Reversing Engines, Unfair Criticism of Officer Murdoch

[Thomas Krom]

then having it off in a car that was supposed to be crated.

Not to mention in a cargo hold which was inaccessible during the voyage.

 

[Roger Southern]

Do we need to continue this? I'm starting to feel nauseated...............

 

[Steven Christian]

So back to the subject...I'm sure it's been discussed before but I'm lazy right now to go look. It's been said that if Titanic had been just one or 2 feet further to port the damage wouldn't have happened. My question for the mariners here. If they had just stopped the port engine would that have given them enough turn to gain the one or two feet needed? Reversing wasn't an a viable option with the time they had from what I understand. But what about just stopping the engine and letting the starboard engine swing it a little bit. Would it have made a difference to gain a foot or two to port? Just curious. Cheers.

 

[Julian Atkins]

My concern is that Murdoch didn’t react before the lookouts rang the bell 3 times.

Boxhall had allegedly finished his ‘rounds’ earlier, if he ever did them, then went to his quarters ie his cabin rather than join Murdoch on the bridge. Boxhall may have been as much use as a chocolate tea pot that night, and Murdoch might have known that. So Murdoch ought to have had other bridge officers with him on the bridge, and it is my view that Captain Smith ought not to have retired, and ought to have joined Murdoch on the bridge much earlier.

Did it need Moody continuously standing by Hichens in the wheelhouse watching Hichens’ every move?

Could Moody not have left Hichens on his own to go and assist Murdoch alone on the bridge?

 

[Samuel Halpern]

It's been said that if Titanic had been just one or 2 feet further to port the damage wouldn't have happened.

That is not at all true. A ship doesn't turn like a motor car. One of those myths told by people who don't really know how a ship turns. In fact, if she turned a few seconds earlier, she would have struck further aft possibly opening up more critical compartments and sinking earlier than she did.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

My concern is that Murdoch didn’t react before the lookouts rang the bell 3 times.

Boxhall had allegedly finished his ‘rounds’ earlier, if he ever did them, then went to his quarters ie his cabin rather than join Murdoch on the bridge. Boxhall may have been as much use as a chocolate tea pot that night, and Murdoch might have known that. So Murdoch ought to have had other bridge officers with him on the bridge, and it is my view that Captain Smith ought not to have retired, and ought to have joined Murdoch on the bridge much earlier.

Did it need Moody continuously standing by Hichens in the wheelhouse watching Hichens’ every move?

Could Moody not have left Hichens on his own to go and assist Murdoch alone on the bridge?

Good questions. I also agree with you about Smith being just inside.

 

[Steven Christian]

That is not at all true. A ship doesn't turn like a motor car. One of those myths told by people who don't really know how a ship turns. In fact, if she turned a few seconds earlier, she would have struck further aft possibly opening up more critical compartments and sinking earlier than she did.

Don't agree. It was a glancing collision. A couple of feet could have made all the difference whether she opened up the way she did. If just one or two of the forward compartments weren't breeched she wouldn't have sunk as fast as she did. Maybe not at all. But your right. I've never operated a ship the size of Titanic so I'm just asking.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Steven, Sam has discussed what might have happened with slightly different timescales and maneuvers in great illustrated detail in pp106-115 of his Strangers On The Horizon and of course throughout of Prelude To An Allison. You might find Chapter 12 of PTAA particularly interesting; I certainly did.

 

[Julian Atkins]

I think that Sam’s “Prelude to an Allision” is a very important new book that sets out the timing of the orders Murdoch made and how they affected Titanic.

I continue to find it odd that Moody had to stand by Hichens instead of being on the bridge with Murdoch. A younger pair of eyes to assist with the lookout on the bridge. It seems to me completely extraordinary that once Moody’s time of 11pm for them coming into ice fields and bergs that Murdoch would not want him on the bridge with him keeping lookout.

Did an officer have to stand always by the QM in the wheelhouse according to White Star Line rules? Seems nonsensical to me if other priorities prevailed.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Did an officer have to stand always by the QM in the wheelhouse according to White Star Line rules?

I did not think so. I was under the impression that the junior officer on the bridge only stood by the helmsman to make sure that an order given by the OOW was followed correctly. He was on the open bridge rest of the time.

I am open to be corrected on this.

 

[Georges Guay]

Mate Murdoch was most likely a very good deck officer. But he certainly didn't have the experience or knowledge of a maritime pilot of Bowyer's stature. It took (relations and) many years of coaching and practical learning to be sanctioned by the Trinity House Pilotage Service to steer such a liner! When you get to that sort of expertise, you have acquired reflexes not only to execute the «precautions which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen» (IRPCS Rule 2 (a)), but the ones expected to be achieve by a practiced seaman in such case.

Murdoch didn’t have nor wasn’t expected to show that level of maneuvering expertise. He has done whatever maneuvers his practice and experience commanded him to do. He tough that from his starboard station it was possible to avoid the berg, but he liner was just too large, too fast, too close, and her engines non maneuverable. The only conclusion left was to acknowledge that the collision was unavoidable and attempt to reduce the shock of a direct blow and then, bring the stern drifting angles away from the berg. The only choice that manoeuvre could somewhat succeeded would’ve been to reduce the lengthy time between the bells and the helm order hard-a-starboard (20sec*), and the extensive period between the next helm order hard-a-port (36sec*), not taking into account that it required an extra 30 sec for the rudder to reach the opposite direction (+66sec).

When I speak about «acquire reflexes» I mean that the time between the bells and the helm order hard-a-starboard could’ve been around 5 to 7 sec max and the rudder only left hard-a-port during nearly the same amount of time.

* Samuel time

 

[Julian Atkins]

Hi @Georges Guay

Wasn’t Bowyer implicated in the Hawke accident and really had very little experience of these very large new ships?

Bisset wrote many years later in ‘Tramps and Ladies’ 1959 that the Olympic class were very different and difficult. Others will be able to supply Bisset’s remarks as quotes.

For others, I have 4 problems with Titanic that night. (Amongst others).

1. Murdoch was alone on the bridge at a crucial time. That Moody himself had apparently said to Lightoller.

2. Other officers were available to assist him in the lookout.

3. Of what we know of the Carpathia and The Californian the bridge was double manned by the Captain and another officer before anything happened to Titanic. I think the same could be said of the Mount Temple.

4. Murdoch didn’t react before Fleet rang his 3 bells.

I have very carefully considered point 4.

Notwithstanding the above, I take the view that Captain Smith ought to have remained on the bridge. I don’t know when he had his last eyesight test, but I know when Fleet last had his. I don’t know when Murdoch had his last eyesight test or Moody or Boxhall.

 

[Georges Guay]

Hi Julian. If you add up the ships’ tonnage that Bowyer pilot from 1871 to 1912, you might find out that the Olympic Class were finally not that large. After 8 years of pilotage practice, I was promoted from Class A to Class A* Unlimited. I went from ships of 800 ft in length to 1000ft. I did not see much difference except that I had to be more relax on the throttle to not drag houses in the channel.

Bowyer was probably stunned by Olympic turning circle difference between the center propeller engaged and disengaged. His turn around Bramble was possibly too large but he felt comfortable that the little grey ship (when its grey stay away) on his starboard bow had all the sea room needed to play with. On board Hawke, everyone was watching the Marvel speeding down. When Olympic got nearer but at safe distance, the distracted steersman had a shout from Captain Blunt; «What are you doing with your helm? Port, Hard-a-Port !!!». As the wheel was corrected, the rudder jammed some 15° to starboard too late. Hawke veered to port and rammed the Olympic against an angle of 67°. See The Bridges & Instrumentation / Indirect Steering System / post #13.

«Mr. Bowyer can do almost inconceivable things with giant liners and I believe he could steer the Majestic through the Bargate without mishap!»

 

[Samuel Halpern]

According to the testimony of Hawke eyewitnesses, Olympic came within about 100 yards (1/2 cable) of Hawke by the time she completed that hard turn around the W. Bramble. According to QM Albert Haines on Olympic, the man at the wheel on Olympic, the No Man's Land Fort was about 2 points on the starboard bow after Olympic came around. If all this is true, then Bowyer's turn was much wider than what he or Capt. Smith claimed during the trial, and Olympic came much closer to Hawke than what they were willing to admit. At the time, Hawke had no maneuvering room to starboard. She was paralleling the three buoys outside the entrance to Cowes (the easternmost being the Prince Consort buoy). If Olympic was in the center of the channel south of the Ryde Middle where she was claimed to have been, she would have been on a heading of about 105°T with the No Man's Land Fort only 1° or 2° off her starboard bow, not the 2 points as Haines had testified to. (Yes, Haines was asked if he knew the difference between 2 points and two degrees.)
The heading paralleling the three buoys that Hawke was forced to be on was about 90°T. The two vessels would have been on slightly converging (about 15°) courses if Olympic had steadied exactly on her predetermined course following the turn around the Bramble. Eyewitnesses on both vessels thought they were on parallel courses, which essentially what you would have if Haines is to be believed. It was after Hawke had the Prince Consort buoy abreast that Blunt ordered his helmsman, QM Lunt, to port the helm (right rudder) and steer for the No Man's Land Fort to give Olympic more room, as Olympic was then accelerating past Hawke. It was then that Hawke's head started to veer off to port, and Capt. Blunt called out, "Port, hard-aport!"
I know Georges that you are toying with the belief that those on Hawke were distracted by this new and very large vessel steaming by, and that her wheel was turned the wrong way. I'm not buying it. On the other hand, I'm started to rethink the analysis that I did back in 2014 where I accepted that Olympic was steadied on het 105°T course line after the turn around the buoy.
What I am doing is reviewing once again all the written statements from Hawke's officers and bluejackets that was written by them the day of the accident on their return to Portsmouth, their testimony at the Admiralty hearing taking soon afterward, and then their testimony taken at the Olympic/Hawke trial in November. As expected, and with no surprise, there were a few small details that were different between these accounts, just like the differences seen between those that testified at both the Senate hearings and what they said before the wreck commission following the Titanic disaster.

 

[Georges Guay]

I know Georges that you are toying…

Thank you Samuel for your esteem, it is appreciated. I understand that since you have little or any merchant marine experience, you have no other choice but to paste & copy official stenographers’ court transcripts or foraging from nautical books to another to deduce a theory which confirms your preconceived ideas. I also comprehend your reluctance to change your mind when a book of your own has already been written.

What you are telling us here is the testimony of Hawke eyewitnesses that have been taught by their lawyers to state or not. How did Hawke measured Olympic distance of about 100 yards (1/2 cable); by octant or by eyesight alone? Mariners know well that the bigger the ship, the closest she appears! The only way to measure another vessel distance off is by Radar or AIS, the latter method not being recommended. Did Titanic observers ever testify that Californian was 5 miles away?

Nowadays, Price Consort buoy is a North Cardinal Buoy meaning in particular to advise commercial traffic to stay to the north if they wish to safely navigate in the Main Fairway. But to the south of that buoy exist what is called the Outer Fairway where the shallowest depth is 32.8 feet of water at lowest mean tide. Therefore, there was all kind of playground water in that area for Hawke to first avoid adverse shoal interaction and two, to not impede the passage of the ‘largest liner in the world’ which could safely navigate only within the Main Fairway. If a small vessel exercising about did not wish to be distracted by a speedy love boat at close range, she just had to stay clear in the Outer Fairway.

Now here is the fun part. For the second times, as when you feel that the carpet is slipping under your feet you run away, please explain in public for the benefit of all, how an aircraft carrier under a replenishment operation with a tanker at such a close range and at great speed, are not just bumping into each other? If they would inadvertently bump against each other, how could the angle of collision be at 67°?

According to the testimony of Hawke eyewitnesses, Olympic came within about 100 yards (1/2 cable) of Hawke by the time she completed that hard turn around the W. Bramble. According to QM Albert Haines on Olympic, the man at the wheel on Olympic, the No Man's Land Fort was about 2 points on the starboard bow after Olympic came around. If all this is true, then Bowyer's turn was much wider than what he or Capt. Smith claimed during the trial, and Olympic came much closer to Hawke than what they were willing to admit. At the time, Hawke had no maneuvering room to starboard. She was paralleling the three buoys outside the entrance to Cowes (the easternmost being the Prince Consort buoy). If Olympic was in the center of the channel south of the Ryde Middle where she was claimed to have been, she would have been on a heading of about 105°T with the No Man's Land Fort only 1° or 2° off her starboard bow, not the 2 points as Haines had testified to. (Yes, Haines was asked if he knew the difference between 2 points and two degrees.)
The heading paralleling the three buoys that Hawke was forced to be on was about 90°T. The two vessels would have been on slightly converging (about 15°) courses if Olympic had steadied exactly on her predetermined course following the turn around the Bramble. Eyewitnesses on both vessels thought they were on parallel courses, which essentially what you would have if Haines is to be believed. It was after Hawke had the Prince Consort buoy abreast that Blunt ordered his helmsman, QM Lunt, to port the helm (right rudder) and steer for the No Man's Land Fort to give Olympic more room, as Olympic was then accelerating past Hawke. It was then that Hawke's head started to veer off to port, and Capt. Blunt called out, "Port, hard-aport!"
I know Georges that you are toying with the belief that those on Hawke were distracted by this new and very large vessel steaming by, and that her wheel was turned the wrong way. I'm not buying it. On the other hand, I'm started to rethink the analysis that I did back in 2014 where I accepted that Olympic was steadied on het 105°T course line after the turn around the buoy.
What I am doing is reviewing once again all the written statements from Hawke's officers and bluejackets that was written by them the day of the accident on their return to Portsmouth, their testimony at the Admiralty hearing taking soon afterward, and then their testimony taken at the Olympic/Hawke trial in November. As expected, and with no surprise, there were a few small details that were different between these accounts, just like the differences seen between those that testified at both the Senate hearings and what they said before the wreck commission following the Titanic disaster.