Watertight compartments

As far as how water would go from compartment to compartment I believe but Mr. Standart might be able to be more clear, it simply over comes. The water tight igrity stops at E deck. Meaning the eventually water will come up through open hatches and go down e deck then down ladders into the next compartment and so on. I think. Michael?

Erik
 
Hi Erik, and I think you pretty much have it right. The water would come up through the hatches, scuttles, and manholes then move most quickly and randomly through the passageways, open spaces and then down the first deck openings it reached. The rate of flooding was anything but consistant. As Dave Gittens pointed out in a different thread, the ship reached a state of near equilibriam where the flooding slowed down some several times. Not totally though, and as the weight of water coming in increased, so too would the rate of flooding.

Stress on the hull would have been a contributing factor as well since the bending loads would have opened up seams, and cracks that were either small or nonexistant, and allowed new ways for water to come in that weren't there befor.

Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
 
Michael,

I don't believe flooding slowed 'several' times. According to modeling (both physical and computer) conducted by Gibbs & Cox, the ship reached a state of near equillibrium just before BR #4 flooded. What tipped the scale, as you mentioned, was water entering non-watertight decks through hull openings pulled under by the weight of the bow.

I don't believe there is any evidence of a bending moment opening seams in the hull prior to the break. You're not talking about the opening of the expansion joint, are you?

Parks
 
Hi Sparks, actually, I was noting evidence of stress fracturing in the hull plating itself as mentioned in the Discovery documentary Titanic, Answers From The Abyss. This was supposed to have been caused by the bending loads which increased with the water flooding in and pulling the ship down.

I'm wondering if you've seen this presentation and what your take is on it. What do you concur with if anything, and what do you disagree with and why? (I like second sources when I can get them. It's about the only good insurance against mistakes.
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I'll defer to the modeling experiments in regards to Boiler Room 4. Though I have to wonder if it was just that or other spaces that may have begun to flood at nearly the same time. Scotland Road had to make for a wonderful aquaduct.

Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
 
Michael,

How much time to do you have? :-)

I have 'Answers From the Abyss' on tape and as usual, I agree with portions of it, disagree with others. I would have to watch it again and take notes, if you wanted me to detail my observations. The problem I find (and this is all my own opinion) with this and other Discovery Channel specials on the forensics of the sinking, is that individual experts make the correct findings within their field of expertise, but in many cases, the findings are skewed in the final analysis to support someone's expectations (it also doesn't help that the entire case has to be laid out within the program's alloted time slot). One example to illustrate my point is the analysis of the rivets. The metallurgical analysis on the recovered samples was correct, but the sampling of 40 rivets from a localised area out of a total of 3 million is inconclusive, as anyone experienced in sampling procedures will tell you.

Stress fracturing of the hull prior to the break was mostly microscopic in nature. Steel has a certain amount of yield before it will fracture, during which time grain separation will occur up to the point where the bending moment exceeds the yield strength of the steel. I don't believe that Titanic's hull suffered any macrocracking significant enough to allow additional water into the hull until the hull began to buckle prior to the break.

When I mention BR #4, that was for establishing a major event on the sinking timeline only. As you say, other spaces were flooding at the same time. Once the water entered the non-watertight decks, it had the run of the ship. Titanic was a passenger liner and therefore did not have the interior compartmentalisation we're accustomed to in warships.

Parks
 
I find this thread fascinating. I would like to see a contributed research piece by a group of you like Parks, Dave Gittins, Michael Standart and Dean...oooops don't forget Bill and Eric. I think it would be a winner guys! This stuff is great!

Just a thought!
Maureen.
 
Hi Sparks, and thanks for that. I can't say as I took the rivits thing all that seriously myself. Granted, some broke, but then the ship DID hit an iceberg at nearly full power, so it shouldn't be a shock that a bunch of them gave up the ghost. Now if an expidition were to collect samples of rivits from all over the ship, THEN the conclusions might be worth a look.

Mo, I might be game for a research project if I had the time and the expertise in some of the more arcane diciplines such as metallurgy. However, for books worth of stuff that I know, there's libraries worth of stuff that I DON'T know...but then, that's why I'm here. To learn whatever is learnable and have some means of fact checking material which comes my way. Sparks comments on stress fracturing is an example of something new I learned today.

Cordially,
Michael H. Standart
 
Hi everyone!

If memory serves me correctly, I seem to remember in the answers from the abyss video the mentioning of a crack forming in the upper part of of the starboard bow. The idea was expressed that the crack did form while the ship was still on the surface, although, there was absolutely no evidence presented to support this.

One note about the rivets. I do agree with you guys for the most part concerning the sample to population size and the lack of variability in the location in which the rivets were chosen from. They are excellent points. However, in processes control engineering, engineers takes samples of both things being processed and supplies (such as resistors, for example) that are shipped in that are used in products. In some cases, the parent population is very large compared to the sample size. The point is that while the data that was presented was by no means good enough to draw concrete conclusions from, I don't think it should necessarily be disregarded either.

Maureen, I've given thought to the idea of doing research. However, at this stage of the game, I'm no where near qualified. Basically, I view myself on the opposite end of the spectrum from Michael. You have to remember, I'm still an engineering *student*. While I may have an advantage in talking technical jargon, I'm still not up to speed in certain technical areas. Couple that with the fact that I'm a land lubber, and I really have nothing to offer. As far as I'm concerned, Parks is really the person on this board to do forensics research. He has the experience of being at sea, and he has specific engineering knowledge about ships. For me to be qualified to conduct research, I would need to get my ME degree, and spend a good amount of time in marine engineering.

-Dean
 
For the record, Titanic had 73 watertight compartments, not 16. Of these, 44 were spaces beneath the tank top deck. Some of these were voids, while others were used as tankage for boiler water. Above the tank top, there were 13 smaller compartments, six of which were used for the storage of fresh water. Finally, there were the 16 large compartments formed by the 15 primary bulkheads.

Any consideration of the flooding of Titanic must take into consideration all of these smaller compartments. For instance, what was the effect of the buoyancy beneath the tank top when the boiler rooms and holds above were flooded?

As I stated in my book, I believe that damage to the void spaces on the starboard side from boiler room #6 forward resulted in the ship's immediate list. The corresponding voids on the port side were not damaged by the ice. This is only speculation, but some of those port voids may have remained dry until the bow reached its crush depth.

-- David G. Brown
 
Hello Again,

I think that it is still worthy to note that the stress fracturs could have occured when she slammed into the bottom or could be just the signs of a new ship getting banged around in transit between docks.

I still stand by my belief that there is no such thing as a watertight compartment.

Erik
 
Hi, can you tell me thr following. Did the openings on the bulkeads on g, f, e deck (to allow full access to the ship eg. walking along the corridors) close if necessary and would there closing be watertight. Or were the openings not closable thereby making the floors g, f, e floodable . I understand that the machinery deck was fully watertight by the closing of their watertight doors and also that the ceiling ofthe machinery deck was not watertightand allowed the incoming water to break through the ceiling into g deck, then f deck etc. Am i right about this.
Am i right in assuming that the watertight bulkheads were not watertight on g, f and e deck due to the opeinings in them.
Thanks,

Ajmal
 
Hi,

To start with, you'll want to be able to refer to the deck plans: Titanic Deckplans : Tank Top , especially "Profile" and from E Deck downwards. All watertight bulkheads (WTBs) are marked "WTB 'A'" and so on at the bottom of the plans, and watertight doors (WTDs) are marked with two triangles and the code "WTD".

It might help to understand that there were two types of watertight doors. The ones in the boiler and engine rooms could be closed from the bridge as well as at the door itself. On the other decks the doors had to be closed manually, either at the door or sometimes on the deck above. Once these doors were closed, however, the bulkhead (i.e. vertical wall) was just as watertight as the doors between boiler rooms. If they were not closed, of course, water could flow easily in.

It seems like your question is about E, F and G decks, so I'll focus on those.

On G Deck, there were no openings in the watertight bulkheads. That meant there was no way to walk between compartments on G; you had to go to a higher deck.

On F Deck, most (but not all) of the watertight bulkheads had WTDs in them. These doors, as mentioned, had to be closed manually using a huge wrench (spanner).

On E Deck, we only encounter watertight bulkheads A, B and K through P. That is, the two forwardmost bulkheads plus all those abaft (behind) the boiler rooms. The other bulkheads only reached as high as the bottom of E Deck; A, B and K through P went to the bottom of D Deck (meaning the highest walls were on E Deck). Bulkheads A and B did not have any openings, which was in part because a collision to the bow was considered the most likely accident. K through P had openings secured by watertight doors, again the manual kind as found on F Deck. Between bulkhead B and K, there was nothing to stop the water flooding through E Deck. So E Deck is probably where a lot of the spilling over the tops of the compartments happened. As you can see from the plan of E Deck, continuing the bulkheads up higher in the amidships sections would have meant WTDs dividing up the first and second class accommodations as well as Scotland Road. From White Star's perspective it appears that WTDs in First Class were not acceptable.

None of the decks were watertight. In some places there were compartments with absolutely no hatches, ladders or companionways (stairs), such as in the stern over the shaft tunnels. But in virtually every compartment, for obvious reasons, the floors and ceilings had openings and so were not watertight. So, water had the ability to flow "upwards", as it did when the damaged compartments were filled, or "downwards", as it did when the first five watertight compartments overflowed into the sixth and so on.

I hope that helps some; if you have any more specific questions I (or someone else!) can try to address them.
 
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