Navigational Confirmation of Titanic's CQD Position

Captain Lewis Marmaduke Collins

On September 1, 1985, an expedition led by Dr. Robert Ballard located the wreckage of the Titanic on the ocean floor in position 41° 43.9’ N., 49° 56.8’ W., some thirteen miles east of where she had reportedly foundered.

Shortly after the impact with the ice, on April 14, 1912, it was the Titanic’s Fourth Officer Boxhall who had calculated her CQD position to be 41° 46’ N., 50° 14’ W. Considering that the wreck was not found at this location, armchair navigators have concluded that Boxhall’s position was wrong

However, navigational calculations, based on the evidence, confirm that Boxhall’s CQD position, of 41°46'N, 50°14'W, was correct.

By examining the evidence of the Titanic's navigating officers on April 14, 1912, we can determine the noon 14th position.

Mr. LOWE. [Senate Inq.Day 5]. We are there to do the navigating part so the senior officer can be and will be in full charge of the bridge and have nothing to worry his head about. We have all that, the junior officers; there are four of us. The three seniors are in absolute charge of the boat. They have nothing to worry themselves about. They simply have to walk backward and forward and look after the ship, and we do all the figuring and all that sort of thing in our chart room.

Junior (Navigating) Officers on watch Sunday, April 14, 1912:

8:00 a.m. - 12 Noon 4th Officer Boxhall, 6th Officer Moody (6th /O Moody, lost with the ship)

12 Noon - 4:00 p.m. 3rd Officer Pitman, 5th Officer Lowe

4:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. 4th /O Boxhall. 6th /O Moody

6:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. 3rd /O Pitman, 5th /O Lowe

8:00 p.m. - 12 Midnight 4th /O Boxhall, 6th /O Moody

Senator SMITH. [Senate Inq.Day 5] Did you have any part in determining the course and position of the Titanic on Sunday afternoon and evening?

Mr. LOWE. I worked the course from noon until what we call the "corner"; that is, 42 north, 47 west. I really forget the course now. It is 60 33 1/2' west -that is as near as I can remember - and 162 miles to the corner.

This evidence of Fifth Officer Lowe was given on April 24, ten days after the accident. Without the benefit of charts, log books, or sight books, all of which were lost with the ship, he was questioned on the navigation of the ship.

Third Officer Pitman, as noted above, was on watch with Mr. Lowe. He stated [British Inquiry Day 13]:

A. I thought that the course should have been altered at 5:00 p.m.

Q. Why did you think so?

A. Judging from the distance run from noon.

Accepting “60° 33 1/2' west" as S 60° 33 ½' W true and rejecting "and 162 miles to the corner,” which is obviously the distance run from noon to evening civil twilight for stellar observation, and accepting 3^rd Officer Pitman's evidence ("I thought that the course should have been altered at 5:00

p.m. .... Judging from the distance run from noon"), we can calculate as follows:

Working back from the expected alter course position at the “corner” 42° N and 47° W applying 5 hrs x 22.1* knots = 110.5 miles, makes noon 14th position 42° 54.3'N, 44° 50'W.

The course being steered was S 85° W [S 62° W true]. Corroborating this, is the evidence of Quartermaster Rowe. Q QM Rowe: 17587. What course was she steering? A S. 85 deg. W. Q 17588. By the compass in front of you, I suppose?

A. By the steering compass.

At 5.45 or 5.50 p.m., the course was altered to N 71° W compass.

QM Rowe

Q. 17583. During that watch, did you alter the course at any time?

A. Yes.

Q. 17584. Do you remember when it was?

A. Yes, at 5.45.

Q. 17590. At 5.45 to what did you alter it?

A. N. 71 W.

Q. 17586. Now, before you altered course, do you remember what course your vessel was steering?

A. Yes.

Q. 17587. What course was she steering?

A. S. 85 deg. W.

At British Enquiry (15315), Fourth Officer Boxhall, in answer to the question, "Between 4 and 6, while you were on watch, do you remember the course being altered?" answered "The course was altered at 5.50."

Q. 15316. Do you remember what it was altered to?

A. I do not remember the compass course, but I remember the true course was S. 86 W.

There is a plausible reason for the five-minute discrepancy (5.45 as opposed to

5.50 p.m.) in the time the course was altered. The course change was made from the standard compass by one of the on-watch junior officers--positioned between numbered 2 and 3 funnels; Quartermaster Rowe, at the helm, was responsible for bringing the ship to the required course by order of the junior officer. QM Rowe would have noted the time as 5.45 p.m. when he commenced the alteration, whereas junior officer Boxhall would have entered into the log book record 5.50 p.m. as the time when the steering compass had settled on the new course.

As Charles H. Lightoller stated on Day 5 to the U.S. Senate Inquiry:

A. We have a standard compass and a steering compass. The standard compass is the compass we go by. That is the course that is handed over from one senior officer to another, the standard course. The junior officer goes to the standard compass which is connected with the wheelhouse by a bell, or by a bell push, wire and bell, and when she is on her course he rings that bell continually, showing the ship is on her course with the standard compass.

The other officer takes her head inside the wheelhouse from the compass the quartermaster is steering by. The standard course is on a board and the steering compass course is also on a board. Therefore, the quartermaster uses the board that is there for the steering compass. The senior officer of the watch looks to the standard compass board and passes that course along.

In the 6-8 p.m. last dog watch, it was the duty of the junior watch officer to prepare the information for evening stellar observation, i.e., time of civil twilight, stars available with approximate azimuths and altitudes. Junior watch officer Lowe determined evening civil twilight to be 22.21 GMT - Noon transit (Sun) 15:00 GMT = 7h 21m x 22 kts**= 162 miles. This is most likely what Lowe meant, when he answered from memory, that the distance was 162 miles--the distance run from noon to civil twilight for stellar observation.

Mr. LOWE. I worked the course from noon until what we call the "corner"; that is, 42 north, 47 west. I really forget the course now. It is 60° 33 1/2' west -that is as near as I can remember - and 162 miles to the corner.

From noon position 14th, 42° 54.3'N, 44° 50'W. Course S 62° W (242°T) to 5.45 p.m.=5h 45m @ 22 kts =126.5 miles gives a/c position 41° 54.9'N, 47° 20.8'W.

5.45 p.m. a/c to S 86° W (266°T) to stellar observation = 1h 36m =@22 kts =35.2 miles gives Position 41° 52.4'N, 48° 07.8'W. Distance run from noon 126.5+35.2 =161.7 (162) miles.

Course 266° T from stellar observation to 11.40 p.m. = 4h 19m @22 kts=95 miles gives CQD position 41° 45.8'N, 50° 14.5'W (41° 46'N, 50° 14' W)

Course 266° T from 5.45p.m. to 11.40 p.m.=5h 55m x 22 kts=130 miles gives CQD position 41° 45.8'N, 50° 14.3'W (41° 46'N, 50° 14' W)

Therefore, Titanic’s CQD position was correct. The wreck site, located by Dr. Robert Ballard, is 099° True, distance 13 nautical miles, from her CQD position.

* Memorandum of Mr. Pitman ** 162 miles/7h21m=22.04 kts.

Dated: 1^st October 2002 Date of Publication 7^th November 2002

Comment and discuss

David G. Brown

Captain Collins has brought us another insight into one of the mystifying aspects of the sinking--Boxhall's "final position." Even in 1912 there were questions over its accuracy. The discovery of the wreck has led to general awareness that Boxhall's CQD position was @ 13 miles west and north of where the ship probably foundered. If Captain Collins is right in his assessment of Boxhall's navigation, then an analysis of the difference between the final CQD position and the debris field yields some interesting possibilities. What Captain Collins has done is reconstruct the dead reckoning plot of Titanic during the last few hours of the voyage. He found that Boxhall's final CQD position fits the known data. The one person who absolutely would not be surprised by Collins' conclusion is Joseph G. Boxhall. Using the standard practices of dead reckoning, the ship's final CQD position is "correct." Captain Collins has shown that Boxhall was justifiably proud of his work. Why the difference between the wreckage and Boxhall's location? Things Titanic are seldom cut-and-dried. There is an alternative solution to why Boxhall's final position was "off." I suggest checking Dave Gittens' web site where he discusses a possible mistake in using the traverse tables. Dave may want to provide more details, but for the moment I want to continue as if Captain Collins is correct. Early last spring I did most of the same work as Captain Collins by plotting the known information. Until
Erik Wood

If someone where to ask me (which nobody has) I would say that Dave just opened a HUGE can of worms.
Michael H. Standart

A can? More like a 55 gallon drum of snakes. The notion that Titanic was dodging bergs befor the accident is something that George Behe brought up in "Speed, Safety and Sacrifice." Considering how this would tend to skew any calculations if the manuevers were not recorded, it's a wonder that Boxhall came as close to the ship's actual position as he did.
Erik Wood

A much more lethal question is why didn't Hitchens or Boxhall say anything about the manuvers if they took place? The Titanic community (excluding myself) is notoriously known for sticking to the testimony and it mentions no dodging anywhere. To say that I agree with Captain Collins or Brown would be lie, to say that I disagree would also be a lie. I am somewhere in the middle. I have always believed (or hoped) that Captain Smith as being proactive about the ice. If this current theory could somehow be proved it would make me happy. It also makes it a little easier to understand why the ship found it self face to face with an overgrown ice cube. Loss of situational awareness is a deadly game.
Michael H. Standart

From what we discussed in Topeka and here, it would seem that a loss of situational awareness was the quintessential killer in this whole mess. It's amazing the way things came together in such a way that the only set of eyes looking forward on the Bridge at the critical moment belonged to Will Murdoch.
Michael F. Koch

Wouldn't the passengers and crew have notice if the ship was continually swerving to avoid icebergs? I do believe the crew saw some before 1130, but just don't think she was dodging them right and left. I prefer Gittins theory and definitely don't buy that Boxhall's position was accurate and an earthquake somehow moved the wreak a whopping 13 miles to the east. If Titanic's position was accurate, why did all the other ships around state she was much further east and somewhat further south? The only reason Carpathia saw the lifeboats was they were lucky and happened to be along the course Carpathia was taking. Cheers! Michael Koch
Michael F. Koch

Someone here also brought up the idea regarding situational awareness on the difficulties with lookouts eyes watering up with the cold and ship relative wind. Although, Fleet spotted the dark mass many minutes ahead of the collision, the watering eyes could certainly have hindered how early he what the mass was. It's funny that this thought has never been brought up to my knowledge in any Titanic books. Cheers! Michael Koch
Michael H. Standart

I don't buy into the earthquake either. An event drastic enough to move a wreck and the surrounding seabed 13 miles would have sent massive tsunamis roaring into harbours on both sides of the Atlantic. I think it might be better to say that Boxhall's position would have been correct if the sum total of all the information he had was correct. GIGO factor in other words. As to whether the passengers and crew wuould have noticed the manuevering, going on near midnight, I can't take this as a given. It would depend on how radical and frequent the course changes were. From my own experience, I would say it's very likely that the crew would not have even bothered to notice anything, especially if it was in some ways trivial. You know you're going from point A to point B, and if the ship does a little puttering around for some reason, the attitude would have been BFD followed by a shrug. As to the passengers, most by this time would have been snug in their beds, either counting sheep or perhaps making a "memory" with a spouse or lover. They wouldn't notice because they wouldn't care.
Michael H. Standart

Mike, I don't think the effect of the wind and the wind chill on the lookouts would have occured to a lot of people who have written on the subject because a lot of them have never been to sea. The book knowladge these researchers have is impressive and commendable, but real world practical experience is sadly lacking.
Michael F. Koch

Michael, is BFD some kind of nautical term I'm unaware of?? =-) I see your point on the crew not knowing, but the way Beesley and some other passengers described the collision, it leads me to believe any perturbation in the motion of the ship would have been noticed. However, I'm not sure what the difference would have been for a passenger noticing a hard-over maneuver compared to a grounding. Memory? Oh, you mean like looking at old pictures and reminiscing? Oh wait, you said making a memory! How bout, making a provocative painting of the sexy looking engaged girl you just met? =-) Cheers! Michael Koch
Michael F. Koch

Michael, even if most of the Titanic authors were not at sea much or at all, it still seems this one would have come up at least once before. I mean, we all have run during the Winter before and noticed our eyes tearing up! Strange. Cheers, Michael Koch
Erik Wood

A couple of other (hole digging) notes: What Captain Collins has done is plot the course and wreck, one of which is based soley on hearsay, and the other based soley on fact. We do not know with FACT that the ship was steering a certain course or not. None of us where there, we have to go off what the surviving officers and crew say. We do know where the wreck is today. Another piece of the mystery pie is the lookouts who where above and forward of the bridge, they do not mention the ship moving off course or dodging bergs or other objects. Some might say that because they didn't signal anything means there was nothing to dodge, that isn't neccessarily the case. If you read the testimony of Captain Lord and Captain Rostron you will notice that the bridge frequently spotted ice before the crew posted forward and above. That is sometimes also the case in a heavy fog. A second and more lethal question would be: Why would Murdoch allow Quartermaster Olliver and Fourth Officer Boxhall off the bridge if the ship was dodging icebergs anytime prior? This is keeping in mind that both Murdoch and Boxhall where going off watch in about 20 minutes. This is not SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) and is an extremely bone headed decision. Not only for Murdoch but for Boxhall as well. A licensed officer on watch leaving the bridge for any reason (unless some medical emergency or unless dispatched by the senior OOD) only 20 minutes before being relieved and just after
Michael F. Koch

Eric, what about the claims made by several passengers that overheard Fleet complaining that their repeated warning bells went unheeded for as much as 20 minutes prior to the collision? I'm not sure if these warnings were for the same black mass that turned out to be "the" ice berg or for other bergs, but there does appear to be evidence that the lookouts were spotting objects all along unless these were stories by Fleet. Cheers, Michael Koch
John M. Feeney

What Captain Collins has done is reconstruct the dead reckoning plot of Titanic during the last few hours of the voyage. He found that Boxhall's final CQD position fits the known data. David: While I think your evolving premises regarding possible evasive maneuers on the part of the Titanic have tantalizing potential, one thing I'd be very wary of, regarding Captain Collins' alleged "proofs" of Boxhall's navigational correctness, *is* their reliance on the supposed perfect fit of his plots to the "known" data. In private discussions with Collins, I've argued that his course projections represent but one possibility in a small universe of same, rather than any conclusive proof. The fact that they agree well numerically (up to a point) with Sir Robert Finlay's reckoning during the British Inquiry (which is quite possibly *solely* responsible for the publication of several of those erstwhile "hard facts" in the Report), simply alludes to the same logic being employed by *both* men to backtrack from the CQD position. The problem with this approach is that both Finlay and Collins seem to have relied heavily on Boxhall's estimated speed and on Finlay's deduced "S62W true" as the last Great Circle leg prior to Titanic's change to the final rhumb line course of S86W true. While "S62W" is certainly not far from the mark as a *first* approximation -- it's in fact an unadjusted (for potential change in deviation) simple conversion from the "by compass" course given by Rowe,
David G. Brown

Everyone--there is a great deal of difference between stating something as fact and testing what may be a useful hypothesis. Also, the truth of any hypothesis lies in whether or not it predicts future events. So, I was testing what Captain Collins wrote for that purpose. What I find is that the logical conclusion of his paper is that Captain Smith was maneuvering in some manner to avoid icebergs. Otherwise, Boxhall's "final position" would have been much close to the debris field. My statement about Boxhall taking rockets into his lifeboat and using them to attract Carpathia is a logical prediction from Captain Collins' paper. Certainly, a navigator who recognized the unavoidable errors in his calculations would realize the necessity of some sort of long-distance (for 1912) signals. By "maneuver," I mean any and all possible methods of conducting the ship. We have evidence of people saying the engines gave off unusual vibration that night about 50 minutes or so before the impact. This could have resulted from slowing down...something that is virtually never considered in discussions of Titanic's accident. Changing course might have been nothing more than a series of two-point turns to the south followed by an equally soft turn back on course. Passenger vessel captains & senior officers know how to avoid jostling the passengers, so it might not have been noticed on a dark and cold night. We are really talking about VMG toward New York. If the ship made an easy

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Navigational Confirmation of Titanic's CQD Position

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