impact was only 1.5% of the total available, so we can conclude that even at a much lower speed the ship would have had more than sufficient energy to inflict the sort of damage incurred.

Might you be overthinking this a bit?

I don't think I am overthinking; just thinking along different lines to most people here. I am thinking in terms of how the inquiry outcome could influence future safety practice for the better rather than simply explain a single accident.