Poingdestre and time

Years ago at a Titanic conference in Toledo, Ohio I published a paper saying just about the same thing as B-rad -- that the captain's CQD coordinates are essentially "true midnight" when April 14th day/date would have changed to April 15th. The captain obviously wanted to use wireless to get potential rescue ships heading his way. The only set of coordinates he had to hand was the ship's predicted midnight position, so it appears he used it. If so, this puts Captain Smith 'way ahead of his time in understanding how to use wireless communications. Getting ships moving in his general direction was of utmost importance. Later, Titanic could issue a revised and more accurate set of coordinates to guide rescue ships to the scene.

Boxhall's so-called "more accurate" set of coordinates is not what he or history has claimed. He said he worked it up from scratch, but simple observation shows that was a lie. All the Fourth Officer did was to move the midnight coordinates on the ship's reciprocal course by 20 minutes.

I've discussed this in many different threads over the years. And, I've pointed out that a DR track starting at "The Corner (42 North; 47 West) on a course of 266 true at 22 knots provides some interesting insights into Captain Smith's intentions. To wit: A line from Smith's CQD position through Boxhall's crosses the 266 course at 41 51 N; 49 48 W. That just happens to be the predicted DR locaton of Titanic at 11:30 in unaltered April 14th time. The direction of the line between CQD coordinates is 255 steaming west, or 075 in the reciprocal direction backwards. The difference between 266, the original course, and 255 is 11 degrees or as close to one compass point (a point equals 11.25 degrees) as could be read on Titanic's compasses.

Bluntly, the numbers indicate Captain Smith actually turned south, away from the ice field at 11:30 unaltered time April 14th or 11:06 on crew clocks. Note this coincides perfectly with IMM/White Star rules requiring half-hourly compass checks. On a cold night a captain might be forgiven for combining a check with a course change instead of sending an officer and QM to the windy standard platform twice in rapid succession.

So, everything works if the starting point is 42 N; 47 W. It is highly doubtful Titanic went "dead nuts" through that point. Unfortunately, however, we can't work up the coordinates when the ship turned "The Corner" or where it made that turn simply because the one key fact needed was conveniently forgotten that night. I find it extremely strange that none of the surviving officers -- especially Boxhall -- were able to provide the coordinates of the turn. Without those coordinates all of the educated guesses about speed, distance, and course prior to making "The Corner" are quite meaningless because they lie on an endless line with no cross reference to properly fix Titanic's location. Now, before fangs and teeth come at me, let me reiterate that the starting point of 42 N; 47 W is a bogus as well. The difference is that it works both on paper and within the context of what the officers said took place on the bridge prior to the accident.

We know that Lowe did not complete working out what are commonly referred to as "7:30 stars." He left the task for Boxhall. Perforce, this means the 8:00 p.m. ship's position required by IMM/WSL rules was a "best guess" based on whatever dead reckoning was being kept. Once Captain Smith came on duty Boxhall's little free time was taken up by helping the Captain plot ice. To my eye, the evidence indicates "7:30 stars" were put off in favor of learning as much as possible about the ice.

The apparent 11 degree turn is also curious. It would only take the ship some 4 miles south for each hour of steaming. That hardly seems enough to avoid an ice field. It would be explainable, however, if Smith believed his ship had steamed well south of "The Corner" as some officers alluded to. If so, a small change might have been used to keep safe distance from the ice while not letting it get out of sight over the horizon. Unless someone can ring him up on his mobile, we'll never know.

-- David G. Brown
Hi David,
I can see you have had years looking into the ship movement. As not a navigator it may look more clearer picture if was show on sketch or diagram of the longitude and latitude to the icefield. Then if possible compare to the route that the Mount Temple ship took to avoid the icefield?
I cant make out if the clocks were ever change at midnight?
That statement: I find it extremely strange that none of the surviving officers -- especially Boxhall -- were able to provide the coordinates of the turn? I am thinking knowing that 1500 who have died and could well been down to your incorrect navigation position! Who the hell in his right mind wants to own up to that?
 
Also of interest the Shipbuilder would state that the Master Clocks were not set until noon 'by the officer in charge, who puts them backwards or forwards according to the longitude'.
Shipbuilder was quite unaware of IMM Co. procedures regarding clock adjustments. Cunard, like WSL, adjusted their clocks around midnight.
 
Some time after Wheat, Ray was in the same place and saw both corridors flooded so much that he could just manage to get through the doorway into the main stairway. It could been 5 or 10 minutes after Wheat but not more, otherwise the water would been to high. It looks like in this period of time, list to starboard decreased and both side of the ship were flooded nearly at the same level.
Then I think you really may want to revise your timeline Mike,
10968. (The Commissioner.) What time was this? - [Wheat] I should think it would be about a quarter or ten minutes to 1.
10969. A little more than an hour after the collision? - Yes, about an hour, I should think.
 
Also found this in the 1885 publication Hints to Captains of the Mercantile Marine
That table Brad is nothing more than a table of Local Mean Time (LMT) differences from GMT at various places mentioned. It had nothing to do with time kept in those places necessarily. For example, New York went to mean time for the 75th meridian of west longitude in 1883. So did Montreal, Canada. LMT at a location was related to GMT by the longitude of the station listed. To get the longitude of the station listed, the conversion was 15 degrees per hour of time. If the the time was slow of GMT, then the longitude was west of Greenwich; if fast of GMT, then the longitude was east of Greenwich.
For example, take the Cathedral at Montreal from the table. LMT there was listed as 4h 54m 12s Slow of GMT. If we convert that to hours we get 4.9033 hours slow of GMT. Multiply by 15 deg per hour gives 73.5500 degrees of west longitude, which is the same as 73° 33' 0" W.
 
I find it extremely strange that none of the surviving officers -- especially Boxhall -- were able to provide the coordinates of the turn.
No more so than providing the coordinates of the ship's noontime position. Why would a set of routine coordinates be something that someone would remember? They were simply not important enough to commit to memory. .
 
Everyone, including Sam, believes that QM Rowe had partly adjusted time on his watch. So consider the following.

At Midnight, April 14, on the SS Californian, the unadjusted time on the ship's clock was 3 hours 10 minutes SLOW of GMT.
On Titanic, at Midnight , April 14, the unadjusted time was 2 hours 58 minutes SLOW of GMT.
It follows that the difference between time on the two ships was 12 minutes. In other words, the clocks on the Titanic were 12 minutes FAST of those on the SS Californian. So when it was Midnight on Titanic, it was only 11-58 pm on the Californian.
However, if the clocks on the Titanic were set back 24 minutes, while those on the Californian remained unchanged, then the situation would be reversed, Time on Titanic would be 12minutes SLOW, not FAST of the time on the Californian.

Now apply this situation to the evidence of QM Rowe.

If Rowe was asked to bring the detonators for the signals at 12-25 am by his watch then, because Californian time was now 12 minutes FAST of adjusted Titanic time kept by QM Rowe, 2nd Officer Stone on the Californian would have had 12-37am on his watch. Right?
If as he claimed, Stone saw his first "flash" in the direction of the nearby ship at 12-45 am. the time on Rowe's watch when that signal detonated above the ship was 12-33 am. That was 8 minutes after 12-25 am when he was told to bring the detonators.

At this point, I can almost see Sam's eye light up and hear his retort concerning Boxhall's evidence: "Ah yes!, but Boxhall said :
"15593. .....
- Yes. I knew one of the boats had gone away, because I happened to be putting the firing lanyard inside the well-house after sending off a rocket, and the telephone bell rang. Somebody telephoned to say that one of the starboard boats had left the ship, and I was rather surprised."

Boxhall makes no mention of detonators but obviously detonated a socket signal just before he received that call. But who made that call?
It could not have been Pitman since Pitman left in the very next boat after the one seen by the caller. Besides which, Boxhall was being told about an event on Titanic, which had taken place a little over 50 feet away from where he, Boxhall was, when the call was made. Pitman would have been 50 feet away from Boxhall so how could Pitman be at the stern and make that call?

Boxhall might well have received such a call, but he had to have detonators to fire that particular signal and these were kept separate from the main charges in a locked cupboard at the stern. However, all this is academic since not one single signal was fired before No.7 left the starboard side. In fact, not a one was fired before boats 5 and 7 left the starboard side. Here's the proof.

First that No 7 must have left the ship before 12-30am,

15036. Again, with regard to the time, how long do you think it was between the time of striking the berg and your boat reaching the water. You have given me two estimates of time, 20 minutes, and 12.20. Could you help me on this matter?
- Well, I should think it would be about 12.30 When No. 5 boat reached the water.

Then concerning the firing of socket signals:

Senator SMITH. Q: You saw those signals of distress, did you, from the Titanic? A: Mr. PITMAN. Yes.
Senator SMITH: Q: When was this? When did you first see them; before you left the Titanic? ...Mr. PITMAN: No; shortly after.
Senator SMITH: Did you see any while you were aboard the Titanic, any of that character? A: Mr. PITMAN...None were fired." [before No. 5 left the ship]


It cannot be any plainer than that. Here's some more information for you:

Like every passenger ship and ship with such devices, the detonators were kept remote from the main charge. To do otherwise was an offense. here are the particular bits of legislation which applied in 1912.

Merchant Shipping Act 1894
"Substances to which this Act applies
This Act shall apply to gunpowder and other explosives as defined by this section. The term " explosive " in this Act—
(1)Means gunpowder, nitro-glycerine, dynamite, gun-cotton, blasting powders, fulminate of mercury or of other metals, coloured fires, and every other substance, whether similar to those above mentioned or not, used or manufactured with a view to produce a practical effect by explosion or a pyrotechnic effect; and
(2)Includes fog-signals, fireworks, fuzes, rockets, percussion caps, detonators, cartridges, ammunition of all descriptions, and every adaptation or preparation of an explosive as above defined.
(3.) For the purpose of this Part of this Act the
expression "dangerous goods" means aquafortis, vitriol,
naphtha, benzine, gunpowder, lucifer matches, nitro-
glycerine, petroleum, any explosives within the meaning
of the Explosives Act, 1875 (d), and any other goods which
are of a dangerous nature.

"Explosives Act, 1875:
22. General Rules
(3)An article or substance of an explosive or highly inflammable nature shall not be kept in a fire-proof safe with the gunpowder, and in every case shall be kept at a safe distance from the gunpowder or the safe containing the same; and
(4)Neither the building exclusively appropriated for the purpose of keeping the gunpowder nor the fire-proof safe shall have any exposed iron or steel in the interior thereof;"

Moving on:

QM Rowe said "I assisted the officer to fire them, and was firing the distress signals until about five and twenty minutes after1."

That was the last one fired then Rowe went in a collapsible boat.

01-25 am on Rowe's watch would have been 1-37 am on Second officer Stone's Watch. Here is an excerpt from Stone's evidence:

"7983. (Mr. Butler Aspinall.) I want to take you back. You remember those 20 minutes you told me you were talking to Gibson - not all the time, but you and he were from time to time having a conversation about the ship, after the eight rockets, that was between 1.40 and 2 o'clock; it was 20 minutes?
- Yes."

Seems pretty conclusive.

 
Yes he did. And guess what angle he said she was down by?

Mr. LOWE. I should say she was about 12° to 15° by the head.

If that were true then the crow's nest would have been submerged by then, and the ship's back would have broke in two by then. I guess Lowe was as good as estimating angles as he was at estimating speed.
Then Lowe must also have been wrong about Titanic swinging to the north.:rolleyes:
 
No more so than providing the coordinates of the ship's noontime position. Why would a set of routine coordinates be something that someone would remember? They were simply not important enough to commit to memory. .
Oh yes they were - and for a very good reason.
The coordinates for the 5-50 pm turn position were the ones used or assumed by Pitman, Boxhall, Lowe and Moody when working future DRs right up until the 7-30 pm fix was obtained... that was from 5-50 pm right up until after 9-30 pm.
 
Everyone, including Sam, believes that QM Rowe had partly adjusted time on his watch. So consider the following.


I personally do not believe that Rowe set his watch. Rowe, as I have pointed out several times, clearly states that he did not adjust nor think about his watch. He also states 11:40 and 12:25 in the same sentence without any mention of time adjustment. Along with that no one has answered my question as far as why would Rowe have only done a partial adjustment on his watch and not the full 47 minutes. Did he plan on starting his next watch 24 minutes late?

Not saying these points answer anything or adds to anything, just my thoughts. :) I've included a report I had written a long while back, and haven't read until now, and is not edited, but still relates what it needs to.
 

Attachments

Along with that no one has answered my question as far as why would Rowe have only done a partial adjustment on his watch and not the full 47 minutes. Did he plan on starting his next watch 24 minutes late?

The answer to this one is simple. Rowe was going to spend the last two hours of his watch freezing his spuds off on the back end of the ship. The one thing at the foremost of his mind would have been a hot brew and his bed. If he'd set his watch back by half the time it would have told him exactly when he was due to be relieved. This does not mean that the ship had set her time back.
 
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