Was Capt Smith lost in a daze during the sinking?

[Dan Parkes]

Capt David Brown might have raised some interesting points, but as his book Titanic Myths, Titanic Truths shows, many of his theories were way, way off.

Personally, I ignore who says what, I am more interested in looking at the facts and questioning everything and everyone, no matter who they are.

I am sorry Dan but I fully agree with Sam and others who believe that Captain Smith was not thinking clearly when he gave that stupid order to "row for the light" in the distance.

Don't be sorry Arun, I enjoy looking at all options and not discounting them based on personalities.

Although I wouldn't call Smith "stupid" - I think that is perhaps a step too far. I would like to quote a recent comment by Mark Chirnside in relation to Murdoch, which I think equally applies here to Smith:

Many of Murdoch's critics judge him unfairly on the basis of inaccurate information! We must never forget that we do not have Murdoch's account of his actions: what he saw, what he did, what he was trying to do and what he judged was achievable.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

I wouldn't call Smith "stupid"

Neither would I. But given the circumstances and the stresses he might have been going through - especially the knowledge of potential loss of lives to come including his own - anyone in his position could have had a momentary loss of focus.

I fully agree that many Titanic historians, particularly Don Lynch, have judged Murdoch VERY unfairly, IMO even more so than Captain Smith or anyone else. Reading Sam Halpern's book about the collision, one can see the task that Murdoch was saddled with and the eventualities that could have arisen had he made different decisions. Also highlighted is the limited time he had to assess the situation before making those decisions and giving the order. To his eternal credit, he almost pulled off a miracle.

I don't believe that any other officer on board, including Captain Smith could have done better than Murdoch. In fact, looking at Sam's hypothetical 'situations', there probably was no "better" since Fleet sounded those 3 bells. There are times when even the best combination of man and machine can only do so much, as we all know.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

But if Smith is elsewhere (and he was indeed moving around to different locations quite frequently) how does that make him "not very proactive"?

Let's not confuse active movements with proactivity. Ever hear of the phrase, 'He was running around like at chicken without a head?' Proactive behavior is not someone waiting to be asked what to do, but someone telling others what should be done. And I agree that we don't have people like Smith, Murdoch, Wilde or Moody to tell us their side of the story, but have what we have to work with. And the theme of those that lived to tell, gave the impression that Smith was more passive than active as far as command and control goes.
As far as the late Dave Brown's statement, I strongly disagree with it. Smith was told quite early on that his ship was going to sink in a relatively short time. Instead f sending boats that were only about 1/3 filled off on an wild goose chase to some unresponsive vessel that appeared to be about 5 miles off, he should have had those boats filled up more. He could have done what Murdoch did on the starboard side and allow men get into the boats when there were no longer any women around to fill those boats up. His priority should have been to save as many as he could. I don't think from what we we told that he was exemplary.

 

[Samuel Halpern]

It must have been beyond frustrating for Smith to see the Californian

Let's be clear about this. Smith, nor anyone else on Titanic, knew the identity of that vessel seen on the horizon that night. Nor did they know exactly how far away it was, only that lights of a vessel was seen, and it appeared to be anywhere from 3 to 10 miles away by most accounts. Some, like Lightoller, even thought it may have been a small sailing vessel.

 

[Mike Spooner]

Neither would I. But given the circumstances and the stresses he might have been going through - especially the knowledge of potential loss of lives to come including his own - anyone in his position could have had a momentary loss of focus.

I fully agree that many Titanic historians, particularly Don Lynch, have judged Murdoch VERY unfairly, IMO even more so than Captain Smith or anyone else. Reading Sam Halpern's book about the collision, one can see the task that Murdoch was saddled with and the eventualities that could have arisen had he made different decisions. Also highlighted is the limited time he had to assess the situation before making those decisions and giving the order. To his eternal credit, he almost pulled off a miracle.

I don't believe that any other officer on board, including Captain Smith could have done better than Murdoch. In fact, looking at Sam's hypothetical 'situations', there probably was no "better" since Fleet sounded those 3 bells. There are times when even the best combination of man and machine can only do so much, as we all know.

I think if Murdoch or Smith where at the centre point of the bridge and not on the wing of the bridge, I see time in seconds are be lost to give that order hard over to starboard for Hitchens.

 

[Mike Spooner]

Let's be clear about this. Smith, nor anyone else on Titanic, knew the identity of that vessel seen on the horizon that night. Nor did they know exactly how far away it was, only that lights of a vessel was seen, and it appeared to be anywhere from 3 to 10 miles away by most accounts. Some, like Lightoller, even thought it may have been a small sailing vessel.

The only statement I have seen by Lightoller in his book, claiming Californian was only a few miles away! Which I have to say take as a pinch of salt. As at that distance a good pair of binoculars from both ships would of seen what the problem was.

 

[Dan Parkes]

And the theme of those that lived to tell, gave the impression that Smith was more passive than active as far as command and control goes.

I think this is a key point. Let's face it, Lightoller was economical with the truth and also relished promoting himself with his version of events, so is he really a reliable witness? The competency/response/accuracy of Pitman and Boxhall is also questionable. And yet the claim that Smith was essentially "comatose" and "inactive" are seemingly based on those accounts (according to Don Lynch). But there is also a lot of reading in between the lines. Phrases such as "carry on" may seem passive to modern ears but were the phrases used then for such an occasion.

he should have had those boats filled up more.

Of course, those boats should have been filled but as I am sure you know Sam it was more complicated than that, with several factors including delegation, human psychology and miscommunication. The reality is that we know that Smith tried hailing the boats at least three times to come alongside to fill up. So it would disingenuous to accuse him of intentionally sending boats away half-filled.

I have been reconstructing Smith's movements post-collision in some detail recently and while I have always considered Smith at times "ornamental" and perhaps even a relic of the past that White Star employed due to his popularity, I have to admit that I cannot find evidence to support this as a final judgment of his character on that night. It is just too easy to be the proverbial Monday quarterback because we know the ultimate outcome. The fact is that Smith was proactive, fielding multiple reports, making many complex decisions and giving a substantial number of orders, many of which have been lost to the sea.

 

[yotsuya]

I think the crux of the matter goes back to Smith's quote about the technology of the day being so advanced that ships shouldn't sink.

That tells us that while he was a skilled captain and commander, he was unprepared for the emergency at hand. His actions show an effort to work through his unpreparedness, but no one on the ship was prepared for such a dire situation and their actions show an uncertainty mostly due to lack of planning for the worst. We do that as a matter of course these days, but at the time such a disaster was unthinkable. It led to many of the lifeboats not being as as full as others. Smith knew what he was doing and was never lost in a daze, but he just had no training for what was happening.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

And the theme of those that lived to tell, gave the impression that Smith was more passive than active as far as command and control goes.

I would temper that feeling slightly and say that Captain Smith was active with passive phases. However, those who lived had their own axes to grind by the time they had to tell their tales. The actual truth is probably somewhere in between.

He could have done what Murdoch did on the starboard side and allow men get into the boats when there were no longer any women around to fill those boats up. His priority should have been to save as many as he could. I don't think from what we we told that he was exemplary.

That's true. While it might appear that there was a shortage of working sailors on the port side, there was no issue with the chain of command........or was there? In fact, I have sometimes wondered exactly who was in overall charge of loading the forward port lifeboats; Smith, Wilde and Lightoller were all there. On the starboard side on the other hand, available evidence suggests that Murdoch was in charge and in control; but for some reason, many First Class passengers seemed to gravitate towards the port side in the early stages, thereby creating a 'shortage' of available and willing passengers - even men - who were willing to board lifeboats on the starboard side.

My feeling is that the presence of Captain Smith on the port side might have caused this 'imbalance' in passenger numbers on the two sides in the early stages. Also, Lightoller's shenanigans with Lifeboat #4, which was lowered to the A-deck quite early, might have had something to do with it.

I think this is a key point. Let's face it, Lightoller was economical with the truth and also relished promoting himself with his version of events, so is he really a reliable witness? The competency/response/accuracy of Pitman and Boxhall is also questionable.

I don't think there was any issue with the competency per se of any of the 4 surviving officers of the Titanic, but response accuracy, yes. But IMO that apparent questionability of many of their statements made during both Inquiries was the result of a carefully thought out and planned strategy that involved self-preservation and future prospects. If you look at their testimonies broadly, while they did not exactly match each others' statements all the time, they did not obviously contradict one another either......at least not with key issues.

The reality is that we know that Smith tried hailing the boats at least three times to come alongside to fill up.

With respect Dan, an old sailor of Smith's experience would have known that the chances of lifeboats coming back to pick-up passengers off the sea were small. The quote attributed to QM Hichens while in charge of Lifeboat #6 - "It is our lives now, not theirs" is crude, harsh but nevertheless true; most humans have a large instinct for survival and that often overrides other emotions in times of crisis.
I agree with Sam that Smith should have had more control over filling of the port side lifeboats. Had he followed Murdoch's example and ordered that men could be allowed into lifeboats if there was room, Wilde and Lightoller would had to follow it and more lives could have been saved. That policy might also have prompted many people - both men and the women who were reluctant to leave their men - to check out their chances on the starboard side. As it was, I believe many such people just stood by on the port side watching the forward lifeboats being filled and wrongly believing that the same "women and children only" policy was being followed on the starboard side as well; with hindsight, we now know that it was not.

 

[Dan Parkes]

I agree with Sam that Smith should have had more control over filling of the port side lifeboats.

Have you considered the distinct possibility that those specific lifeboats left the port side under-filled without his knowledge, as he was busy attending to matters elsewhere and believed it was in safe hands under Wilde and Lightoller, who he had delegated responsibility?

You also neglect the fact that boats on the starboard side, under Murdoch's authority, also left grossly under-filled. I don't believe you will specifically blame Murdoch for that... but somehow you will freely blame Smith.

The reality of what happened is far more complex and nuanced and does not necessitate the retrospective explanation of an inactive, comatose captain.

 

[Mike Spooner]

I think Smith was in a daze was a bit over the top. But was thinking straight at the times? As I see some of his problems had already started before the sinking of the ship on the bridge. In conversion with OOW Lightoller of the flat calm sea and drop in temperature where it becomes more difficulty to see icebergs ahead. Where clearly you need to apply safety caution. As for Smith did nothing about it and left the bridge with instruction if any change in the weather reported it immediately to me. But as in the British inquiry Lightoller saw it different after Smith left the bridge and did apply safety caution by giving an order for the lookout men to keep a sharp lookout for icebergs and growlers. I ask myself should a captain left the bridge without asking Lightoller of his opinion what laid ahead? In fact should of Smith of left the bridge at all to? Then on collision with the iceberg he was slow to come on the bridge. Then to learn the unsinkable ship is domed by chief designer Thomas Andrews must of been a shell shock to his brain. Then officers having asking him should we send distress rockets and only to stop after 8 where fired of the 36 aboard. Sir can we load lifeboats. Sir can we launch the boats. Followed by life boat No1 with only 12 in. Early boats to row for a ship light about 5 miles and return back. I afraid this not sound like a captain is in full control of a very difficult situation which is not trained for. With a further regret I wander if a younger senior officers in charge would of done better job to? In other words was Smith just too old for the job in such a tricky position. But when Don Lynch said he was in a daze of the sinking, with regret again I can see there some true in the matter.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

Have you considered the distinct possibility that those specific lifeboats left the port side under-filled without his knowledge, as he was busy attending to matters elsewhere and believed it was in safe hands under Wilde and Lightoller, who he had delegated responsibility?

I am sure that Smith had other tasks to oversee, but I do not believe that he did not know about the underfilled port side forward lifeboats. Passengers mentioned seeing him around those boats and a few like Margaret Swift, Dr Alice Leader etc said that the Captain effectively escorted them into Lifeboat #8. Also, he must have been there to tell the crew of both #8 and #6 to 'row for the light' in the horizon just as they were about to be lowered.

You also neglect the fact that boats on the starboard side, under Murdoch's authority, also left grossly under-filled. I don't believe you will specifically blame Murdoch for that..

Dan, if you read the earlier posts in this thread and a few others in other threads, where I have discussed that issue repeatedly. No, I do NOT blame Murdoch specifically for that because contrary from what was happening on the port side, Murdoch was allowing men to board his starboard lifeboats if they were willing; he even made up numbers with non-essential crewmen. It was not his fault that there was a shortage of passengers willing to board the forward starboard side boats and he had to make a start. The simple fact is that there was nobody - child, woman, man or crewman - who was refused a place in any of the starboard side forward boats. Symons, who was saved on Lifeboat #1, clearly said that after those who were rescued on it got on board, there was nobody in the vicinity to add to the numbers. Similarly, with the earlier boats #7, #5 and #3, all those who were willing to board were allowed.

but somehow you will freely blame Smith.

No, I do not 'freely blame' Smith; in fact, I have given him the benefit of doubt, pointing out the various responsibilities he had and the stress that he must have been under. I have repeatedly dismissed the notion that Smith was in any kind of daze and even suggested that Sam's opinion that he was passive could be a tad harsh only in the previous post.

If you'll forgive me for saying so, you are the one who seem to be a bit too keen on jumping to Captain Smith's defense. That's your privilege of course, but IMO there were a few loose ends that night which could have been tightened.

 

[Dan Parkes]

If you'll forgive me for saying so, you are the one who seem to be a bit too keen on jumping to Captain Smith's defense. That's your privilege of course, but IMO there were a few loose ends that night which could have been tightened.

No, not jumping to Smith's defense, but simply questioning those who are claiming that Smith was "inactive" "comatose" etc.

Of course, there are "loose ends" and I am sure Smith would be the first if given a second-chance to do things differently. There was a distinct failure in communication and competency on several levels.

But too many seem to be affected by the cinematic portrayal of a "shell-shocked" Captain standing around in some unresponsive stupor.

No one has yet been able to support such an unresponsive claim with any actual evidence. Only retrospective opinion.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

But too many seem to be affected by the cinematic portrayal of a "shell-shocked" Captain standing around in some unresponsive stupor.

Actually, not that many. Most of the posters in this thread seem to believe that such accusations, which were exacerbated - even if not started by - Don Lynch, are unfair and largely not true. In On A Sea Of Glass, the myth of "A Weak Leader" is discussed and dismissed.

The reality is that Captain Smith received a big shock when his ship struck an iceberg and learned within the next half an hour that it was sinking. That latter part at least was unexpected and would have resulted in a wave of various emotions run through him. Given that circumstances, IMO he did all right but it could definitely have been better. The fact that many passengers seemed to gravitate towards the port side in the early stages suggests that Smith's presence might have had something to do with it. Therefore, if he had issued clear and firm orders to the crew to fill their lifeboats to the limit that they felt was safe while they hung from the davits and allow men if no women or children were in the vicinity, it would have worked. Also, as soon as the hissing of steam stopped, he could have made a megaphone announcement to passengers to follow instructions of the crew without delay...........period.

 

[legoking5522]

I agree with what you said Arun. it makes sense. it's not uncommon for people to go into shock, and I think even an experienced captain would go into shock if his ship, (labeled unsinkable, and not carrying the required number of lifeboats) started to sink.