Like the Titanic, Flawed Engineering—and Hubris—Doomed the Titan

Design Choices and Innovation Risks

• Unlike typical deep-sea submersibles, which are designed as spheres to withstand high underwater pressure, Titan featured a cylindrical hull of carbon fibre with titanium end caps. This shape was intended to maximize interior space and accommodate up to five passengers.
• The cylindrical shape allowed Titan to maintain buoyancy with minimal battery power use, but it also created uneven stress on the hull at extreme depths, particularly in the midsection, where the potential for material fatigue and delamination was higher.

Material and Structural Concerns

• Carbon fibre, though prized for its lightweight strength in aerospace applications, had not been extensively tested for repeated deep-sea compressive stress. OceanGate manufactured the 12.7 cm thick hull by wrapping carbon-fiber layers around a metal core, curing it at high temperatures. However, any production flaws—such as air gaps or weak bonding—could remain hidden, making the structure vulnerable under deep-sea pressure.
• Experts recommended using traditional materials like titanium or steel and a spherical design to avoid these risks. Additionally, scanning the hull with thermal imaging, X-rays, or ultrasound could have detected flaws. OceanGate, however, did not conduct these scans, which would have been required for third-party safety certification.

Warnings and Whistleblower Concerns

• Internally, OceanGate’s director of marine operations, David Lochridge, highlighted multiple safety concerns in a 2018 report. He identified visible deterioration in the carbon fibre, loose seals, unsecured components, and other issues. He recommended a complete overhaul of Titan’s hull.
• Lochridge’s warnings were dismissed, and he was subsequently fired, which he claimed was retaliation for raising safety concerns. He filed a whistleblower complaint with OSHA, alleging negligence, though he later withdrew it due to a lawsuit from OceanGate.

External Warnings and Regulatory Oversight

• Industry experts and organizations, including the Marine Technology Society, urged OceanGate to pursue third-party certification for Titan to ensure safety, but Rush resisted, arguing that regulatory processes would stifle innovation.
• The article discusses how regulatory oversight for submersibles is complex and inconsistent. Titan’s expeditions operated in a legal grey area because it was launched from Canadian waters, built in the U.S., and incorporated in the Bahamas, with no clear regulatory authority responsible for safety enforcement.

Real-Time Monitoring vs. Traditional Safety Measures

• OceanGate implemented a real-time hull monitoring system using acoustic sensors and strain gauges. This system aimed to detect any imminent failure by alerting the crew if the hull started to crack.
• Experts criticized this approach, arguing that once cracks begin in deep-sea conditions, failure is immediate and catastrophic, rendering real-time monitoring ineffective as a preventive measure.

Outcome and Implications

• The Titan’s implosion occurred near the Titanic wreck, highlighting a tragic parallel to the original Titanic disaster, where ambition and engineering oversight also played a role.
• The incident has sparked debate on the need for stricter regulations in deep-sea tourism and prompted OceanGate to cease operations. Investigations by U.S. and Canadian authorities are ongoing, and findings may lead to tighter safety standards for submersibles.

 Broader Lessons in Engineering Ethics

• The Titan disaster is being compared to other recent engineering failures, like the Boeing 737 Max crashes and the Surfside condominium collapse. Experts emphasize that safety and ethics should take precedence over business and innovation pressures, especially when human lives are at stake.