Hello David!
I keep missing your posts.
I was interested in your take on bridge managements systems and enclosed quartermasters.
In fact, the only difference between a modern ship and Titanic was that the QM was enclosed at night. During the day time, he would have been on the wheel in front of enclosed wheelhouse. At night on a modern ship, the QM wouldn't be able to see anything anyway. In a warship, (particularly a submarine
) it's the same.
As for radar: only one person at a time can look at it so it's not exactly a sharing thing. Nor is it, as you know, much use in detecting small icebergs.
I'm afraid you are looking at old things with a modern eye. In fact, there's nothing new under the sun except electronics!
The modern concept of a bridge management team and 'kitchen design' navigating bridge is theoretically excellent but totally impractical when staff numbers are cut to the bone. In fact, I suggest to you that with the exception of Smith playing his cards close to his chest, there was nothing much wrong with the management system on board Titanic. The best, most modern management system in the world could not have helped them. Only forward sensing sonar of sufficient range coupled with audio alarm could have saved that ship.
I agree about the position of the standard compass. However, it was placed between the second and third funnels for a particular reason. It was placed there mid-ship, in the belief that it would require a minimum of correction in two main directions because the mass of steel forward would counteract the mass of steel aft. I don't know the direction of the building berth but that would play an inportant role as well. Having said that, as long as there was an efficient means of comparing it with the steering compasses, and sufficient staff to do it, it didn't really matter where it was sited. Later vessel had a projector standard compass. i.e. the standard compass was located directly above the steering compass and the helmsman could see it's compass card reflected in the mirror of a periscope, the view-finder of which was located in front of him at eye level. To check it, an officer went aloft to the deck above. There was a speaking tube located at the side of the standard compass thie led to a bell-mouth next to the projector in the wheelhous. he would shout down the tube to the helmsman "let me know when you're right on". Whe the helmsman had the ship right on course, he would shout "right on now sir" and the officer would take the reading on the standard compass. This is still done on a regular basis.
When a ship of that size alters course in the normal way, you do not 'feel it'. That only happens in an emergency turn and only in certain places in the ship. My bet is that the first indication to Smith of anything wrong would have been the double ring on the telegraphs or the sudden stopping of the engines.
I find it quite amusing to suggest that there was some kind of "let's get-together and get our stories right" meeting.
For a start off, the person who came up with it hasn't the faintest idea of how a ship hierarchy worked in the British Merchant Service of 1912 and well into the late decades of the last century.
Captain Smith was a maritime 'snob'. Not his fault... just the way things were. There was no such thing as hob-nobbing with the lower ranks and certainly no possibility of sharing confidential information with them. If you read the transcrips of the hearings, you will note that apart from, discussing details of navigation. Smith hardly passed the time of day with the junior officers. If he was going to meet with any of his officers, it would have been with the three senior Watch Keepers.. Wilde, Murdoch and Lightoller.Possibly not even Lightoller since he was the junior of the three.
However, what would be the point of such a meeting?
It could have little or nothing to do with what happened after impact since Wilde, Lightoller, Boxhall, Pitman and Lowe were absent from the bridge before the time. As for Andrews: what on earth would he have to do with it? He was simply the 'guarantee man'. His knowledge of what happened would start with him being called to help with the damage assessment after impact. So what did all the officer's know of events up until then that would harm them or the Company?
That there were numerous ice warnings received? Not that, because the senders of such warnings could vouch that they did. In incidentally to claim they never received them would have needed collussion by both wireless operators. This was highly unlikely sin they did not work for the WSC but for Marconi direct.
That the ship' speed was increased? Not that either because there is firm evidence that it was not.
The whole idea is just plain romantic daftness!
Scott:
Lightoller was in charge of the ship from 6pm to 10 pm that night. Apart from the half hour when he was relieved for his dinner, he would spend the entire time on the bridge wing.
When he came back on Watch after dinner, his relief would stay on the bridge wing, on Watch until he, Lightoller, had taken six or seven star sights. Then Lightoller would return to the bridge wing and stay there until Murdoch relieved him at 10pm.
Sure these guys would discuss what was happening. In fact I recall someone saying they discussed just how fast Titanic would go when they eventually did a full speed trial.
What most people do not know is that when it is planned to significantly increase a ship's speed, the navigators must be informed. There are very sound reasons for doing so, one of which is the ability to predict the time for the next day's Noon on board the ship. If you read my last post, you will discover that they worked on the surmise that the clocks would be changed 47 minutes during the period Noon 14 to Noon 15. If there was going to be a speed run or a speed increase, it would not take place before Noon on April 15.
If Smith had informed his navigators that he was going to significantly increase speed he would have told them so, since this would effect there work when determining the approximate (DR) position at any time. In any case, the planned clock change shows that they expected to cover about the same distance as they did on the previous day.
As I pointed out to David, there would be no use trying to hide the ice warnings. Those who sent them and those who received them were outwith the controls of the White Star Company.
Jim C
