Those accounts were before they opened up the Abrose channel. Here is the path they had to take in those earlier years.I assumed so too. I think you can be sure that Lightoller and the Press were using poetic licence since it woud have been a hige law suit if the chnel hd been blocked by the back end of a grounded liner. You've sailed in that area> If i remember rightly the current can be fierce at Spring Tides. If so, the you want to maintain speed within the channel.
Great book. One of my favorites.
I'll address your points in order, Seamas.What I am referring to Jim is not Smith's post-collision actions.
Rather his pre-collision actions.
Smith's whole set up for ensuring that warnings of ice were delivered to the bridge immediately upon receiving them and that each new watch was appraised of the changing situation was flimsy and too trusting.
Bride and Phillips were never given such a simple thing as an order to bring ice warnings to the bridge as soon as they had transcribed them. They took them up (well, the ones that did get there anyway) when they had a moment to spare.
The testimony from the four surviving officers regarding ice warnings was notoriously confusing and contradictory.
Our quartet all had different memories (and sometimes no memory at all) of who saw what ice messages tacked to the chart room wall on the night of April 14th. Smith's system of keeping his officers "in the know" was rotten and quite incredible for such an experienced captain.
I won't ever be convinced that Smith wasn't at fault for that. The man had become overconfident and children's bodies floating on the North Atlantic was the horrific result.
With regard to not reducing speed and the failure to turn much further south than they did. There's nothing more I can add that haven't already posted.
The likes of Sam Halpern, Dave Gittins, Bill Wormstedt, George Behe, Tad Fitch, J. Kent Layton et al have written extensively about the failings regarding speed and there for years. Their case is solid and in some cases based on decades of research into the disaster. I trust them impeccably when it comes to that.
Jim, that's not correct about the Marconi men.I'll address your points in order, Seamas.
First: The Marconi Operators were not employees of the shipping Company but of the Marconi Company. As such, they had a laid down protocol regarding the receipt and sending of messages....particularly navigation warnings and master to master messages. these were to be delivered to the bridge immediately. That was nothing to do with the Master but was the responsibility of the Operator on duty. So Smith cannot be blame for another not following the rules.
The standard practice on every MN ship was for all navigation warnings to be plotted on the chart on the chart desk and the warning message to be pinned to the chart room message board. There was nothing done differently on the Titanic from any MN ship I ever sailed in. the Juniors performed these duties.
Warnings would also have been written in the Master's Night Order Book which had to be read and signed by every OOW coming on duty. That too was standard MN regs.
. The ice warning positions were known well before 8 pm that night otherwise how was Lightoller be able to work an ETA. ice?
Smith was no responsible for a single death.. that was the result of hitting an iceberg. The lives of women and childen were his very first priority. in fact, it might be claimed that the the fact that so many were saved should be his epitaph.
As for your list of lllustrious names? They might have been digging for years, but if they didn't have all, or know how to use all, the right tools , they will continue to come up with intelletual inexactitudes, assumptions and downright fabrications.
Why not?However Jim, I can't accept your scepticism of their research. It's not even up for debate. They are the best. Even some people who bore grudges against the authors said they could not fault "On A Sea of Glass" or "Report Into the Loss....". The late John P. Eaton who died recently was another sterling historian of the disaster.
Jim. Having a bit more time to read your relies. First I would agree with you on the safety precaution captain Lord took for his crew and ship safety was the right thing to do. Which Smith was far from lacking in doing the same. Quite frankly he was responsible for the 1500 who lost there lives.Mike - It depended on the type of ship, but in most ships, the 8 to 12 Watch was the Captain's Watch. He did not keep it himself but it was usually taken by the most Junior Watch Keeping officer. In the case of Titanic, that was Lightoller and on Californian it was Groves. However, until that officer proved himself, the captain was off and on his bridge frequently but not so much as to destroy the confidence of the Officer of The Watch
At the time of Titanic, in my time and years thereafter, the OOW did not leave the bridge... not even for a call of nature. He paced the deck (I'm sure you've heard of that?) for four hours at a time. Boring? You bet it was, particularly if you sailed from Honolulu to Sidney Heads - right down the center of the Pacific in a 10 knot ship without ever seeing another ship. However he was the first responder when action had to be taken to alter the course of the ship. I've told you where he should be but obviously you did not understand or want to understand my explanation.
Read the evidence - there was no delay time in giv8ing the first helm order.
Have to correct you, Seumas.Jim, that's not correct about the Marconi men.
I believe it was Parks Stephenson (he is the "go to" guy for info about the Titanic's radio, what he doesn't know about it ain't worth knowing) who a number of years ago looked into the issue of the Marconi men's exact legal standing aboard the ship. He looked at the actual contracts signed between Marconi and White Star.
He found that they were indeed bound to the orders from their captain. So Smith did have the option to order Bride and Phillips to promptly report to the bridge with every ice warning as soon one had been received and jotted down.
The messy testimony of the four surviving officers regarding what they knew of ice warnings shows that there was poor communication between the officers regarding what warnings from what ships they knew or did not know about.
For example: Lightoller claimed he told Pitman of one particular message. However, Pitman denied this. One was telling the truth and the other wasn't. Which one was being honest ? Who knows ?
After the RMS Caronia message was received on either late morning or early afternoon (there is uncertainty over the time) on April 14th, the whole of issue of "who knew what", "who saw what" and "who said what" regarding these wee slips of paper that could have made all the difference, descends into farce.
Smith's system for a) making sure all his officers were kept up to date on developments and b) ensuring a steady flow of relevant information to his bridge from the wireless room was in both cases lax and far too trusting of his subordinates.
The Master's Night Order Book (and with all the ships papers) was destroyed in the sinking. Therefore, none of us can say what was written in it and what was not.
I'm sure that the authors I mentioned would be flattered to be called "illustrious" !
However Jim, I can't accept your scepticism of their research. It's not even up for debate. They are the best. Even some people who bore grudges against the authors said they could not fault "On A Sea of Glass" or "Report Into the Loss....". The late John P. Eaton who died recently was another sterling historian of the disaster.
It's been a while since I went over the relevant articles, but aren't there a few cases where one survivor said they launched the lifeboats in one order but another said a different order for those same four boats?
Since you had apart in it, Sam, I'll let you tell us.
Sam knows perfectly well the two points of contradiction.It's been a while since I went over the relevant articles, but aren't there a few cases where one survivor said they launched the lifeboats in one order but another said a different order for those same four boats?
I'll let Currie speak for himself on the matter, but that's my first thought as far as what might be seen as contradicting.
For what it's worth Sam, I and I'm sure the clear majority of people interested in the subject do fully accept the timeline that your co-authors Bill Wormstedt and Tad Fitch gave in "Report Into the Loss ...".There are contradictions in testimonies all over the place. Not only among different eye witnesses, but also contradictions from the same eyewitness. And that is to be expected. The lifeboat article, as well as my own published work, bring out those contradictions. It becomes a problem of sorting out the various claims and so forth, and then trying to put everything together in way that appears to fit best when that is possible, keeping in mind that not everything reported is precise, especially when it comes to subjective assessments such as clock times, durations, directions and distances.
As far as the lifeboat article, I suggest people take the time actually read it. If you then want to disagree, then that is fine.