>>If you will re-read (and re-re-read if necessary) my post here, you will find that I stipulated the inappropriateness of audible signals. <<
Which you prefaced by saying
>>The best way to save the most was a judgment call ...<<
Which they made and which you've been second guessing from the very start.
>>and the officers of RMS Titanic had been making bad calls since sundown.<<
And I don't recall anyone disputing this. However, the issue here is not the bad calls they made since sundown, but the way they handled the evacuation of the ship.
>>A quiet word or two from Smith to his officers would have saved dozens, perhaps hundreds, more people. "Mr. Lightoller, you may board the gentlemen if there are no women or children about. Mr. Wilde, please see to impressing more passengers with the necessity of abandoning ship. A general announcement will not be advisable."<<
Which could have stampeded the cattle as likely as not. Erik has already commented on the inadvisability of countermanding orders once things are going on. Now to add to that, do you have any idea just how quickly word of something like this can spread throughout the ship??? Remember the situation: Sinking ship plus a Surplus of bodies along with a shortage of boats. Now throw into this mix a couple of people "passing it on" and then having it heard and misheard on down the line until a situation with a reasonable level of calm degenerates into a panic because of the way the story would "improve" in the telling. Grapevine communications are funny this way. That's not to say it would happen, but it could and they couldn't take that chance.
>>The decision to maintain speed informed by the knowledge of the prevailing conditions was reprehensible.<<
Also, unfortunately, the practice of the day and not just on the Titanic. It's amazing how often this factor keeps getting missed.
>>Smith's famous "if it becomes at all doubtful" reveals that he didn't already think it was doubtful - which Lightoller obviously did.<<
I wouldn't make that assumption. There was nothing unusual about the order that Smith gave. It's practically the standard instruction every ship's master gives in both the merchent service and the military even to this day. Yes, they knew of reported ice conditions ahead, discussed it and acted on it. (Otherwise, why instruct the lookouts to be alert for possible ice in the first place.) In hindsight, it obviously wasn't enough, but back then, doing business this way had served the ships on the North Atlantic run quite well for a very long time. Why change a system which...up to that time...had worked quite well?
>>Why the first officer didn't press the issue is known all too well to anyone familiar with the politics of a chain of command.<<
Since Murdock didn't survive, I'm afraid I don't know the reasons for this, and neither do you. I can only guess at them. Being rather inconveniently dead, he can't speak for himself as the others had the opportunity to do. What little we know of what he said or what concerns he may have expressed comes to us second hand from fallible memories. Your opinion on this might be bang on the money. It might also be so far off base that it's not even in the ballpark.
For all we know, he may not have been in the least bit concerned, or he was, but kept the difference of opinion private. I'm all to aware of the politics of the chain of command on a ship. Well enough in fact to know that some things...like differences of opinion...are not discussed in front of the troops.
>>As far as excusing Boxhall's incompetent navigation with "errors creep in," I would say that a discrepancy of 8-10 miles on a 95-mile run is inexcusable. The information that he had was: a precise fix at sundown, a known course and speed, and sufficient knowledge of the current to dead-reckon within a mile or less.<<
And sufficient knowladge of what else? What possible course changes and speed changes that may never have made it into the record? What of his illness which may and very likely did handicap his judgement??? We assume an awful lot when we come to the idea that we know all the factors involved when all we have is what came from those who survived.
Which you prefaced by saying
The caveat came afterwords. Since how you say something is as important as what you say, you might take note that "Failed to exhibet" implies a certain level of error which in this case is very debatable. Since you have now postively ruled out sound signals as being inappropriate, that leaves only the matter of flames and Erik has already spelled out why this is a bad idea.Signals they failed to exhibit: (I would think this should be fairly obvious to anyone who can read):
1. Gun
2. Flames
4. Fog-signal
>>The best way to save the most was a judgment call ...<<
Which they made and which you've been second guessing from the very start.
>>and the officers of RMS Titanic had been making bad calls since sundown.<<
And I don't recall anyone disputing this. However, the issue here is not the bad calls they made since sundown, but the way they handled the evacuation of the ship.
>>A quiet word or two from Smith to his officers would have saved dozens, perhaps hundreds, more people. "Mr. Lightoller, you may board the gentlemen if there are no women or children about. Mr. Wilde, please see to impressing more passengers with the necessity of abandoning ship. A general announcement will not be advisable."<<
Which could have stampeded the cattle as likely as not. Erik has already commented on the inadvisability of countermanding orders once things are going on. Now to add to that, do you have any idea just how quickly word of something like this can spread throughout the ship??? Remember the situation: Sinking ship plus a Surplus of bodies along with a shortage of boats. Now throw into this mix a couple of people "passing it on" and then having it heard and misheard on down the line until a situation with a reasonable level of calm degenerates into a panic because of the way the story would "improve" in the telling. Grapevine communications are funny this way. That's not to say it would happen, but it could and they couldn't take that chance.
>>The decision to maintain speed informed by the knowledge of the prevailing conditions was reprehensible.<<
Also, unfortunately, the practice of the day and not just on the Titanic. It's amazing how often this factor keeps getting missed.
>>Smith's famous "if it becomes at all doubtful" reveals that he didn't already think it was doubtful - which Lightoller obviously did.<<
I wouldn't make that assumption. There was nothing unusual about the order that Smith gave. It's practically the standard instruction every ship's master gives in both the merchent service and the military even to this day. Yes, they knew of reported ice conditions ahead, discussed it and acted on it. (Otherwise, why instruct the lookouts to be alert for possible ice in the first place.) In hindsight, it obviously wasn't enough, but back then, doing business this way had served the ships on the North Atlantic run quite well for a very long time. Why change a system which...up to that time...had worked quite well?
>>Why the first officer didn't press the issue is known all too well to anyone familiar with the politics of a chain of command.<<
Since Murdock didn't survive, I'm afraid I don't know the reasons for this, and neither do you. I can only guess at them. Being rather inconveniently dead, he can't speak for himself as the others had the opportunity to do. What little we know of what he said or what concerns he may have expressed comes to us second hand from fallible memories. Your opinion on this might be bang on the money. It might also be so far off base that it's not even in the ballpark.
For all we know, he may not have been in the least bit concerned, or he was, but kept the difference of opinion private. I'm all to aware of the politics of the chain of command on a ship. Well enough in fact to know that some things...like differences of opinion...are not discussed in front of the troops.
>>As far as excusing Boxhall's incompetent navigation with "errors creep in," I would say that a discrepancy of 8-10 miles on a 95-mile run is inexcusable. The information that he had was: a precise fix at sundown, a known course and speed, and sufficient knowledge of the current to dead-reckon within a mile or less.<<
And sufficient knowladge of what else? What possible course changes and speed changes that may never have made it into the record? What of his illness which may and very likely did handicap his judgement??? We assume an awful lot when we come to the idea that we know all the factors involved when all we have is what came from those who survived.