No Excuse for Capt Lord's Inaction

Jim Currie

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Starting from an estimated position of the wreckage for 11:20am and working the drift of current backward toward the wreck site for about 2½ hours, we find that the wreckage at the time Carpathia departed would be close to 41° 37’ N, 50° 00’ W. After leaving the scene of the wreckage, Carpathia briefly headed southward for a couple of miles and then southeastward to parallel the eastern edge of the pack ice. Eventually they would turn southward and then southwestward to get around the southern extent of the pack before heading due west. In that wireless message to Haddock, Rostron said that the pack ice extended as far south as 41° 16’ N, and that bergs and floe ice could be expected as far eastward as 49° 30’ W.

From the derived location of the wreckage for 9am, Carpathia would have had to go 20 miles to the south in latitude to reach the southern extent of the ice. Notice that this distance happens to match the “20 miles of field ice with bergs amongst” mentioned by Captain Rostron in his wireless message to Cunard’s New York office. But the pack ice was trended southeastward from the area of wreckage as far as the eye could see according to Rostron. That means Carpathia had to first go southeastward before she could turn southwestward and then westward. Eventually, Carpathia was able to get around the ice to reach a latitude of 41°15’N, one mile south of the southernmost point of the heavy pack. At 2:30pm NYT, a little over 7½ hours after departing the wreckage, Carpathia was reported at 41° 15’ N, 51° 45’ W, where she was put on a course of 267° True direct for the Nantucket Shoals light vessel. We know this from another message from Rostron to Hddock: "Captain Olympic: 7.30 G.M.T. [2:30pm NYT] Lat. 41.15 north, long. 51.45 west. Am steering south 87 west, true. Returning to New York with Titanic’s passengers. Rostron." In addition to this, we have the position, 41° 15’ N, 50° 20’ W, given to IMM’s vice president Franklin by the Cunard Line. This position is exactly 64 nautical miles due east of the 2:30pm NYT position for Carpathia sent in the message from Rostron to Haddock. At her normal fullahead speed of 14 knots, Carpathia would have covered that distance in 4 hours 35 minutes. That means that Carpathia would have passed 41° 15’ N, 50° 20’ W at 9:55am NYT, about three hours after Carpathia departed the area of wreckage. On Carpathia, it would have been less than half an hour before local apparent noon which came at 10:22am NYT on that date and location.

The departure course for Carpathia begins at the derived location of the wreckage for 6:55am NYT at 41° 37’ N, 50° 00’ W. It then follows a path down along the eastern edge of the pack ice southeastward, then south and around southwestward, and then westward to 41° 15’ N, 50° 20’ W, the location given to IMM’s Philip Franklin, for 9:55am NYT. The distance along the route shown to that point is 42 nautical miles, a distance that Carpathia would have traveled in 3 hours at 14 knots, Carpathia’s normal full-ahead service speed. From there, Carpathia would head due west (270° True) for another 64 nautical miles reaching 41° 15’ N, 51° 45’ W at 2:30pm NYT, where a slight course change to 267° True would put her on a direct heading for the Nantucket Shoals light vessel.

According to James Bisset, Carpathia did not reach open water until sometime after they took sights of the sun at local apparent noon where they would have obtained their precise latitude. At local apparent noon April 15, 1912, Carpathia would have been crossing 50° 28’ W longitude at 10:22am NYT, about 3½ hours after departing the wreckage. According to Captain Rostron, Carpathia was traveling about 4 hours, a distance of 56 miles at 14 knots, before reaching open water. This means that they did not reach completely open water until passing longitude 50° 40’ W in latitude 41° 15’ N. According to a Hydrographic office report submitted by Californian’s Captain Lord, Californian did not reach completely open water after resuming her voyage to Boston until she reached longitude 50° 42’ W in latitude 41° 33’ N. Clearly, the sea was spotted with lots of icebergs and patches of ice floes over a very large area extending well to the west of that major field of pack ice that we have been so involved with.
I'm sure you will correct me if I'm wrong. I use latitude difference only.

If the wreckage was at 41-33 north at 11-20 am, then by your reckoning, it was at 41-37 North at 9 am, This is a drift/leeway rate of 1. 74 nautical miles every hour. If this was the case . then we can estimate where the wreckage and survivors were, five (5) hours earlier, at 4 am when Carpathia found them...41-45.7'North?
Leaving out the leeway due to wind and using a south-setting current of 1.1 for the period 11-45 pm until 4 am, we then add another 4.7' to the 4 am latitude and arrive at a latitude of 41-50.4/North for the place where Titanic finally came to a halt.
We can also forget about leeway and simply add 1.1 minute of latitude to the latitude of the wreck site to obtain the latitude when Titanic finally stopped. That gives us a stop latitude of 41-47'North (rounded-up).

I note that none of the "maps" show Lord's search area which must have been at least 45 square miles of the area to the south and east of Carpathia's position at 9 pm.

You keep mixing up Pack Ice with Filed Ice.
The former is part of the latter.
Carpathia entered the Ice Field at 2-45 am and was in it from then until he cleared the westward side on the afternoon of April 15.

If you care to plot the ice reports, you will discover that the main Field extended from the north to south then tapered southeastward to about 41-28'North where Carpathia first encountered it. It had a central "spine" of pack ice interspersed with bergs and had bergs and small stuff tapering southwestward to latitude 41-15 North.
The plot of ice reports between April 11 and April 18 suggest that the bergs were being entrained in the northern margin of the North Atlantic Current...Not the Gulf Stream. The latter ends at about 60 West.
If as you suggest, Carpathia headed in a SE direction when 2 miles south of her starting point at 9 am, then she would simply have retraced her journey between 2-45 am and 4 am and been in bergs all the way. We know for sure that there were many bergs in that direction. This from Captain Lord:

" Q I will ask you whether you saw any icebergs while you were making that circle?
A: I was surrounded by icebergs.
Q: How large were they?
A: The ones way to the southeast were much larger than the ones to the westward."

Now why would captain Rostron take the route you suggest if his declared intent was not to aggravate the suffering of the survivors by prolonging their time in sight of ice bergs?
 
Mar 22, 2003
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If the wreckage was at 41-33 north at 11-20 am, then by your reckoning, it was at 41-37 North at 9 am,
The latitude of the wreckage was based on Californian's noontime position which was given as 41° 33'N. He was heading about 270° true when leaving the wreckage area. The time interval from when Titanic sank to Californian's noon sight is about 10 hours. That's a drift of about 11 miles in about 10 hours, a little over a knot. When Carpathia departed, about 9am, the wreckage would have been up around 41° 36'N, roughly. Sorry if I was off a mile.
 

Jim Currie

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A thought occurred to me: Why is Lord's Noon position for April 15 accepted without question yet his position of 10-21 pm the previous evening is unacceptable?

As it happens, I accept both positions. However, I think there is something wrong with the interpretation of his evidence regarding the Titanic main wreckage allegedly at the position lat 11-20am that morning.
For a start off, when the ship went down, there would have been a great deal more wreckage than what was reported by Lord.
We know there most certainly would have been very many people afloat in the water wearing lifejackets...that there was at least one staircase, a red and white Barber's Pole, a vast amount of cork afloat and an upturned boat in the immediate area. Certainly a lot more than wreckage from "an old fishing boat."

Let's start with some facts as can be derived from research and witness evidence.

First:
The main wreckage would originally consist of a large quantity of cork, a floating staircase, a red and white Barber's Pole, an upturned boat and a very large quantity of cork, as well as very many bodies

Current
When an object is afloat in a current it will move down-current at the rate of the surface current. It follows therefore, that everything in that current - lifeboats adrift, bodies in lifejackets, flotsam, and jetsam (deck chairs, Barber's Pole etc will move down-current at the same speed. After 1 hour, these should be in the same position relative to each other.

Wind:
When a wind blows over the sea surface, a surface current is generated. A floating object will be influenced by 2 things, the wind-generated surface current and the profile the object presents to the wind.
Your own Coast Guard developed tables showing the effect of wind at various strengths on floating objects of various air-profile. According to this Table, a loaded lifeboat or similar size craft present similar air profiles, in a Moderate breeze will very quickly attain a surface leeway speed of about 0.9 knots.
On the other hand, things with the same profile as a surfboard (upturned boat, people, poles and cork) in the same wind at the same place, will only attain a maximum leeway speed of about 0.23 knots.

Here's what we know:

At 00-25 am EST on April 14, Titanic sank.
At approximately 2-14 am EST that same morning, Carpathia arrived at the location of the survivors.
At about 1-45 am, EST, the north wind started to blow and soon developed into a moderate northerly breeze with wind between 11 and 16 knots... enough to drive a lifeboat under sail at a speed of about 4 knots.
At 2-15 am EST, Carpathia stopped beside lifeboat No.2 which was originally about a mile NE of Titanic at 00-25 am EST. By then there was a decided "slop" to the sea.
At 6-15 am EST, Carpathia was recovering the last of the survivors.
At 7-15 EST she departed for New York. Californian made a wide, circular sweep of the area,
At 9-35 EST, Californian returned to the spot she commenced the turn from. At that spot, there were a few cushions, empty lifejackets, wood planks and some deck chairs. No upturned boat, no Barber's Pole, no large amounts of cork or floating bodies. It was not the main wreckage.
My best guess (for what it's worth) is that most of what Lord saw had been chucked out of the lifeboats and/or discarded by users when they were of no longer any use and a hamper to the recovery of survivors using ash-bags.

The question must be asked: where was the main concentration of the flotsam, jetsam and bodies from the disaster?
If there had been a current flowing at that time, then every item would have remained in the same position relative to the other items and the lot would have been carried along at the same speed.
A northerly wind rose an hour after Titanic sank. Since the flotsam and jetsam had more or less the same air profile, all this would have done would have been to increase the speed of southward transportation and perhaps alter the direction of travel a little to the right.
If Carpathia had been at the main wreckage when Californian arrived beside her. then that same main wreckage would have been as visible to Captain Lord and his people as it was to Major Peuchen and the other Survivors earlier that morning.
 

Julian Atkins

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Why is Lord's Noon position for April 15 accepted without question yet his position of 10-21 pm the previous evening is unacceptable?
Hi Jim,

The simple answer is that apparently at noon on 15th April Captain Lord got all the officers to take the position, and all agreed. So The Californian was where the Ships Log states at that time.

The working back from this position is however much more questionable, and fraught with errors. As The Californian steamed round, or in a figure of eight, or a decreasing circle (there is evidence of each), after Carpathia steamed away, attempting to plot anything going backwards from the noon position is pretty nigh impossible. Even the time The Californian 'hove to' to Carpathia is not agreed, neither is when The Californian finished her search (Thanks to Groves, and some notes to the Ogden photos).

Captain Lord did not record a position earlier that morning, unlike Captain Moore on The Mount Temple.

On the evening of the 14th April, The Antillian message coordinates sent by The Californian were via dead reckoning, and Sam has cast doubt on whether Stewart's Polar Star 'fix' at 7.30pm on the 14th actually occurred.

(There is some evidence that Stone took sightings around 5.30pm, but these are also questionable).

The general assumption is that The Californian had a 'fix' at noon on the 14th, and at noon on the 15th, and there are lots of question marks in respect of Stewart's 14th April Polar Star observation at 7.30pm, and despite Captain Lord in 1961 stating the 11pm 'We are stopped surrounded by ice' message sent to Titanic by Evans (with Phillips replying 'DDD' ('shut up')) was with a position given, no such position was added to the message as the 1912 evidence shows.

Even if a position had been given (which I have always regarded as highly improbable), Phillips took no notice of the message transmitted by Evans in any event.

My personal view is that Captain Lord did not work out a dead reckoning position for The Californian when stopped at 10.21pm on the 14th till much later and after Evans' 11pm message to Titanic.

Cheers,

Julian
 

Jim Currie

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Hello Julian.

Your "simple answer" illustrates a point I have been trying to make for a very long time.
Everyone accepts Californian's April 15 Noon position because it is corroborated by the evidence of 3rd officer Groves. This makes it easier to accept the evidence without having any "feel" for the situation.
However, what you and so very many others (including Sam) can be excused for not knowing, is the importance placed on obtaining a DR position. and more to the point, the importance of such a position when anything affected the normal passage which caused the ship to stop, alter speed and or course. This was drummed into every Candidate for a Navigation Certificate in evert Navigation School across the Globe.

It is totally inconceivable that Lord would not have calculated or had someone else calculate a DR position when his ship stopped. This is the very essence of good seamanship.
Given the perfect conditions prevailing at the time, it is also ridiculous to suggest that an officer of Stewart's experience would not take the opportunity to obtain an accurate latitude by sextant altitude of Polaris.
in messrooms all over the world, such a suggestion would have been laughed out of the door.

In my day and long before that, it was common practice (if he had time) for the 2nd officer to obtain a sun sight at the end of the afternoon Watch. I have done it myself. Thus, you get a fairly accurate longitude to use to obtain a good DR for evening "Stars".

In fact, it would surprise you and non-seafarers just how often a "Good" DR was needed on the bridge of a ship.

Here's another thought for you.

If Captain Rostron obtained a good April 15 Noon position and new his courses from 9 am, how was he able to declare that the CQD position given by Boxhall was an excellent One?
This "hero" sent up confusing rockets and confirmed to any would be searchers that the false CQD position was an excellent one.
Not only that, but the US hydrographic office "bent" the pack ice to firt his evidence. And everyone jumps on poor old Captain Lord?:confused:
 
A

Aaron_2016

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This might help regarding the drift.


Extracts from the 1982 book:

Titanicbook1.png





'.......The best possible oceanographic search team had been assembled, and its conclusions as to the location of the great ship were almost surely the most accurate ever formulated.'


Can anyone rule out what is correct and incorrect in their pre-discovery data?


upload_2018-11-28_14-50-45.png



.
 

Jim Currie

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Very "Safe" Aaron but hardly "scientific"

Note the use of the expressions "could have" and "might have".

I'm afraid the authors did not avail themselves of all of the available evidence.
 
Mar 22, 2003
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It is totally inconceivable that Lord would not have calculated or had someone else calculate a DR position when his ship stopped. This is the very essence of good seamanship.
That I have to agree with. Any change, such as a change in heading or speed, would have been noted along with the time, and the DR position of the vessel worked out and noted in the scrap log. The stopped DR position worked by Capt.Lord was communicated to Virginian around 6am Monday morning. It showed Californian 17' of arc in lat north of the SOS latitude according to what Capt. Lord wrote to BoT. Those 17 miles also confirmed by Virginian's Capt. Gambell. That would be the same latitude as sent in the message to Antillian, 42° 03'N. It wasn't 42° 05'N, which is what Lord claimed at the inquiries.
 
A

Aaron_2016

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I thought they were very close. Dr. Ballard used to joke about how close the other team came to finding the wreck and would have taken the fame and glory. The wreck was found just outside the outer circle search zone.

1982 Data

chart1a.png


Red spot = Location of wreck.

map-Titanic3a.png
 

Julian Atkins

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It is totally inconceivable that Lord would not have calculated or had someone else calculate a DR position when his ship stopped.
I also agree it is totally inconceivable that Captain Lord would not have calculated this position.

The question I posed was when Captain Lord did this, and whether it was before or after Evans' 'We are stopped surrounded by ice message'. There was quite a lot going on on The Californian after 10.21pm when stopped, till Evans' message to Titanic at 11pm on the 14th.

According to the Walter Lord/Groves correspondence in the NMM at Greenwich, a basket of coal was thrown over the side to see how thick the ice was. Then Captain Lord has to go down below to get the Chief Engineer (Mahan) and they have that conversation on the deck about 'keeping steam up in case some of those big fellows come crunching along'. According to Captain Lord, Chief Engineer Mahan was with him when Captain Lord had his conversation with Evans and then went to the Marconi room (1961 transcripts).

Clearly no position was added to Evans' message to Phillips on Titanic at 11pm, despite Captain Lord claiming afterwards his position was sent to Titanic. He claimed this in 1961 and the 1959 Affidavit, and I will need to check but I think he claimed this also in the various correspondence after the British Inquiry in 1912.

It is an interesting point that during the USA Inquiry Captain Lord would have been aware that Bride had no surviving Marconi documents from Titanic, and no other ship's PV recorded overhearing in detail or at all Evans' message to Titanic at 11pm.

I totally agree that Rostron got his navigation wrong, and there is ample evidence of this. And Captain Rostron had a very good team of officers under him, unlike Captain Lord. So by implication if Captain Rostron got his navigation wrong (as did Captain Moore to a certain degree) why not also Captain Lord? What made Captain Lord so perfect and beyond question in his navigation that night?

He provided a very minimal somewhat evasive report to Leyland Line before he got to Boston, and when he got to Boston he lied repeatedly to The Boston Press. And whatever Captain Lord had noted down in the scrap log had been thrown overboard by Stewart significantly after it was known Titanic and sunk and whilst The Californian was searching the wreckage location on the morning of the 15th, and during a period when there was considerable disquiet on The Californian amongst the ranks; and by all accounts Captain Lord was 'in a tizzy' to put it mildly.

Cheers,

Julian
 
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Jim Currie

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Keep it going, Julian.

Captain Lord would work his 10-21 DR as soon as he left the upper bridge. he would do so for 2 reasons.
1. In the event, he had to move his ship for any reason, he would need a starting point. He could not know when he stopped, how long he was going to remain at that position. As it turned out, he decided to stop there until daylight and told the Chief as much. However, he might have had to move his ship at any time after he stopped.
2. A DR would be needed to work any celestial observations such as a star or planet azimuth for compass error determination which might be contemplated by any of his officers.

Evans was not instructed to send a master to master ice warning. He was simply told to let Titanic (her operators- not her captain) know that Californian was stopped for ice.
At the time, Lord had no idea of the extent of the ice surrounding him but he knew from his DR position that Titanic was following a track way to the south of where he was and that the normal behavior of the ice was to move eastward and northward, not to the south.

I suspect that the position Lord was referring to was the one sent earlier in the day, to Antillean at 6-30 pm that evening which was picked up by Titanic.
If Smith had received the "shut-up"n message, it would have had little interest to him since he would know that Californian was way to the north of Titanic's intended track and in any case, the ice warnings he had earlier received talk of ice way up there...of no danger to him under normal conditions. Incidentally, Lord would know exactly the same things.
 

Julian Atkins

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Hi Jim,

I don't know the answers to all this.

My premise was that Captain Lord did not have the opportunity to work out his DR stopped position till after Evans' message to Phillips on Titanic at 11pm on the 14th. Captain Lord went below to get Chief Engineer Mahan. We don't know whether the Chief Engineer was on duty in the engine room, or in his generous cabin at the rear of the starboard side of the main deck (which was incidentally far better appointed than Captain Lord's cabin!).

I am very aware that Captain Lord said he worked out his DR stopped position 'pronto', but my suggestion was that other evidence of Captain Lord suggests he was otherwise engaged in conversations with Chief Engineer Mahan, and then with Evans.

And by implication why did Captain Lord not add The Californian's position to the Titanic message sent by Evans to Phillips at 11pm 'Say Old Man We are stopped surrrounded by ice'? Why send a 'courtesy' (as per the USA Inquiry) message at all with no position added that makes the message totally worthless and of no use at all?! If Phillips had not been otherwise engaged he would no doubt have then asked what The Californian's position was! And what would Evans had replied?

Why send the message to Titanic at 11pm in the first place? And why did Captain Lord not order Evans to send this as an official MSG, as he had done earlier that evening to The Antillian (and there is some compelling evidence also to Titanic at the time and not just overheard by Bride as the detailed evidence and analysis of the PVs and Marconi chits at the British Inquiry suggests).

And why was this 11pm message not overheard and recorded in any other PV or Marconi station?

Bride had no recollection of this message as he was in his bunk at the time, and Phillips died in the disaster.

You can probably guess where this is leading to.

Cheers,

Julian
 
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Jim Currie

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Hello Julian.

If a Captain knows the average speed of his vessel and he has no intention of altering his course by very much in the near future, the amount of changes in his longitude and latitude will be constant as long as the average speed is maintained and the intended course is followed.
In the case of Captain Lord, he was on a due west course in latitude 41-05'North at or just before 7-30 pm that night. This from Stewarts Polaris sight. At that time, Stewart would note the position as
42-05 North, 49-25'West.
Lord would know that his ship increased her longitude by 15 minutes every hour, as would Stewart. Therefore, at 8 pm, Stewart would record an 8 pm DR of about 42-05'North, 49-32.5West.

In reality, Lord could have worked his 10-21pm DR in his head. Before he left the upper bridge, he would know that he had increased his westerly longitude by 2.3 x 15 = 34.5 minutes. Since he was on a westerly course, his latitude would not have changed. So all he had to do was add that 34.5 minutes to the 8 pm DR Longitude and he would obtain the longitude for his stopped position...42-05'North, 50-07'West. Because the polaris sight put Californian 2 miles north of her expected Longitude, Stewart would immediately have informed his captain. so you can see how easy it would have been for Lord to work his stopped DR position.
Lord left the bridge at or near to 11-35 pm he had plenty of time to work his DR and not it in the Scrap Log before searching out the Chief.
We know that it was 20 minutes after that before he had that conversation with Evans.

The courtesy message was Operator to Operator. If lo9rd had though it necessary, he would have sent it Master to Master and would have included his position in it. Keep in mind, Lord did not know where Titanic was. He only knew that her track was at least 17 miles due south at nearest approach to Californian's position and would then begin to increase the separation distance rapidly. under normal circumstances. Titanic was the last vessel using wireless that Evans had heard and that was much earlier. Why then, other than as a matter of courtesy as well as a wake-up call to any other nearby operator who might just be within hearing, would Lord have bothered?

As to where this is leading?

I would be suspicious myself but for the fact that Evans was not an employee of the Leyland Line and, although under the direct orders of Lord, Owed his allegiance to the Marconi Company.
However, I am sure there is a way to determine what wireless-equipped vessels were in range at the time.
Incidentally, I would not put too much store by the absence of wireless witnesses. At the time Titanic was sending out her cries for help, the Carpathia was well within range but never heard her. It was only when Carpathia's W/O called Titanic with a message that he found out about the distress.
Additionally: when Evans gave his evidence, he had no way of knowing whether or not there had been a wireless-equipped vessel of another Wireless Company nearby whose Operator could scupper his story.
 
Mar 22, 2003
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When Californian stopped because of ice, someone took the time because it was specified as 10:21pm ATS. That is too specific to be just an estimate. The reason that the exact time was needed was to work out a DR position from Californian's last known fix based on course, speed and elapsed time. Anyway, getting an approximate DR would have taken less than a minute. As we used to say in engineering, a simple back of the envelope calculation. (No slide rules needed.)
How so?
Actually, you can even forget about using an envelope. The last position given out was the DR coordinates to Antillian for 6:30pm. 42° 03'N, 49° 09'W. Californian was making 11 knots on a course heading of almost due west true. Up around latitude 42°N every 3 miles westward is worth 4 minutes of arc. The difference in time was a little under 4 hours, so Californian would have ran roughly a couple of miles short of 44 miles west to where she stopped. So lets put it at 42 miles west. Now 1/3 of 42 is 14, and 4 times that would be 56 minutes of arc, which is a mere 4 minutes of arc short of 1 degree, westward. So the very quick and dirty DR, done without pencil or paper, is 42° 03'N, 50° 05'W.
 
Mar 22, 2003
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The courtesy message was Operator to Operator. If Lord had though it necessary, he would have sent it Master to Master and would have included his position in it. Keep in mind, Lord did not know where Titanic was. He only knew that her track was at least 17 miles due south at nearest approach to Californian's position and would then begin to increase the separation distance rapidly. under normal circumstances.
So why was it necessary for Lord to send an MSG to Antillian when the two vessels were separated by about 87 miles with Antillian on the eastbound track heading toward the 41°N, 47°W eastbound corner?
 

Julian Atkins

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I don't know about all this - perhaps I am missing something obvious?

If Captain Lord could have worked out his DR stopped position on the back of his match box used to light his pipe in a few minutes or quicker, or worked it out in his head then I presume this was because he was a course due west or near enough due west?

The other available primary source evidence is that Captain Smith could not do this calculation in his head, and even when he had wrote out Titanic's CQD position got it wrong. Boxhall also got the position wrong.

Rostron got his DR course to Titanic's CQD wrong and despite getting it wrong still thought he was in the correct Boxhall CQD position despite him obviously (with hindsight) not being in Boxhall's CQD position. He also clearly got his speed wildly wrong after altering course for the CQD position.

There is some evidence that also Captain Moore got his navigation wrong on his rescue attempt.

So I pose again why was Captain Lord so perfect in his navigation that evening and night, when all the other key players got it wrong to a greater or lesser degree?

The corroboration of The Antillian ice warning message of bergs seen sent by The Californian is hidden in the depths of the British Inquiry and the evidence of George Turnball, Deputy Manager of Marconi in the UK. Plus it is generally assumed that The Parisian (on the same course as The Californian) and an hour or so ahead saw exactly the same icebergs that The Californian did as reported to The Antillian and Titanic by Evans on The Californian. In respect of such important corroboration as came from The Parisian, it may be that too many assumptions have been made? (Plus of course assuming that The Parisian's navigation was as 'perfect' as The Californian's!)

On a separate matter I accept on the above posts of Sam and Jim that Captain Lord did not have to go down to the chart room and spent 10 - 15 minutes to work out the DR stopped position of The Californian, though it did take the slow and plodding Boxhill some time to work out his own faulty and inaccurate CQD position and Boxhall certainly could not do this quickly in his head or on the back of a fag packet or back of an envelope.

I agree with Jim that even though Captain Lord would not have known beforehand where The Antillian was, having got wireless contact he would have supplied the info to The Antillian as not only a ship of his own line, but also a ship he had previously commanded, and no doubt he was familiar with it's officers and many of it's crew.

The associated point I have made a number of times that this message to The Antillian was also sent at the same time to Titanic as Turnball's detailed evidence shows plus Bride being recalled (Bride admitted he did not respond initially because he was writing up his accounts at the time).

Cheers,

Julian
 
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Aaron_2016

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Is it possible that Titanic's bridge did receive the ice warning from the Californian, but since Bride was in bed and Murdoch went down with the ship we will never know if they did or did not see and react to their message?

I'm reminded of the Mesaba ice warning. Stanley Adams was the wireless operator on that ship. He told the Inquiry:

"I sent this message, and the Titanic sent: “Received, thanks.” If I had not received that acknowledgment I should not have put the office I had sent it to, the time, and my signature. As soon as I received the official received signal, I timed it, dated it, put the office sent to, and initialled it."

Lightoller was on duty when that message was received, yet he denied it was ever received. I believe that is possibly the biggest mystery of the disaster.



Lightoller was asked:

Q - Did you ever hear of any such messages?
A - Nothing whatever.

Q - Are you positive that you never heard anything of either of those telegrams?
A - Absolutely positive.

Q - You were on the bridge?
A - I was.

Q - And nothing was said by anyone about such telegrams?
A - There was no telegram received by me, nor did I hear of any telegram.

Q - A message such as that from the Mesaba would be one, of course, of great importance?
A - I have no doubt it would have been immediately communicated to me if it referred to pack ice, as I believe it does.

Q - What was the course of business with regard to messages which are communicated by the Marconi operators to the Captain or officers?
A - It is customary for the message to be sent direct to the bridge. If addressed “The Captain,” or “Captain Smith,” it is delivered to Captain Smith personally, if he was in the quarters or about the bridge. If Captain Smith is not immediately get-at-able, if not in his room or on the bridge, it is then delivered to the senior officer of the watch (Lightoller)."

"Captain Smith’s instructions were to open all telegrams and act on your own discretion." (Perhaps Lightoller did not act wisely and did not want to admit that he received the ice message and did nothing in response?)



Statement by Sir Robert Finlay (representing the White Star Line):

"I think we should be able without going into detail at the present moment to satisfy your Lordship beyond all doubt that these messages, the 'Mesaba' message and the 'Amerika' message, were not communicated either to the Commander or to any of the officers on board the Titanic."

Lightoller - "I felt more like a legal doormat, than a mail boat officer."


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