do we know why smith gave ice warning to ismay?

[Mike Spooner]

Was there a time limit in the rules of posting messages to the chartroom?

 

[Richard C Elliott]

Was there a time limit in the rules of posting messages to the chartroom?

Probably not. We certainly don't know of one.

In fact we don't really know exactly what the rules were, who made them, what legal status they had, who enforced them or what the penalties were. In many of our discussions we only really know what the standard practices of the time were, but we have come to regard them as "rules". We need to bear that in mind when attributing responsibility to those who may have "broken" them.

 

[Scott Mills]

Is there any particular reason to disbelieve Bride about that?

There is always reason to question testimony, including Bride's. You have your obvious reasons, like a story was being told with details changed for a specific reason, whether that is to mitigate one's responsibility in a disaster that cost 1,500 lives, to make yourself out in the best light possible, or because someone you work for told you to for their own reasons; however, the most likely reason is the reason often least understood by people--how human memory works, the inaccuracy of memory, the social character of that memory, and the very real and very common phenomena of false memory.

It is even more the case, I think at least, that you cannot just accept these narratives at face value since the people who espoused those narratives are no longer here to answer further clarification questions. For example, "so if you were both working on it, does that mean there was a time that nobody was listening to wireless traffic?"

Was this a requirement at the time? I haven't come across it. In any case it could only have applied to the equipment at the start of the voyage. If it broke down that would be just tough. The operators were not required to repair it, and my understanding is that Phillips and Bride were actually breaking their own company's rules by attempting to repair the high voltage circuitry. They were supposed to leave that to qualified electrical engineers on shore.

You are correct on both accounts! Of course, it should not come as a surprise that both operators were attempting to restore their ability to transmit because there was no requirement at the time that there be 24 hour operator coverage on wireless sets. That requirement did not come into being until after the foundering of Titanic, and was a direct result of Californian not receiving Titanic's wireless distress because Californian's wireless operator was off shift.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

There is always reason to question testimony, including Bride's.

Very true, and perhaps I should have made my point clearer. There are various other points in Bride's testimony that I think are open to question but I was referring here specifically to the question of the transmitter fault. I can think of no reason why he should invent that, particulary since it involves an admission of breaking his employer's rules, so in the absence of any contradictory evidence I am willing to accept it.

 

[Scott Mills]

Very true, and perhaps I should have made my point clearer. There are various other points in Bride's testimony that I think are open to question but I was referring here specifically to the question of the transmitter fault. I can think of no reason why he should invent that, particulary since it involves an admission of breaking his employer's rules, so in the absence of any contradictory evidence I am willing to accept it.

I can spin up reasons to doubt this occurred I am sure, but I am with you here. I think it is exceedingly probable that this event did, in fact, occur; however, this is part of the conundrum we face trying to investigate and understand the events that led up to an accident on the sea that occurred 112 years ago.

Had someone thought more about getting verification of all the testimony it was possible to verify at the time of the official inquiries (something a modern accident investigator would certainly do), a simple query of the process verbal of Cape Race and any ships or wireless stations within broadcast range of Titanic at the time could have very easily established that no transmission was received from Titanic at the time her surviving wireless operator was asserting that Titanic had no ability to transmit.

Absolute verification of events and timelines (where possible) in modern accident investigation is--rightly--considered extremely important for a multitude of reasons.

Unfortunately, there was no NTSB or Marine Accident Investigation Brach to look into the Titanic's sinking in 1912.

 

[Mike Spooner]

The ice message given to B Ismay was clearly captain Smith decision,
and one only can think was no more than a courtesy information for his company boss.
But more intriguing why did he ask for back after about 5 hours later.

 

[marina_irc]

@Mike Spooner Smith made his instructions clear to Lightoller and we can interpret his actions through that.

Mr. LIGHTOLLER.
Capt. Smith made a remark that if it was in a slight degree hazy there would be no doubt we should have to go very slowly.

Quite simply, Captain Smith was "priming the pump" with Ismay to avoid any issues (for Ismay or himself) if visibility declined and they had to slow down. That's why he gave the ice message to Ismay. It doesn't mention haze, and it doesn't need to. It just lets Ismay know the ice is there. If they need to slow down because haze also comes up, then the message provides the context Ismay needs to understand why that decision was made.

 

[marina_irc]

The modern equivalent would be:

Ismay morning of 15 April to [email protected]: "Why did we slow down last night? Passengers very upset, bad press in New York City."

[email protected]: "As per my last email our company steamer "Baltic" reported ice ahead, I fully intended not to slow down, but haze came up so safe operations required us to reduce speed until morning. My apologies."

That's what it was. The 1912 corporate equivalent of sending out that email that lets you later say "as per my last email" if something does in fact go wrong.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

At some point Smith was going to have to ask for its return so he could belatedly comply with the rules.

Well, he did but that 'point' was several hours later, probably in the First Class Smoking Room. I think Major Peuchen saw Captain Smith emerging from there after a conversation with Ismay, who later testified that he returned the slip to Smith.

Since Captain Smith himself knew about the Baltic MSG message but took no additional precautionary measures, it seems clear that he did not consider it significant enough. But by not even posting it in the chart room, Smith removed the possibility that one of the senior officers, having seen the message, made a respectful suggestion to the skipper.

Lord Mersey in the official report:

"Nevertheless, I think it was irregular for the Master to part with the document, and improper for Mr. Ismay to retain it, but the incident had, in my opinion, no connection with or influence upon the manner in which the vessel was navigated by the Master."

It is an interesting comment by Mersey. On one hand, he admits that it was "irregular" of Captain Smith to have handed the message to Ismay but at the same time comments that the action had "no influence on the way in which the ship was navigated by the Captain".

IMO, that remark was an intended or unintended antithesis by Lord Mersey. After all, it was Captain Smith who made decisions regarding navigation of the Titanic under all conditions but he made none specifically in response to the MSG ice messge fom the Baltic. From that perspective therefore, Mersey was stating the obvious but in a way that he appeared to be neither approving nor disapproving of the Captain's error. Some people might argue that Mersey was stating a veiled opinion that Smith could have given orders that were more precautionary.

I agree with Paul Lee's view that having belatedly got back the message from Ismay, Smith did not post it but took it to the Widener's dinner party with him. The follwoing is an excerpt from Paul Lee's article "Failure To Act"

Ismay had handed the "Baltic's" Marconigram back to Captain Smith at about 7.10pm. Allowing for the time taken to walk to the bridge, and given a few minutes either way, there is a possibility that the message was indeed handed to the Captain that night. With this proposed solution comes further problems, for the "Baltic" message was never seen by anyone on the bridge and its position was never marked off in the chart room. And, as previously remarked, there are serious timing issues with the hypothesis that Smith was heading straight to the bridge and chart room after seeing Ismay. If the timing is right, Smith instead headed straight for his dinner date.

 

[Richard C Elliott]

Some people might argue that Mersey was stating a veiled opinion that Smith could have given orders that were more precautionary.

I suspect he may well have been doing that. Everyone, with the benefit of hindsight, thought that the speed should have been reduced. Everyone thought that surely the captain or one of the officers would have done that if only enough attention was given to the ice messages.

I disagree. The captain and officers had taken what they considered to be the appropriate actions. They were already expecting to encounter ice at some point and one more warning was not going to make any difference. A hundred more warnings wouldn't have made a difference. Nobody was going to reduce speed. It simply wasn't part of their mindset on safety precautions at that time.

 

[marina_irc]

I suspect he may well have been doing that. Everyone, with the benefit of hindsight, thought that the speed should have been reduced. Everyone thought that surely the captain or one of the officers would have done that if only enough attention was given to the ice messages.

I disagree. The captain and officers had taken what the considered to be the appropriate actions. They were already expecting to encounter ice at some point and one more warning was not going to make any difference. A hundred more warnings wouldn't have made a difference. Nobody was going to reduce speed. It simply wasn't part of their mindset on safety precations at that time.

Agreed. Mind you, failing to leave a copy of the message on the bridge appropriately posted, at least, was laxness with proper procedure, and is not a good look. But Captain Smith did it for banal corporate reasons related to managing senior leadership and passenger expectations and from his point of view was being as diligent and prepared about ice as he needed to be, that is to say, he had all his bases covered in case he needed to slow down because it got hazy. There was no other reason to be concerned.

Until, as we all know, there was.

 

[Julian Atkins]

@marina_irc I always read your posts with great interest.

And thank you for your further comments.

I just don’t see the clear link between the Baltic MSG of an ice report and haze. I just don’t see why Captain Smith didn’t post the Marconigram form for this MSG up in the chart room and plot the ice report on the chart.

If Captain Smith wanted to cover his back so to speak with any delay in Titanic getting to New York, he had multiple avenues to explore and discuss with Ismay. The haze issue (No Officer saw a haze anyway that we know of) turned out to be an irrelevant issue.

So what was the point of Captain Smith handing this Baltic MSG to Ismay? Give it instead to Andrews? Or Astor? Get it printed off and posted in all departments of the ship and sent out as flyers to all passengers?

By implication, and some 6 hours later Sutherland the Marconi operator on the Parisian had already been sending out warnings of the ice bergs seen and had been tracking Titanic and The Californian. The Parisian sends a MSG to The Californian of the ice bergs seen. The Californian sends a MSG to the Antillian of the same ice bergs. Sam, in his reconstruction of the Parisian’s course indicates that the Parisian got pretty close to the ice field and very close to a berg close to the wreck position of Titanic as per a hydrographic report.

The Mesaba Marconi operator Stanley Adams had also been sending out ice warning reports to a whole host of ships that afternoon and then infamous “ice report” to Titanic shortly before 10pm (Titanic time).

An hour later The Californian sends to Phillips on Titanic “We are stopped surrounded by ice”.

Captain Lord and Groves and Stone and Gibson never saw any haze.

Titanic ought to have seen the same ice bergs as per the MSGs as the Parisian and The Californian, although darker then and looking towards a darker northward direction. Titanic’s Marconi operators ought to have received the Parisian MSG to The Californian, and Bride did accept that he overheard the MSG from The Californian to the Antillian.

By the time of the above, the Baltic MSG was still in Ismay’s pocket where it had been for over 6 hours!

If Captain Smith was genuinely concerned about haze (or more importantly updates from other ships as to ice field and bergs and weather conditions) he singularly failed to ensure that the Marconi operators sent reports to the bridge at all.

Paul Lee is quoted by Arun, and I very much agree with Paul’s analysis, and Arun’s comments.

If we believe Lightoller’s account on oath as to his 9pm chat with Captain Smith about haze, and you piece together the mass of evidence known by Bride and Phillips in the Marconi room whether written down on a Marconigram or ‘chat’ between operators on other ships as to bergs and ice fields seen, then I am of the view that there was a spectacular communication breakdown.

Taken to some sort of logical conclusion, may I suggest (perhaps naïvely) that Titanic, had it missed the berg that proved fatal, would have then ploughed into at speed a huge ice field.

This is one of the issues I have with all the Captains (including Captain Ranson of the Baltic) that they would go full steam ahead when ice bergs might be about. In the circumstances of April 1912, there was this huge ice field as well. This dangerous hazard was glossed over (some described the lower section of the south east section as 16 feet high above the water level and like a wall).

 

[marina_irc]

@Julian Atkins Haze is very common in some conditions at sea. One of those conditions is a boundary between warmer air and cold ocean waters--advection fog. This could easily occur at that time of year near sea ice in that location.

Encountering ice was a certainty. Smith made Ismay aware of it.

Encountering haze around an ice floe is a known contingent risk. Not certain to happen, maybe even not likely, but probable enough to discuss and plan for. Smith and his officers had a strategy to deal with it--reduce speed.

Smith knew he might be late into New York.

The Baltic message primes his excuse to Mr. Ismay on the contingency of the haze coming on.

In my professional career I have done something similar: "Sir, the automatic controls for the facility are down, so we'll be making manual adjustments by the techs spinning valves."

What I don't say is: "As a result, an abrupt outdoor air temperature excursion could cause a significant temperature swing in the facility before the next duty shift arrives to make adjustments".

No need to make it look like we can't accomplish the work. Nothing will change that anyway. It will work or it won't.

But I can refer back to the first conversation in the event I am called to carpet for the contingent possibility coming to pass. It will make it go much smoother for me because leadership is now already aware an atypical situation exists.

Does that help explain my thinking?

 

[Julian Atkins]

@marina_irc

Thank you, but I’m not convinced.

I can recall many occasions during my career as a Solicitor when I refused to do things I was asked/tasked with doing because those things contravened the Solicitors conduct and ethic rules and regulations and my duties to the Court.

I am not an expert in Maritime Law, but a Captain of a ship flying a British flag is totally in charge when at sea. I think Captain Rostron gave testimony on this. Others may be able to provide the relevant quotes.

Again, I go back to process and proprietary, and Captain Smith could have showed a “1 finger” to Ismay and treated him in the same way Lowe did at the lifeboats.

The fact remains that whilst the Baltic MSG may have not been of crucial importance, other stuff was piling up in the Marconi Room while Ismay chatted to Mrs Thayer and Ryerson disclosing confidential information. Captain Smith goes to the Widener’s diner that evening not even have popped into the Marconi room to ask for any updates (there were many by then, and of vital significance).

If Sutherland on the Parisian is correct, and no doubt Evans on The Californian, and also Adams on the Mesaba (who gave evidence on oath and we have extensively examined his testimony and documents) Captain Smith ought to have had a much fuller picture of what lay ahead.

If Captain Smith had prioritised things.

The obvious fact is that the Baltic, with Captain Ranson in charge was also involved in the Republic disaster with Binns on board as the Marconi operator. And the Captain Smith being a previous Captain of the Baltic.

I don’t know why Captain Smith gave the Baltic MSG to Ismay. What I don’t understand is why he didn’t post it up immediately in the chart room etc.

 

[Arun Vajpey]

The captain and officers had taken what they considered to be the appropriate actions. They were already expecting to encounter ice at some point and one more warning was not going to make any difference.

You are probably right and the fact that we are viewing at the scenario not only with hindsight but over 100 years later with contemporary onus on health & safety measures might be what makes some of us opine on this matter.

I have deliberately highighted the words showing what many (but not all) Captains and Officers of the era considered as "appropriate" because it does not mean that it was actually the best procedure. I am beginning to understand why Dan Parkes and some others appear to "defend" Captain Smith about his actions (or lack of them) regarding the ship's speed, course, lookouts etc.

Nobody was going to reduce speed. It simply wasn't part of their mindset on safety precautions at that time.

Again, I have highlighted keywords just to show where some of us are coming from with our opinions. Just because Smith and several other Captains believed that they were doing the right thing by following what had become the SOP at the time (in fact, it was people like them that made the practice into an SOP), did not mean that it was the right thing. The Titanic colliding with the icebergand sinking with huge loss of life and the subsequent tightening of regulations proved it.

I think at least part of the problem in 1912 was that SOPs at sea were made by older sailors and technicians who had been brought up to a large extent on smaller and slower ships. Most senior captains like Smith belonged to the same generation and so with a few exceptions like Captain Moore, saw no issue with following the set SOP. I believe there is a quote somewhere from Captain Smith about how he believed that modern shipbuilding had "gone beyond" accidents that could cause a liner to founder. To some extent, younger officers serving under senior captains accepted that point of view and therefore the SOP that went with it, but I suspect that some of the more intelligent ones like Murdoch did have their doubts. In the 15 years or so leading up to the Titanic disaster, ships had become larger, faster and technically more complicated, necessitating matching changes in procedures which were slow in forthcoming. But the deaths of 1496 people was a rude wake-up call.

A kind of analogy here would be the fact that many pilots of the past started their careers on piston-engined planes like the Douglas DC3 Dakota but 25 years or so later were flying Boeing 707s. They had to adjust and did.

Getting back to that opinion by Lord Mersey that you quoted - the one about the handling of the Baltic ice message, the more I think about it more I believe that it was a double-edged comment. Lord Mersey might have been the official Wreck Commissioner at the British Inquiry but it was 1912 and a man in his position would certainly have been some part of the "Old Boy Network" of the era. Therefore, he too would have been expected to measure his words carefully and that quoted opinion shows that he did exactly that. Notice that Mersey merely says that even if Smith had not given the Baltic message to Mersey but posted it in the chartroom instead, it might not have made any difference to the navigational plans though the ice field - which is what you, Richard, are pointing out. I now agree that you might be right but I think it is significant that Mersey is not directly suggesting that it would not have made any difference had Smith and his officers taken the Baltic and other ice messages seriously and taken additional precautions; I believe it was Mersey's way of implying that it could have made a difference had they done so.