Thanks again, Arun, for your long and thoughful response. Apologies for taking so long to get back to you.
"....The information, or rather the instructions, that the stewards gave them was evidently to return inside the ship and to make their way to the stern...."
"That is what I have some doubts about. Is there any evidence that the stewards actually instructed the Third Class passengers berthed at the bow end to head towards the stern or was that the natural instinct of many passengers themselves who realized that the Titanic was flooding from the bow end?"
Well, the stewards certainly did _not_ send the 100 or so steerage passengers on the forward well deck directly up to the boat deck, although that was one of their designated escape routes. They all filed below. At some point, I am not sure whether it was before or after the return of the steerage men below deck, but it was early on, Daniel Buckley joined a small group of young men attempting to reach the boat deck via the ladders leading up from the forward well deck (again, it was an officially designated route). There was a scuffle with one of the crew who repelled the young men and locked the gate / barrier to prevent a second attempt. However the leader of the group smashed the gate and the young men got through (Lord, "Night Lives On" p. 114).
" I know that this [the door to the 'saloon companionway'] was locked during normal passage and likely remained so in the first hour after the collision. You might be right, but I might have missed the evidence that they remained locked throughout." I have not seen any evidence that this door (again, the second officially designated route of steerage escape) was ever opened. I have never read any reports of even a handful of steerage men coming up the grand staircase to the forward boat deck (except in the final minutes of the Titanic's life -- see Archibald Gracie's testimony -- and these people had clearly made it there from the stern). Also, if either of these totally unfamiliar routes off Scotland Rd were open and available to the steerage men, they would almost certainly have required the guidance of the stewards to find and use them. Otherwise, why would they not find and use them? I am not aware of any evidence that the stewards offered such guidance. The evidence seems to be that the stewards guided them past these escape routes (see below) to the public areas in the stern.
The trimmer George Cavell testified to seeing the steerage men filing down Scotland Road. Both he and others reported seeing stewards posted along the route, reassuring the steerage men, telling them "to keep calm." If the stewards gave them any directions, they did not apparently include any to the boat deck, because that is not where they went.
Fireman Charles Hendrickson was caught in a crowd of steerage men on Scotland Road "working their way aft," apparently under the supervision of the stewards. They were almost all carrying their luggage. Apparently none of the stewards suggested to them that their luggage would better be abandoned (as Steward Wareham advised Edith Russell: "Kiss your trunks good-bye").
Hart's testimony agrees with that of Cavell and Hendrickson, that the steerage men were directed aft by the stewards, and not up to the boat deck. Under examination Hart explained that the steerage men went aft (rather than up to the boat deck) because no one told them to do otherwise. But surely this would have been the job of the third class stewards posted along Scotland Rd., unless they had received alternative instructions. In fact, Hart's instructions, according to his testimony, were originally not to conduct steerage passengers (of either sex) up to the boat deck, but to "wait with his people" in the after steerage section pending further instructions from the head Third-Class steward (Kiernan).
Even more disturbing, there is evidence that, in accordance with instructions, a not insignificant number or steerage passengers were actually parked in the third class dining saloon on F deck.
There is evidence of steerage passengers being restrained from access to the boat deck until quite late in the disaster. When Hart returned for his second batch of women and children, the men were demanding access to the boat deck, and "it was all the stewards could do to hold them back" (Lord, "Night Lives On," 113). Even women had trouble getting through the barriers: Kathy Gilnaugh and her friends were not permitted off the after well deck through second class space. Their male companions had to overcome the reluctance of the stewards with shouting and threats. Olaus Abelseth and his friends were stuck on the after well deck because access to the boat deck via second class was closed to the steerage men. Women were not allowed to pass until 1:30. The men were kept back until 2:00.
I have read Appendix Q of "
On a Sea of Glass," and I generally agree with the facts as stated. However, I do not conclude from those facts that certain disadvantages were not imposed on the steerage passengers, both male and female -- but especially on the males -- and that, to put it as mildly as I think the evidence allows, they received less assistance than they needed, and that the third class stewards did not show the same zeal in saving their charges as did their counterparts in first and second class. I also do not believe that the evidence indicates, as some recent commentators have suggested, that the disproportionately large loss of life among the steerage passengers was due to their own short-comings.
Best wishes,
Brad