The Final Seconds before Collision

Traditional Account

• The British Enquiry concluded that there was a 37-second interval between the lookout’s warning and the collision.
• This interval is widely accepted and used in various accounts and films.

Charles Pellegrino’s Challenge

• Pellegrino argues that the interval was much shorter and that the ship turned to port due to the iceberg’s impact rather than the helm’s action.
• Walter Lord, who initially supported the 37-second interval, later questioned its accuracy.

Testimonies from the Inquiries

• Quartermaster Robert Hitchens: Indicated that the helm was put hard-a-starboard almost simultaneously with the impact.
• Lookout Frederick Fleet: Reported the iceberg and noted the ship began turning to port while he was still on the phone.
• Lookout Reginald Lee: Confirmed the ship started veering to port immediately after Fleet’s phone call.
• Fourth Officer Joseph Boxhall: Heard the lookout’s bells and the order to go hard-a-starboard almost simultaneously with the impact.
• Quartermaster Alfred Olliver: Was near the bridge and heard the three bells and the impact in quick succession.
• Trimmer Thomas Dillon: Noted the engine room telegraph rang just seconds before the collision.
• Leading Stoker Frederick Barrett: The order to stop the engines and the collision were nearly simultaneous.
• Fireman George Beauchamp: Recalled the stop order and the collision happening almost together.
• Greaser Frederick Scott: Indicated the stop order came after the collision.
• Able-bodied Seaman Joseph Scarrott: Provided a much longer interval, which is inconsistent with other testimonies.

Conclusions

The testimonies suggest a much shorter interval between the lookout’s warning and the collision than the 37 seconds proposed by the British Enquiry.

The ship’s turn to port may have been influenced by the iceberg’s impact and the rudder’s action.

The traditional 37-second interval is likely incorrect, and the actual events unfolded much more rapidly.