It's my view that the revisionist history was written back in 1912 and that I'm only pointing out the large gaps in both logic and fact that is contained within the myths and legends passed down to us.
For instance, Sam points out truthfully that an iceberg on a dark night cannot reliably be seen by reflected light at distances of even a mile and in reality would not be seen for half that distance or less. True. I have no argument with that reality, but with the misguided conclusion that historians have drawn from it. For thousands of years prior to Titanic sailors had been identifying dangers that cannot be seen by reflected light. I daresay Sam has used this technique during his sailing days. It involves noting when a distant light is eclipsed by something at closer range, the result is a silhouette. Whenever you see this at sea you know one thing for certain: something hard enough to block light is between you and the source of that light. This directly applies to Titanic. The lookouts did not first see the iceberg by reflected light. What they saw was a "dark mass." Put that into context with the light horizon created by the ice field (the lookouts called it "haze") and it becomes apparent how they were able to identify an object ahead at as much as 2.5 miles. They didn't see the iceberg, they saw the lack of light created by the berg. And, as well-trained lookouts, they reported that "black mass" to the bridge by ringing the crow's nest bell three times. It was not until the berg was within a half mile or less that Fleet and Lee were able to discern by reflected light the approximate size and shape of the fatal iceberg.
My point is that by focusing on only half the facts...the ones supporting conventional wisdom...myth and misdirection are easily supported. Every kid knows the easiest way to tell a lie is to just tell only the facts that seem to support your case.
I'm amused by attempts to refute seaman Scarrott's estimate of both time and duration by quoting other witnesses who made equally vague statements. I'm also a bit chagrined by historians who assume that the way they use language today is the same as it was used in 1912. Words change both denotation and connotation over time. For proof consider that as late as the 1960s the word "gay" was used to describe people having a good time. Today, the word has a totally different meaning. With that said, let's look at lookout Fleet's time testimony. "Three bells were struck by Fleet, warning 'Right ahead,' and immediately he rung the telephone up to the bridge, 'Iceberg right ahead.' The reply came back from the bridge, 'Thank you.'" It is easy to use this testimony to bolster the concept of less than a minute passing between warning and impact. However, this inference hangs on one word, "immediately." Today, it means quickly following, minimal time passing. The definition of a century ago was somewhat different. It meant without an intermediary event, or without delay. There was no connotation of speed. And, in that sense Lee chose his words wisely. There was no intermediate event in the crow's nest between the warning bell and Fleet's phone call. Nor was there any delay. Even so, Lee's "immediately" did not connote any duration -- short or long -- between those critical events.
Another thing, Olliver never said what he did upon hearing the three strikes on the lookout's bell other than look around him. He was, as he said, tending the lamps in the standard compass. When did he finish that job? And, why was he doing it at that precise moment? None of this background information was included in Olliver's U.S. testimony. The man simply stated his actions without illuminating them with details about what was taking place around him.
Senator BURTON. Where were you when the collision occurred?
Mr. OLLIVER. I was stand-by quartermaster on the bridge. I had been relieved from the wheel at 10 o'clock, and I was stand-by after 10 o'clock. I was running messages and doing various other duties. I was not right on the bridge; I was just entering the bridge. I had just performed an errand and was entering the bridge when the collision occurred.
Senator BURTON. Just state what happened?
Mr. OLLIVER. When I was doing this bit of duty I heard three bells rung up in the crow's nest, which I knew that it was something ahead; so I looked, but I did not see anything. I happened to be looking at the lights in the standing compass at the time. That was my duty, to look at the lights in the standing compass, and I was trimming them so that they would burn properly. When I heard the report, I looked, but could not see anything, and I left that and came was just entering on the bridge just as the shock came. I knew we had touched something.
Fortunatley, the IMM/WSL rules perfectly explain why he was on the platform and why Boxhall was leaving the officers quarters door at that moment. But, they are inconvenient facts to conventional wisdom so they have been peer-reviewed out. That doesn't change history a whit, it just makes it easier to continue telling the same ol' myths. Olliver was on the platform because every half hour the steering compass had to be checked against the standard. And, that required making sure the binnacle lamps were trimmed before the arrival of the officer who was to do the work. And, at a few minutes before 2400 April 14th ship's time that was Boxhall. Note that the Fourth Officer said he was just coming out of the officers quarters. That means he was on his way to do some ship's business. The only task at hand for him was the compass check. The bottom line in all of this is that the assumption Olliver immediately left the platform after hearing the lookout's warning bell is nothing by suds off the ol' porker.
Now let's talk about that alleged "hard a-starboard" order to dodge the iceberg. If you'll note, I totally agree that a starboard helm order to turn the ship to the left came after the lookouts rang their warning bell. No quibble with that
955 The Attorney GENERAL: ... You had got an order, “Hard
a-starboard”?
Mr. HICHENS: Yes.
956 You proceeded at once to put the wheel hard astarboard?
Mr. HICHENS: immediately, yes.
957 Before the vessel struck had you time to get the wheel
right over?
Mr. HICHENS: The wheel was over then, hard over
My quibble is with the inference that Hichens' answer to question 957 refers to the "hard a-starboard" mentioned in question 956. Note that Hichens does not say which way the helm was over in his 957 answer, only that it was hard over. If we look into quartermaster Olliver's testimony we find that Murdoch's helm order when the ship struck was not "hard a-starboard," but quite the opposite. Olliver said that he heard Murdoch yell, "Hard a-port." as the ship struck.
Senator BURTON. Do you know whether the wheel was hard aport then?
Mr. OLLIVER. What I know about the wheel - I was stand-by to run messages, but what I knew about the helm is, hard aport.
Senator BURTON. Do you mean hard aport or hard astarboard?
Mr. OLLIVER. I know the orders I heard when I was on the bridge was after we had struck the iceberg. I heard hard aport, and there was the man at the wheel and the officer. The officer was seeing it was carried out right.
Senator BURTON. What officer was it?
Mr. OLLIVER. Mr. Moody, the sixth officer, was stationed in the wheelhouse.
Senator BURTON. Who was the man at the wheel?
Mr. OLLIVER. Hichens, quartermaster.
Senator BURTON. You do not know whether the helm was put hard astarboard first, or not?
Mr. OLLIVER. No, sir; I do not know that.
Senator BURTON. But you know it was put hard aport after you got there?
Mr. OLLIVER. After I got there; yes, sir.
Senator BURTON. Where was the iceberg, do you think, when the helm was shifted?
Mr. OLLIVER. The iceberg was away up stern.
Senator BURTON. That is when the order "hard aport" was given?
Mr. OLLIVER. That is when the order "hard aport" was given; yes, sir.
Senator BURTON. Who gave the order?
Mr. OLLIVER. The first officer.
Senator BURTON. And that order was immediately executed, was it?
Mr. OLLIVER. Immediately executed, and the sixth officer saw that it was carried out.
At this point it helps to think about Murdoch's choices. He could turn left or turn right. Stopping in the available time was not possible. According to Olliver, the ship was already running over the iceberg. If the First Officer turned left (starboard helm), he would swing the side of Titanic hard against the menace and might even cause it to become entangled in the starboard wing propeller. On the other hand, if he turned right (port helm) Murdoch would swing the side and stern away from the ice and confine damage to the bow where contact was already taking place. We know he chose to turn right (port helm) as Olliver stated because of actions by Captain Smith and others seconds after impact. They went to the starboard bridge wing to look aft in an attempt to see the iceberg. A right turn would have put the berg off the starboard quarter just where it was seen. However, the mythical left turn (starboard helm) would have placed the iceberg off the port quarter where it was not seen. In the end, Olliver is supported by the dictates of good ship handling, the physical damage on the hull, and the juxtaposition of the iceberg to ship after impact. We are still confounded by Hichens' testimony.
948. Had you had any instructions before she struck? Had
you been told to do anything with your helm
before she struck?
Mr. HICHENS: Just as she struck I had the order “Hard-astarboard”
when she struck.
949. Just as she struck, is that what you said?
Mr. Hichens: Not immediately as she struck; the ship was
swinging. We had the order, “Hard-a-starboard,”
and she just swung about two points when she
struck.
950. You got the order, “Hard-a-starboard”?
Mr. HICHENS: Yes.
951. Had you time to get the helm hard a starboard before
she struck?
Mr. HICHENS: No, she was crashing then.
952. Did you begin to get the helm over?
Mr. HICHENS: Yes, the helm was barely over when she
struck. The ship had swung about two points.
953. She had swung two points?
Mr. HICHENS: Yes.
Quartermaster Hichens was apparently a bit of an odd duck, but he was also a good sailor. He did not confuse port helm with starboard helm, nor left turns with right even though his claim that a starboard helm left turn maneuver was ongoing flies in the face of both the direct testimony of the lookouts and the location of damage to the hull. My suspicion is that the man had a touch of well-found paranoia about being blamed for the fatal accident if he said that at the last second he turned the ship toward the iceberg. Better in his mind was to leave the impression of a failed attempt to turn away from danger. He could not be faulted for an officer's failure to issue a critical helm order in time. But, that's just my speculation. Lacking the ability to speak to him directly we have no choice but to rely on what other people testified. The only other eyewitnesses who saw everything were in the crow's nest -- lookouts Fleet and Lee. Both were quite adamant that the ship made a straight, head-on final approach to the iceberg. Fleet was quite direct, testifying, "...we were making straight for it.” But, even more telling were his words on the telephone in the seconds before Titanic struck, "Iceberg right ahead.”
Worse for the ongoing turn myth is the placement of damage on the hull. If Titanic had been rotating to port as the myth claims, then the forefoot should have escaped damage and contact with the berg should have started farther aft, possibly as far aft as hold #2. Either that or Murdoch turned left to dodge an iceberg that was already well on his port side. "Not damned likely," to paraphrase our favorite Second Officer. Even so, I do believe Hichens and the implications of Boxhall's testimony that Titanic did turn about two points to port that night and it was to avoid ice. It was just not to avoid the deadly iceberg. Rather, Titanic was dropping to the south in an effort to take the shortest route around the ice field.
Using Sam's advance and transfer data and a bit o' my rusty high school trigonometry I found something interesting. At a range of 2.2 miles (6 minutes at 22 knots) the iceberg would have been roughly 900 feet left of the ship's track when the "black mass" silhouette was first reported. In practical terms that was dead ahead and required the 3-stroke bell signal. About five minutes later, the berg would have been some 22 to 24 degrees off the port bow -- which is when I postulate the two point (22.5 degree) left (starboard helm) turn described by Hichens and Boxhall was completed. The range was under a minute to contact, which was just enough time for Boxhall and Olliver to walk back from the compass platform and be nearing the bridge.
Anyway, my original purpose in this thread was to show our friend, Titanicnerd, the difference between self-indulgent comments and conclusions based on historical research. My thanks to Sam and Jim for engaging in this illuminating discussion. We may not agree upon exactly how the accident took place but we are united in our desire to sort out the evidence.
-- David G. Brown
